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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is two-fold:
(1) To present a preliminary assessment of the possible role of
nuclear power plant design innovations in enhancing the
attractiveness of the nuclear energy option to U.S. electric
utilities; and
(2) To suggest some promising avenues for further technological
development, and to define a role for MIT in the context of
these proposed efforts.
The main findings are as follows:
A. The Need for Nuclear Power and the Role of Nuclear Power Plant Design
Innovations
(1) It is highly unlikely that any orders for new nuclear plants
will be placed by U.S. utilities before the end of the decade.
Several factors are responsible, including a general lack of need
for additional power and the plethora of uncertainties surrounding
the performance of the current generation of nuclear plants.
Nevertheless, there is a broad range of plausible circumstances --
even including those in which electricity demand grows a good deal
more slowly than the latest mid-range forecasts of the government
and the electric power industry -- under which nuclear energy
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could once again be called on to supply an important fraction of
the nation's new and replacement electricity supplies by the turn
of the century.
(2) It is possible to conceive of circumstances in which new nuclear
plants would assume a dominant role; this could occur, for example,
if concerns about the environmental impacts of coal combustion were
to escalate much above the present level. It is also possible that
a future nuclear contribution could be ruled out entirely, for
example if electricity demand were to grow at a rate of 1% per year
or less, or if one of the nation's 120 or so nuclear plants now in
operation or under construction were to undergo a major accident.
(3) On balance, we believe that the likelihood of an important na-
tional role for new nuclear power plants towards the end of the
1990s and for some time thereafter is sufficiently high that the
electric power industry, the nuclear supply industry, and the
government should explore carefully the conditions that would
foster a resumption of nuclear ordering beginning in the early
1990s, and that industry and government, both separately and in
partnership, should take steps to ensure that these conditions will
be met at the appropriate time.
(4) Several of the more important reasons why utilities are not
presently ordering nuclear power plants are beyond the ability of
the nuclear industry and the nuclear-related government agencies
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directly to control. This is clearly true of the sharp drop in the
rate of electricity demand growth, and of the present high cost of
capital. Other problems are less obviously out of reach, but still
revolve around issues -- political, constitutional, social -- which
transcend the particular technological characteristics of nuclear
power plants: for example, the impact of the separate and over-
lapping jurisdictions of the states and the federal government on
the climate of economic and environmental regulation; the rights of
individuals and interest groups to intervene in regulatory proceed-
ings, and the effect on the predictability of the regulatory pro-
cess, and the delay and uncertainty introduced by litigation and
judicial review.
(5) On the other hand, some of the most important reasons for
electric utilities not to build new nuclear plants are more
directly susceptible to the corrective efforts of industry and
government. Many of the worst problems to befall the nuclear
industry have occurred as a result of its own management failures;
the best-known examples include mistakes in the execution of
designs, mismanagement of construction projects, and poor operating
practices. Upgrading the quality of the management of nuclear
plant technology is of vital importance to the future of the
nuclear option.
(6) The importance of the nuclear industry's efforts to improve its
management performance cannot be overstated, and such efforts
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demand the highest priority. Nevertheless, doing better with
the technology that is already available is not the only
possible goal in this regard. Management effectiveness is
strongly coupled to the nature of the technology itself. A
fundamental cause of problems in nuclear construction and
operation, for example, is the extraordinary complexity of
contemporary light water reactor plant designs. Potentially
large opportunities exist for nuclear power plant design
innovations which would reduce the demands placed on their
builders and operators, or which would enhance the
attractiveness of nuclear power to utilities in other ways.
Relatively little attention is being paid to these
opportunities at present.
(7) We do not speculate on whether the realization of such
innovations is a necessary condition for the revitalization of
the nuclear option. However, we believe that technological
changes are in prospect which could substantially improve the
prospects for a resumption of nuclear ordering in the 1990s,
which are within reach within the time available, but which
are unlikely to be realized given the current direction of
industry and government policies.
(8) The traditional view of nuclear power plant innovation,
formulated during a period of rapid expansion of the nuclear
industry, has been that competition among alternative reactor
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types in the long run will be decided primarily by the criterion of
uranium utilization efficiency, and that the key economic variable
in this competition is the price of natural uranium. The primary
objective of innovation efforts, according to this view, is to
ensure that nuclear plant systems with suitably conservative
uranium consumption characteristics are available as required by
depletion-driven uranium price increases. However, for the
foreseeable future, the market position of nuclear plants in the
U.S. relative to each other and to alternative sources of electric
power will be primarily determined by other factors. Among the
most important of these are the plant capital cost, the
construction lead-time, the operating reliability, and the
perceived and actual risks to public safety and to utility
investors associated with the plants. The changed economic and
political outlook for nuclear power in the United States demands a
fundamental reexamination of the premises and goals of the nation's
nuclear power plant innovation efforts.
B. The Options
Two technological paths are available for the pursuit of these
revised goals: one is based on evolutionary improvements to
existing light water reactor designs, and the other involves radically
different design concepts. Because of the large amount of experience
accumulated with light water reactors and the very large investment
already made in this technology, the electric power industry will be
1-6
naturally inclined towards the former route. These are not in
themselves sufficient grounds to rule out the latter, however.
(1) The present generation of LWRs has been aptly described as the
product of a 'band-aid' approach to design, especially with regard
to safety, with safety-related systems added over time to meet
safety requirements imposed after completion of the initial design
of the plant. No plant today is the result of a systematic,
optimized approach to the satisfaction of current safety
requirements. Neither have the safety requirements themselves been
rationalized to resolve inconsistencies and to establish a
hierarchy among the sometimes conflicting goals that have evolved
over time. The present hiatus in nuclear ordering provides an
opportunity to undertake a major rationalization both of LWR plant
safety criteria and of plant designs. A key goal of these efforts
would be to achieve substantial design simplification. In our
view, the current activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the nuclear reactor suppliers fall well short of what could be
achieved in these areas.
(2) Of the other design concepts, a fully modularized system of small
pebble-bed high temperature gas reactors appears to offer
significant promise, when all relevant design goals are
considered. In such plants, the economies of scale of large
individual reactors are exchanged for the economies of serial
production and shop fabrication of small st'andardized units.
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Small, pebble-bed reactors exhibit a high level of inherent safety,
simplicity of design, a potentially high capacity factor and a high
thermal efficiency. Operation is relatively straightforward and
quite readily suited to full automation, and dose levels to
operating and maintenance personnel are low relative to other
systems. Compared with large individual plants, modular arrays of
small units would permit utilities to make smaller incremental
investments in new generating capacity, and to match capacity
expansions more closely to the availability of financing and to
load growth. The combination of on-line refueling and moderately
redundant modular arrays promises high overall plant availability,
as well as a much lower probability of full plant forced outages
than with large individual units. Although there are unresolved
engineering and economic issues associated with this concept,
resolution of these questions appears to be feasible within a five
year time frame.
(3) The PIUS reactor system, a radically redesigned LWR concept, has
the advantage of being able to draw substantially on available LWR
technology, and appears to be significantly less likely to undergo
severe core damage than LWRs of conventional design. However,
whether it can meet utility requirements in other key areas,
including reliability, maintainability, and adaptability to
downsizing and accelerated construction, remains to be seen.
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(4) The CANDU-type reactor is by far the most highly developed of the
heavy water-moderated systems for central station power generation,
and has compiled an impressive operating record in Canada.
However, we doubt that the CANDU system, or any evolutionary
extension of its essential features, offers the prospect of a large
enough advance beyond the performance of current LWRs in ways
important to the concerns of this study to warrant its introduction
into the United States.
(5) Regarding the LMFBR, we believe that the basic design concept is
potentially more responsive to expected conditions in the electric
utility industry during the next few decades than present designs
would indicate. However, compared with the other options, the
available technology base and operating experience is narrower and
less advanced, and could not support commercialization in the time
frame of interest here.
C. The Innovation Process
(1) Present conditions in the nuclear power industry are not favorable
to the active pursuit of technological innovation in the nuclear
power plant field. For different reasons, the electric utility
industry, the nuclear plant suppliers, and the government are all
reluctant to undertake major new initiatives at this stage.
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(2) The problems are deep-rooted, and without a basic change in
assumptions and policies no amount of creativity in organizational
restructuring will be sufficient to stimulate more vigorous efforts
to develop innovative power plant system designs for the 1990s.
(3) The most important requirement is for the electric utility
industry to recognize its own pre-eminent role in ensuring the
timely availability of the technology which will enable it to
sustain and improve the quality of its service. Without a clear
financial commitment by the utilities, neither the traditional
suppliers of nuclear power plant nor the federal government will be
prepared to increase their own efforts in this area. Further, the
the difficulties encountered in past nuclear power plant
innovation efforts amply demonstrate the importance of a
technically well-informed user and of good technical communication
between the user and the supplier of the plants. Without the
active technical participation of the utilities in the formulation
of design specifications and, where applicable, in the construction
and operation of prototypes, future nuclear power plant innovation
efforts appear much less likely to succeed.
D. The Role of MIT
(1) Developing and implementing major nuclear power plant design
changes would require a very large commitment of technical,
financial and probably also political resources over an
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extended period. No university research effort can make more than
a minor contribution on this scale. But in the shorter run,
however, the role of a small, independent research group such as
exists at MIT may be more important. By being prepared to take the
lead in addressing some of the more difficult, speculative, or
sensitive design-related issues which government and industry
organizations are unable or unwilling to act on at this stage, such
a group could play a key role in catalyzing the much larger scale
effort that would be required for full implementation. The
rationalization of LWR plant safety requirements is one area where
the MIT group could conceivably play such a role. Other areas
include system simplification through probabilistic and other
methods, and the application of advanced control technology.
(2) A new program of research at MIT is proposed in the area of
advanced nuclear power plant design and supporting research and
development for systems targeted for commercial introduction in the
1990s. The program will be centered on engineering development
projects in two areas -- evolutionary improvements in LWR designs,
and small, modular high temperature gas reactor systems; it will
also include supporting engineering and social science research and
policy studies. The program will be based in the Nuclear
Engineering department, but will draw on the full range of
relevant interests and experience at the Institute.
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(3) LWR Innovation. It is proposed to form a research consortium in
association with a group of leading utilities with the goal of
developing a rationalized design specification for an advanced LWR
plant tailored to the projected needs of the utilities in the
1990s. The duration of the project would be approximately 5
years. With four to eight utility participants, each contributing
$200,000/yr, the MIT research budget would amount to $0.8-1.6
million/yr. Each utility would also be asked assign two technical
staff members to the project.
(4) Small modular HTGR systems development. A new MIT initiative is
proposed in the area of small HTGR systems. The main thrust of
this project will be in the area of modular reactor systems
studies. The ultimate target funding level for the project is
$0.5-1 million/yr. Utility sponsors will be sought from the
membership of Gas Cooled Reactor Associates. The goal of the
project is to determine whether small, modular HTGRs should be
promoted as next generation power systems. The first phase of the
project would be completed in 3-5 years.
2. INTRODUCTION
This report examines the role that nuclear power plant design
innovations might play in making nuclear energy a more attractive generating
option for U.S. electric utilities in the 1990s and beyond. It addresses
both the commercial potential of such innovations and the feasibility of
bringing them to market.
Even under normal circumstances -- given the relative youth of the civil
nuclear industry -- the rapid accumulation of nuclear plant construction and
operating experience over the last few years would provide a rich source of
ideas for future design refinements and modifications.* As it is, several
recent developments, including some which threaten the survival of the
industry, have focused new attention on the possibilities of technological
innovation, while at the same time creating an environment in which the
continuation of the innovation process itself is in jeopardy. These
developments include the following:
Js American electric utilities stopped ordering nuclear power plants in
the mid-1970s, and a resumption of ordering is not presently in prospect.
Many factors have contributed to this situation, some of them closely related
to the technical characteristics of the plants themselves. If further
ordering is ever to take place, utility managements must be convinced that
* It is noteworthy that as much LWR operating experience (measured in
reactor-years of operation) has been gained since 1979 as in the preceding
twenty years. For construction experience the picture is similar.
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the nuclear option is economic, safe, and politically acceptable, and hence
competitive with alternative sources of electric power. This is largely not
the case today. Attempts to restore the competitiveness of the nuclear
option will involve an array of institutional measures aimed at rationalizing
plant construction and operating practices and regulatory procedures. It is
also appropriate to ask to what extent changes in the design of these plants
can affect utility attitudes, and how such changes might be implemented.
* The present hiatus in nuclear ordering in principle increases the
number of design options which could potentially be made available
commercially in time for the next round of orders, should there be one. It
is now generally expected that no new orders will be placed by U.S. utilities
before the end of the decade, at the earliest. Though this outlook poses
difficult problems of adjustment for the nuclear supply industry, and
seriously complicates the innovation process, it also opens an opportunity
for the exploration of a broader array of options than might have been
considered for the next generation of designs in a growing market.
* The sharp decline in the expected growth rate of nuclear power plant
capacity coupled with the more promising outlook for the availability of
reasonably-priced uranium resources means that uranium conservation need no
longer be the overriding objective of reactor designers during the next few
decades. The fuel supply outlook is further enhanced by the shift towards
higher burnup fuel and the favorable prospects for advanced enrichment
technologies. Together, these developments open a commercial 'window of
opportunity' for design innovations which may not offer any major
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improvements in the efficiency of uranium use over light water reactors of
conventional design, but whose advantages lie in other, increasingly
important directions. In previous years, the case for such innovations --
especially those demanding large initial investments -- would have been
undermined by expectations of early obsolescence in the face of rapidly
rising uranium prices and the prompt commercial introduction of the fast
breeder reactor.
* The changing structure of the world nuclear power plant industry
raises new questions regarding U.S. innovation strategy, as the number of
nations at the forefront of reactor technology grows. In the light water
reactor area, several European nations and more recently Japan have joined
American firms at the technological frontier; West Germany is establishing a
strong position in advanced high temperature gas reactor technology; and the
American liquid metal fast breeder reactor development program, though still
the world's largest, may no longer be the most advanced, at least in terms of
experience with large-scale operating systems. Moreover, the structure of
the nuclear power plant industry is increasingly becoming integrated across
national boundaries. In this new environment, the importation of reactor
technology into the U.S. is for the first time becoming a plausible option.
The question arises as to whether and in what circumstances it would be an
attractive one. Other questions concern the export competitiveness of the
American nuclear industry. If, as seems inevitable, the U.S. must forego its
traditional dominance across the full spectrum of civil nuclear technologies,
in which specific segments of the industry should it seek to retain
technological and commercial leadership? Also, under what circumstances
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would an innovation strategy which sought to 'leapfrog' the current efforts
of its international competitors be appropriate?
Unfortunately, the U.S. nuclear power plant industry at present appears
not to have sufficient vitality to respond effectively to these challenges.
The interest of the electric utilities in innovations is largely confined to
developments which could be applied at small cost to plants already in
operation or under construction. With a substantial surplus of generating
capacity at present, faltering demand growth, and a record of vastly
underestimating the difficulty of introducing the current generation of
nuclear power plants, the utilities see few incentives to promote the
development of another generation of systems. Moreover, to the extent that
such developments would reflect negatively on public or regulatory
perceptions of their existing nuclear investments, the utilities will
actually have a disincentive to undertake such an exploration.
In turn, the reactor vendors, whose previous nuclear plant design and
manufacturing activities have generally been unprofitable, whose investments
in the current product line are yet to be fully amortized, and whose market
projections beyond the next several years are highly uncertain, are not
contemplating the allocation of a large amount of risk capital to the
development of advanced reactor designs at present. The major design
activity in which the two leading U.S. light-water reactor vendors,
Westinghouse and General Electric, are currently engaged is being conducted
in cooperation with their nuclear reactor manufacturing licensees in Japan,
with the Japanese government, utilities and manufacturers providing most of
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the funds.* The goal of these two projects is to develop advanced light
water reactor designs for commercial introduction into the Japanese electric
utility market by the mid-1980s. (The first of these plants would then enter
service in the early 1990s.) At present, the two American vendors are making
little if any effort to explore the possibilities of introducing these
advanced systems into the U.S. market. None of the U.S. vendors is engaged
in any other advanced design activity of comparable magnitude.
Finally, the government, which for many years has concentrated its
nuclear power plant innovation efforts almost exclusively on the development
of the liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor, now confronts an economic
environment in which commercial breeder deployment is a much more distant
prospect, but so far has been unable to reach a consensus on an innovation
strategy appropriate for these new conditions.
This report has two purposes:
(1) To present a preliminary assessment of the role of nuclear power
plant design innovations in enhancing the attractiveness of the
nuclear energy option to U.S. electric utilities; and
* The so-called ABWR (advanced boiling water reactor) project involves
General Electric, Toshiba, Hitachi, and a group of BWR-owning Japanese
electric utilities led by Tokyo Electric Power Company. The participants
in the APWR (advanced pressurized water reactor) project are Westinghouse,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and a PWR utility group led by Kansai Electric
Power. The combined cost of these two projects is reportedly on the order
of $200-250 million (Nucleonics Week, 3 March 1982, p. 4; Oriental
Economist, January 1982, p. 12).
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(2) To suggest some promising avenues for further development, and to
define a role for M.I.T. in the context of these proposed efforts.
We approach these issues with the perspective of the electric utilities
uppermost in mind. Unless the utilities -- or a subset of them -- are
persuaded of the possible need for advanced nuclear power plant systems and,
equally important, actively participate in defining the requirements to be
met by those systems, it is highly unlikely that any effort to implement
significant design innovations will succeed. From the utilities'
perspective, the central issue is whether an advanced nuclear power plant
system could more closely approach the (often conflicting) demands of
ratepayers, stockholders, regulators, and other interested constituencies
than could the most attractive of the available electricity supply
alternatives.
Other perspectives are also important, however. For current or
prospective private sector suppliers of advanced power plant technology the
question is whether the potential demand for such a product, assuming it can
be engineered and manufactured at a profit, would be large enough to justify
the costs required to develop it. And for the government, the question is
whether there are advanced nuclear technologies which are capable of
supplying electric power more cheaply and/or with less environmental insult
than the alternatives (including conventional nuclear systems) but which are
unlikely to materialize if reliance is placed exclusively on existing market
mechanisms to make them available.
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It is important to emphasize what is not addressed in this report.
First, we do not analyse in detail the range of possible design modifications
to existing plants or to those now under construction. We recognize that the
opportunities here are considerable, that the benefits are more immediate,
and that such improvements could go some way towards restoring the
competitiveness of the nuclear option. (We note, for example, that
increasing the capacity factor of the operating nuclear plants from the
current average of about 60% to the original design objective of 80% would
not only reduce the cost of nuclear electricity by a substantial margin but
would also effectively add 15,000 MWe of capacity to the national electricity
supply system.) However, the economic incentives to pursue such improvements
are reasonably clear, and much work is already underway in this area. In
contrast, for the reasons already mentioned the possible outlines of the next
generation of nuclear plant designs are receiving relatively little
attention, yet the longer-term benefits are potentially large.
Similarly, it should be noted that while we will not primarily be
concerned with technological innovations in the remainder of the nuclear fuel
cycle, there are, nevertheless, important opportunities for advance here, and
in at least one case -- the management and disposal of high-level nuclear
wastes -- further progress is almost certainly a prerequisite for future
nuclear power plant ordering.
Finally, our focus is almost exclusively on the domestic electric
utility industry: the international prospects for advanced nuclear power
plant technologies will not be addressed explicitly. We recognize that the
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expectations of government and industry regarding export prospects may
critically influence the scale of any private or public commitment to
large-scale innovation in the U.S. However, in our view there is little
chance that American industry could successfully market nuclear power plant
innovations overseas without first having proven them commercially at home.
More generally, unless the domestic nuclear energy option is revitalized, the
international competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry will almost
certainly continue to decline.* Consequently, we believe that it is
appropriate to concentrate on the opportunities presented by the U.S.
electric utility market, at least as a first step.
Choosing among alternatives: some initial considerations
Even in theory, there can be no single universally 'optimal' nuclear
power plant design concept, given the broad range of conditions in which
plants are built and operated and the uncertain evolution of these conditions
over time. Ideally, sufficient technological diversity would be sustained to
enable a close-to-optimal system to be available for each set of
circumstances that is likely to arise. In practice, the virtues of diversity
must be weighed against the benefits of standardization and the high costs of
* The present collaborations of Westinghouse and General Electric with their
Japanese partners are not inconsistent with this view. The American firms
are playing an important role as system designers inthese projects. But
the Japanese industry will supply virtually all of the hardware for the
commercial plants (as indeed is the case for the current generation of
plants under construction in Japan), and in the longer run seems likely to
take the lead in any efforts to export the advanced systems to third
countries.
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pursuing many alternatives in parallel. Obviously, both the choice of design
objectives and the selection of the technological means for pursuing them are
strongly conditioned by the existing base of technology and experience. To
this extent, future developments are determined by past decisions.
Nevertheless, there is still some flexibility in the choice of direction and
pace of development. In these decisions, the key considerations are the
suitability (and hence marketability) of the proposed innovations given the
range of likely commercial environments, and the feasibility of making them
commercially available in the first place.
Perhaps the most fundamental issue that is addressed in this report --
aside from the question of whether the nuclear option is worth preserving at
all -- is whether a technological strategy of evolutionary improvements to
existing light water reactor designs is to be preferred to one based on
radically different design concepts. Strong opinions are held on both sides
of this issue. Proponents of an evolutionary improvement strategy believe
that the option of a major shift away from conventional light water reactor
technology is unrealistic and illusory. They argue that it is wiser to draw
on the great store of LWR experience in order to move incrementally towards
an improved system than to forego this experience in favor of an unproven
concept. Though the latter may offer advantages on paper, in practice it
would almost certainly have to overcome a long stream of unexpected problems
similar to that which has plagued LWR technology, and from which the latter
is only now emerging. Moreover, they point out the great practical
difficulty of changing the technological course of a very large,
inertia-ridden industry which for over two decades has been so strongly
oriented towards LWR systems.
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Advocates of the alternative strategy suggest that an evolutionary
approach towards LWR improvements by its very nature may be insufficient to
address the fundamental problems that have arisen with the nuclear option.
They argue that a more radical technological shift would not entail a
completely new start, with all of the inevitable problems of technological
learning lying in the future. They point out that a good deal of the
existing LWR technology base is likely to be transferable, irrespective of
the direction of the shift, and that at least in the case of heavy water
moderated or graphite moderated, gas-cooled systems a large amount of
directly relevant experience already exists both in the U.S. and overseas.
It is also suggested that the present reluctance of the industry to
contemplate technological change may be significantly weaker a decade or so
from now. (In this view, the longer the duration of the present moratorium
on nuclear ordering the easier it is to envisage a major departure from
conventional light water reactor technology.) Some of those urging a more
radical technological departure take a stronger view, holding that
disaffection towards conventional LWR technology in the electric utility
industry and among the general public may be so strong that only a major
technological change could prompt a return to the nuclear option.
In an ideal economic world, the marketplace would be the ultimate
arbiter of these opposing points of view. In practice, however, the high
entry barriers and large risks and costs associated with major innovations in
the electric power plant industry mean that product competition is highly
imperfect, and choices made far in advance of commercialization will
limit the number and nature of the options made available to the utility
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customer, and hence profoundly and irreversibly influence the direction of
technological change. To this extent, predictive analysis must replace
marketplace interactions as a means of choosing an appropriate course of
action. This report is an attempt to move beyond the largely subjective
arguments presented so far towards the more detailed, objective appraisals of
the individual options which such an analysis requires.
3. THE FUTURE MARKET FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
We next consider the potential demand by U.S utilities for new nuclear
power plants through the year 2010. The size of this market will provide an
indication of whether the costs of developing significant changes in nuclear
power plant designs would be recoverable. The choice of 2010 as an endpoint
is somewhat arbitrary, but reflects a balance between the intrinsic need for
a long term assessment and the practical need to avoid being overwhelmed by
the uncertainties involved. The primary task of this section is to estimate
the probable requirement for new baseload electricity supplies; if nuclear
power is to regain competitiveness it will again primarily be as a baseload
supplier, because of the high capital intensity and low fuel costs of nuclear
plants relative to most conventional alternatives. At least until the end of
the century, and possibly for a good deal longer, the major competition for
new baseload applications will come from coal-fired plants, although in
certain localities other sources (natural gas, geothermal, hydro) may play an
important role.
3.1 Electricity demand projections
The size of the market for baseload power plants will be primarily
determined by future trends in the demand for electricity. No attempt was
made to develop independent electricity demand projections for this project.
Instead, we reviewed a number of recent studies to establish a representative
range of anticipated growth rates.
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The key influences on electricity demand are the overall size of the
economy; the aggregate price of energy; the relative prices of electricity
and other forms of energy; and energy price elasticities in different sectors
of the economy. These last are in turn strongly influenced by the prevailing
cost of capital. In the longer run, structural changes in the composition of
the gross national product induced by foreign economic competition,
technological innovation, and changing social preferences may have a major
impact. Large uncertainties remain regarding the contributions of each of
these factors.
Several recent demand growth projections for the period 1981-2000 are
summarized in Table 3.1. During this period, economic growth is generally
the most important of the above-mentioned variables affecting electricity
demand, and the GNP growth rates assumed for each of the projections are also
shown in the Table. Over the longer term, the 'structural' factors acquire
increased importance.
All the demand growth rate projections fall well below the average of 7%
per year experienced in the decades prior to 1973, but the range is
nevertheless large, from almost zero up to about 4% per year. The base-case
projections by the government and the utility industry fall within a narrower
range, from 2.5 to 3.2%/yr. A recent analysis of several low-demand
projections suggests that these differ from the mainstream of government and
industry forecasts primarily as a result of different assumptions about
electricity prices and consumer price responses. Specifically, the
low-demand studies assume electricity prices higher in relation to other
Table 3.1
Selected Recent U.S. Electricity Demand Growth Projections
Projection Electricity Assumed GNP
Period Demand Growth Rate Growth Rate
(% year) (% year)
DOE/Electricity Policy Project 1981-2000 2.5(1.1-3.8)+ 2.6(2.3-3.0)
(6/83)
DOE/Energy Information Administration 1981-2000 2.6(2.2-3.0) 2.5
(2/81)
EPRI/Starr and Searl 1981-2000 3.2(2.6-3.7) 2.5(2.0-3.0)
(4/82)
Electrical World 1981-2000 2.6
(9/82)
CONAES/Demand and Conservation 1975-2010
Panel (1979)*
Scenario A 0.6(0.2-2.5) 2.0
Scenario B 1.3(0.7-3.0) 2.0
Scenario C 2.7(2.2-4.0) 2.0
Congressional Research Service 1981-1995 2.9(1.8-3.9) 3.0(2.0-4.0)
(8/82)
Solar Energy Research Institute 1978-2000 0.2(-1.4-0.4) 2.6
(1981)
+ Range indicates upper and lower bounds of projections
* CONAES Scenarios:
A: Aggressive conservation policy; four-fold increase in average
delivered energy price over 1975 price
B: Moderate conservation policy; two-fold increase in average
delivered energy price over 1975 price
C: Unchanged conservation policy; energy prices unchanged.
(continued)
Sources for Table 3.1
DOE/Electricity Policy Project:
DOE/Energy Information
Administration:
EPRI/Starr and Searle:
Electrical World:
CONAES:
Congressional Research Service:
Solar Energy Research Institute:
Report of the Electricity Policy
Project, The Future of Electric Power in
America: Economic Supply for Economic
Growth, Office of Policy, Planning and
Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy, June
1983.
Annual Report to Congress, 17, Vol. 3,
DOE/EIA-0173(81)/3 (Washington, D.C.
1981).
C. Starr and M.F. Searl, "U.S. Generating
Capacity Requirements for Economic Growth,
1990-2000," Public Utilities Fortnightly,
April 29, 1982, 17-24.
33rd Annual Electrical Industry Forecast,
Electrical.World, September 1982, 79.
National Research Council, Alternative
Energy Demand Futures to 2010, Committee
on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems,
Demand and Conservation Panel (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1979).
A. Kaufman and K.K. Nelson, "Do We Really
Need All Those Electric Plants?", Report
No. 81-1475, U.S. Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, August
1982.
The SERI Solar/Conservation Study, A
New Prosperity: Building a Sustainable
Energy Future, Brick House Publishing,
Andover, MA, 1981.
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energy prices than do other studies, as well as a lower propensity on the
part of consumers to substitute electricity for other energy forms.* The GNP
growth and aggregate energy price behavior assumed in these studies were not
radically different, however.
3.2 Other relevant factors affecting the need for baseload plants
The size of the baseload plant market will depend on several factors in
addition to the overall rate of growth of electricity demand:
(1) Because of daily and seasonal demand fluctuations, only part of the
new demand can be met economically by conventional baseload power
plants. At present, 60-70% of the nation's electricity is
generated by units on baseload duty.** Changes in the shape of the
load duration curve are probable during the time frame of this
study, but not even the direction is clear. Time-of-day pricing
will tend to flatten the curve, with a consequent increase in the
share of total generation captured by baseload plants. Improved
grid interconnections between different regions will have a similar
effect. On the other hand, increases in intermittent generation
(wind, solar, etc.) will reduce the baseload share.
* Report of the Electricity Policy Project, The Future of Electric Power in
America: Economic Supply for Economic Growth, Office of Policy, Planning
and Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy, June 1983.
*'rthur Barstow, Northeast Utilities/New England Power Pool, private
communication, June 26, 1983. Part of the uncertainty arises from the
absence of a sharp distinction between baseload and intermediate load
fossil plants.
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(2) An additional requirement for new baseload plants will be created
by the retirement of some older units and a decline in the
productivity of others as they age. As Figure 3.1 shows, over
100,000 MWe of existing fossil steam plant, much of it baseload
capacity, will be over 40 years old if still in service in the year
2000. In the present financial climate, many utilities are
deferring plant retirements well beyond original design lifetimes
to avoid major new capital investments. However, the incentives
for early retirement of fossil baseload plants in some regions of
the country are strong, and may be increasing. The cost of
retrofitting some of the older coal plants to meet the more
stringent emissions standards that are likely to go into effect
shortly may be prohibitive. Also, substantial quantities of oil
and gas are still being burned in baseload units. In 1982, oil
and gas together accounted for about 21% of the nation's
electricity supply; oil use by utilities averaged 0.85 million
bbl/d (down from 1.5 million bbl/d in the mid-1970s), while gas use
averaged 1.6 million bbl/d oil equivalent. Much of this was burned
in baseload plants.* Although the economic incentives to displace
* The exact fraction is not easily determined. But both oil and gas use
are concentrated in a few states, where they account for a large
proportion of the electricity generated. In these states, the fraction
used for baseload generation must therefore be high, and consequently so
must the national fraction. (For a fuller discussion of this point, see:
D. Bodansky, "A Strategy for Saving Oil," Journal of Contemporary Studies,
Spring 1983, 84-85.) If the national fraction were 70%, say, the amount of
baseload oil and gas capacity in service in 1982 would be approximately 88
GWe (assuming a 65% plant capacity factor).
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baseload oil-fired capacity with new coal and nuclear plants have
declined with the recent softening of world oil prices and the
rapid increases in coal and nuclear capital costs, this will be at
least partly offset by the increasing incentives for gas
displacement as gas deregulation continues to take effect during
the 1980s.
(3) An increase in the amount of industrially cogenerated electricity
would reduce the need for new utility baseload capacity. At
present, cogeneration provides only about 8% of industry's
electricity supplies. Despite some very optimistic recent
estimates of cogeneration potential, it is more likely that the
actual future contribution will be quite modest. A careful recent
analysis by Joskow at M.I.T. suggests that annual increments in
cogeneration capacity for the next decade or so will probably be
less than 1 GWe/yr, even if all economical opportunities are
pursued -- a small fraction of total utility requirements for new
capacity.*
(4) The need for new baseload capacity will also be affected by the
introduction of new solar electric technologies (solar thermal
* Paul Joskow, Industrial Cogeneration and Electricity Production in the
United States, Studies in Energy and the Economy Discussion Paper No. 8,
MIT-EL 81-061/WP, M.I.T., September 1981. A much more optimistic
assessment of the cogeneration potential is given in the SERI
Solar/Conservation Study, Building a Sustainable Energy Future (Brick
House, Andover, MA, 1981). Here it is reported that exploitation of the
cogeneration potential in six basic industries would displace almost 100
GWe of utility baseload capacity (p. 179).
3-6
electric, solar photovoltaic) and by the increased deployment of
geothermal, biomass, hydroelectric, and wind capacity. Major new
contributions from the latter sources are not expected, though in
certain localities the incremental supply may be important.
Regarding the new solar electric technologies, large uncertainties
surround both the ultimate potential and the rate of market
penetration. Because of the high costs of storage, these
technologies will first become competitive on the grid in peak
shaving and fuel saving applications. For small-scale, dispersed
systems, such as photovoltaics, market penetration could occur
quite rapidly once economic feasibility has been demonstrated,
because of the short installation time relative to large central
station plants. In the early stages, this would not affect utility
baseload capacity requirements significantly. However, the
generation of relatively large amounts of power from dispersed,
intermittent solar electric systems could substantially alter the
time patterns of electricity demand to be met by the electric
utilities, and consequently affect their need for conventional
baseload capacity.*
* At present, the cost of photovoltaic cell modules is still a factor of 15
higher than would be competitive for peaking or fuel saving applications.
However, technological advances are in prospect which could make
photovoltaics for these applications competitive at the margin by about the
turn of the century. The development of economic baseload systems is a
more distant prospect, as this would require further major reductions in
module costs, along with major improvements in storage technology.
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(5) The U.S. electricity grid is not a perfectly interconnected
system. This reduces the overall efficiency of capacity
utilization, thus increasing the need for new baseload plants.
3.3 The need for new baseload plants, 1990-2010
To investigate the combined effect of most of these factors on the size
of the market for new baseload power plants, a very simple model of the U.S.
electricity supply system was constructed. Three electricity demand growth
scenarios were analysed:
Assumed growth rate (%/yr)
1983-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
HIGH 3 3.5 3
MID 2 2.5 2
LOW 1 1.5 1
Several other assumptions were made regarding the rate of capacity loss due
to retirements and plant producttvity decline; the fraction of new and
replacement electricity demand that will be met by new 'conventional' central
station baseload capacity (i.e. coal or nuclear) versus intermediate, peaking
and dispersed baseload capacity; coal and nuclear plant capacity factors, and
so on. A fuller description of these assumptions is given in the Appendix to
this section.
3-8
Figure 3.2 shows the projected need for new baseload capacity for the
three electricity demand scenarios. For each demand scenario, the projection
more probably underestimates the actual need than exaggerates it. Two almost
certainly conservative assumptions made in the analysis deserve special em-
phasis: first, oil and gas baseload generation is assumed to remain at its
present level until 2010; and second, all of the coal units which the utili-
ties are currently committed to build and all nuclear plants under construc-
tion except those that have been deferred indefinitely are assumed to be
completed. Regarding the latter, it is probable that several more nuclear
plants will be cancelled during the next two or three years, especially if
electricity demand growth remains sluggish. Several coal plants may also be
at risk.
According to Fig. 3.2, for the 'HIGH' demand growth scenario (3.3%/yr
between now and 2000; 3%/yr thereafter) the first as yet unordered central
station baseload plant will be required to enter service by 1993. There-
after, new capacity will have to be added at a rate of approximately 17
GWe/yr. For the 'MID' case (2.3%/yr growth until 2000; 2%/yr afterwards),
the target date will be deferred to around 1996, and subsequent capacity
additions will be required at a rate of about 10 GWe/yr. And for the 'LOW'
scenario (1.3%/yr until 2000; 1%/yr thereafter), the first new baseload plant
will be required in about 2002, with subsequent additions at a rate of about
5 GWe/yr.*
* These results have not been systematically compared with other recent
projections. However, it is important to note that the criterion of need
in this case is the adequacy of economic baseload capacity, while many
other studies focus on the need for an adequate capacity reserve margin
(typically taken as 20% above peak load) to ensure overall system
reliability. Satisfaction of one criterion obviously need not imply
satisfaction of the other.
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Since even coal plants take on the order of a decade to complete, the
likelihood of a shortfall in economic baseload capacity in the early 1990s
seems high if electricity demand grows faster than 3% per year. In this
case, the difference could be made up -- at higher cost -- by running
intermediate and peaking units at a higher capacity factor or by deferring
the retirement of old coal baseload plants. (As noted previously, however,
the latter might well be precluded by the introduction of more stringent
emission controls.) Some additional respite would be gained if the average
capacity factor of existing coal and nuclear baseload plants could be
increased above the 60% level assumed in Fig. 3.2. Figure 3.5 (the 'Maximum
Delay' schedule) shows that by increasing the average retirement age of coal
plants from 40 to 50 years and by increasing the capacity factor of all of
the current generation of coal and nuclear plants to 65%, the need for new
baseload capacity is delayed by 3 years in the 'HIGH' case and 4 years in the
'MID' case. The subsequent rate of capacity additions is essentially
unchanged.
It is evident from Fig. 3.2 that even if electricity demand grows at
less than 2% per year, new baseload plant completions will be required at a
rate of several GWe per year starting in the late 1990s.
For each of the baseload capacity projections in Fig. 3.2, Figs. 3.3 and
3.4 show the potential market for new nuclear plants, assuming nuclear shares
of the total baseload market of 50% and 25% respectively. The actual market
share gained by nuclear will obviously depend on its competitiveness with
coal in various parts of the country.
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Appendix to Section 3
Baseload plant market model
A very simple model of the U.S. electricity supply system was developed
in order to predict the first year in which as yet unordered baseload power
plants would be required to enter service to satisfy electricity demand, and
to estimate the market for new baseload plants (in GWe/yr) for subsequent
years until the year 2010.
Three electricity demand growth scenarios were selected:
Assumed Growth Rate (%/yr)
HIGH
MID
LOW
1983-1990
3
2
1
1991-2000
3.5
2.5
1.5
2001-2010
3
2
1
The model incorporates several other assumptions:
1. Plant retirement rates and productivity losses:
Since the objective is to project the need for new baseload plants, only
baseload plant retirements and productivity losses need be considered. The
following assumptions were made:
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Nuclear. No existing nuclear plants are retired before 2010; the
average capacity factor of these plants, presently about 57%,
is increased to 60%.
Hydro. Any baseload hydro capacity retired before 2010 is replaced by
new hydro plants; the average capacity factor of these plants
is unchanged.
Oil and gas. Baseload oil and gas generation will remain constant at the
present level until 2010.
Coal. No coal plants are retired until 1990; thereafter, all coal
units 40 years old or more are retired at a uniform rate.
(The age distribution of existing coal-fired capacity was
obtained from the 1980 Annual Inventory of Power Plants
published by the Department of Energy.) The coal plants are
assumed to operate with a capacity factor of 44% at the time
of retirement.
2. Completion of plants already on order or under construction:
No as-yet unordered baseload plants will enter service until the last of
the coal and nuclear plants currently under construction are completed. (In
the nuclear case, those plants which have been indefinitely deferred are
3.A-3
assumed not to be completed.*) The average capacity factor of these plants
does not exceed 60%. Further, they will account for all of the total
marginal (i.e. new and replacement) electricity demand until their capacity
factor limit is reached.**
3. New baseload plants:
After full utilization of all currently committed plants has been
achieved, the share of the total marginal electricity demand that will be
captured by new baseload coal or nuclear power plants will be 60%. The
remainder will be provided by new intermediate or peaking units, old baseload
fossil units downgraded to intermediate/peaking duty, and unconventional or
small-scale baseload capacity (e.g. geothermal, hydro, solar, cogeneration,
etc.).*** The new baseload plants will operate at an average capacity factor
of 65%.
* Excluding the indefinitely deferred units, 54 plants (58.8GWe) are
currently under construction (U.S. NRC, Nuclear Power Plants:
Construction Status Report, Vol. 6, No. 2, NUREG-0030, 1982, as modified
by "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, February 1983).
In fact, at least 6 of the 54, none of them more than 30% complete as of
February 1983, are in danger of being abandoned during the next two or
three years. The amount of coal capacity under construction is 76 GWe.
(1981 Inventory of Power Plants (Table 2).)
** The Energy Information Administration estimates that the coal and nuclear
plants entering service between 1980 and 1990 will supply about 97% of the
increase in electricity consumption during this period. (1982 Annual
Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0383(82), April 1983,p. 129.)
***The 60% share assumed here is obviously well below the share that will be
taken by new baseload plants during the coming decade, (see the preceding
footnote), and is probably a conservative estimate for all but the very
low growth scenarios through the year 2010.
4. INNOVATION GOALS
The strength of the competition that nuclear power will face from coal
in the market for new baseload plants in the 1990s is highly uncertain. Much
will depend on the severity of the emission controls that are eventually
adopted in response to the acid rain problem. On the other hand, by the
1990s one or more of several advanced coal technologies now under development
may offer substantial economic advantages over conventional coal-fired steam
cycle plants for baseload applications. Among the leading candidates are
moving-bed and entrained gasification-combined cycle systems with high
temperature turbines, and atmospheric and pressurized fluidized bed
combustion systems. The pending environmental controls may in fact hasten
the introduction of these technologies, as their emissions are usually lower
and more easily controllable than those from conventional coal plants.
But even if the exact nature of the competition from coal is difficult
to predict, the most important general targets for nuclear power plant
innovation efforts are clear from the performance of the current generation
of LWR plants. These targets are listed in Table 4.1. We have grouped them
into two general categories, based on our judgement of their relative
importance. Neither the list nor the ranking should be regarded as
definitive, since time did not permit a systematic survey of current and
prospective plant owners concerning this question. Moreover, no secondary
ranking was attempted nor should be inferred within each category. Each of
the first rank of goals is discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
Table 4.1
The main targets of technological innovation
A. First rank
e Lower and more predictable plant capital costs
* Shorter and more predictable construction lead-times
* Higher reliability
e Reduced financial and health and safety risks (perceived and
actual)
* Optimized plant size
B. Second rank
e Lower fuel cycle costs
e Lower operating and maintenance costs
* Lower occupational radiation exposures
* Higher thermal efficiency
* Enhanced load-following capability
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(i) Lower and more predictable plant capital costs
During the past 15 years, average capital costs of U.S. nuclear
plants have escalated at a compound rate of at least 20% per year -- roughly
twice the rate of inflation over this period.* The multiplicative effects of
high interest and inflation rates and lengthening construction times have
been a major factor underlying this trend. (In a recent DOE capital cost
projection for a hypothetical nuclear plant begun in 1981 and entering
service in 1993, escalation and interest during construction account for
about 70% of the final cost.**) But there have also been dramatic increases
in base construction costs (i.e., the costs of construction materials, site
labor, engineering services, equipment and components, etc.), reflecting the
greatly increased complexity of the more recent plants. Figure 4.1 shows the
rapid growth in requirements for construction materials and the sharp decline
in craft labor productivity experienced during the last decade.
At least as striking as the increase in average construction costs is
the extraordinary variation in these costs across the country. As Fig. 4.2
shows, the most expensive plant to be completed during the coming year is
more than a factor of three costlier than the cheapest. Figure 4.1 provides
a glimpse of the widely varying materials and labor requirements for plants
entering service during the next few years, but a systematic analysis of the
factors responsible for these cost differences has yet to be carried out.
* J.H. Crowley and J.D. Griffith, "U.S. construction cost rise threatens
nuclear option," Nuclear Engineering International, June 1982, 25-28.
*'rowley and Griffith, op. cit.
8.9
6.2
3.5
11.4
17 1
WASH EEDB EED6
1345 PHASE-I PHASE-IV
(10/74) Q / 7 8 ) (1/81)
High
35
30
25
20
Trend in PW R craft labour requirements
Trends in PWR construction material
requirements
A-PWR Wash 1230 (1971)-1000MWe
B-PWR Nureg-0241 1976)-1139MWe
C-Data of 8 PWR's (1982-85COMM.OP.) -1150 MWe
C
331
276
B g 238 655 4,517
98
259
(AVG)
81 (LOW)
Concrete Piping Cable Raceway
(000 yd') (000t) (000ft) (000ft)
Fig. 4.1 Trends in PWR construction material and labour requirements
(source: Crowley and Griffith)
Average
15
Low
9/81 SURVEY
OF 16 PLANTS
(198246 C0)
=
I'
a
a
a
C
I'
10
5
WASH
1082
(6/67)
WASH
1230
(1/71)
U,
C3
cc
7
6-
5
4'
3
2
1
Nuclear Plant Construction Costs: Cost per kW
Shoreham *
0
a
C
River Bend 3
S
a
1990
SAW
5373
4701
402
33s7
1982
S/kW
2946
2578
2209
1841
1473
1106
736
1975
S/kW
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
-600
400
200
.
i .
Diablo
Canyon
No1*
0 .
-
0 *
* Canyon
No. 2
S
1976 1980
* Range of projected costs for addtional new plants in 1996, based on Projected Cost of Electricity from Nuclear and Coal-Fired Power Plants.
EIA, August 1982.
Includes all cost (both construction expenditures and accumulated AFUDC. where applicable).
SOURCE: EIA Form 254
Fig. 4.2 Nuclear plant construction cost trends.
(source: Report of the Electricity Policy Project,
U.S. Department of Energy, June 1983)
0
00 .
ZOM
2015
1342
671
0
0 1
0
. S-0
* 0
6
S
S
0
6 0
*
0
.5
6
Os
0
*0
0
0
ma
S
6
0
,
0 S
0
3S
~0 :
* 5
0
6
0
n I
1968 1972 1984 198 1992 1996
.
4-3
Whatever the causes, there is no doubt that the most egregious examples of
nuclear power plant cost overruns, and the financial troubles they have
created, stand as a highly undesirable precedent and a significant deterrent
to new nuclear ordering.
But there is also reason to believe that even the 'average' performance
of the industry with regard to nuclear power plant construction is no longer
adequate. If the nuclear option is to be restored to competitiveness, not
only must aberrations of the Shoreham type be prevented, but the average
plant construction cost must be reduced below the present level.
(ii) Shorter and more predictable construction lead-times
Construction lead-times for nuclear power plants in the United States
have doubled during the last decade (see Fig. 4.3). In some instances,
schedules have been deliberately stretched out by utilities confronting
stagnating or declining demand or cash flow problems. In other cases,
management and labor problems, poor quality control, and retrofit
requirements arising from regulatory changes have played a role. In general,
the rapidly growing complexity of power plant designs, driven by increases in
unit size and by the increasing number and stringency of nuclear safety and
environmental regulations, has been a key contributor to the lead-time trend.
The impact on capital costs has already been noted. An additional
effect has been that lead-times now typically extend beyond utility planning
horizons. The latter problem has been compounded by the increasing uncer-
tainties associated with electricity demand forecasts. In such a situation,
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planners will opt for capacity additions with shorter and more predictable
lead times, and will probably be prepared to incur a generation cost penalty
in return for the reduction in uncertainty so obtained. Given the volatility
of the present demand outlook, even the fastest construction schedule of
which the industry is currently capable -- a 72-month interval from
construction permit issuance to full-power operation recorded by Florida
Power and Light with St. Lucie 2 -- when combined with a typical
preconstruction lead-time (i.e., the time required for site selection and
approval and issuance of the construction permit) of three years or more, may
still exceed the prudent planning limit for many utilities. Even with a more
predictable demand outlook, a significant reduction below the recent average
construction lead-time of 120 months would be necessary to restore the
competitiveness of the nuclear option.
(iii) Higher plant reliabilities
The operating performance of most U.S. nuclear power plants thus far has
been a disappointment. Despite early predictions that plant capacity factors
would approach or even exceed 80%, only 5 of the 72 U.S. light water reactors
in commercial operation as of late 1982 had achieved lifetime capacity
factors of 75% or more, whereas the cumu-lative performance of almost
two-thirds of the plants had failed to exceed 60%. For the last several
years, the average annual capacity factor for all U.S. plants has ranged from
55 to 60%.
Several recent analyses have sought to explain the wide variation in
plant performance in terms of unit size, age, design vintage,
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manufacturer, and other factors.* There is good evidence that reliability
decreases with increasing plant size, and other evidence that it improves as
plants age. (See Tables 4.2 and 4.3.) But much of the variation cannot
satisfactorily be explained in such general terms. In any event, there is a
strong economic incentive to improve plant performance. In today's economic
conditions, an increase in capacity factor from 60% to 80% would reduce the
cost of nuclear electricity by about 20%. Put differently, a recently
completed light water reactor power plant operating on the once-through fuel
cycle with a capacity factor of 80% could afford to burn uranium costing
almost $180/lb U30 8 during the forthcoming year (i.e., about seven times more
expensive than today's spot market price) and still produce electricity
during that period at the same overall cost as an average performer among
current plants with the same capital cost.** For the more expensive plants
shortly to be completed, an even higher uranium cost could be offset by the
same improvement in capacity factor.
* See, for example, S. Thomas, "Worldwide Nuclear Plant Performance
Revisited," Science Policy Research Unit Occasional Paper Series No. 18,
University of Sussex, 1982; C. Komanoff, Power Plant Performance -- Nuclear
and Coal Capacity Factors and Economics, Report No. 56-1, Council on
Economic Priorities, New York 1976; P.L. Joskow and G.A. Rozanski, "The
effects of learning by doing on nuclear plant operating reliability," Rev.
Econ. Stat., Vol. LXI, May 1979, No. 2.
*'or this comparison, the average plant was assumed to have a capacity
factor of 60%. The capital cost of both plants was assumed to be
$1500/kw, and a capital charge rate of 20% was used. The discharge fuel
burnup was assumed to be 30,000 MWD/MT, and the plant thermal efficiency
was 32%.
Table 4.2
U.S. Reactor Performance: Lifetime Load Factors*
500-700 MWe 700-1000MWe 1000+Mwe
No. of Reactors % No. of Reactors % No. of Reactors %
Westinghouse 6 77.2 8 55.0 8 57.6
General Electric 7 64.0 9 55.6 5 65.0
Babcock and Wilcox 9 47.6
Combustion Eng. 6 66.6
* Mean lifetime load factors for each reactor exclude years 1 and 2 of operation.
Source: S. Thomas (1982)
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(iv) Risk reduction
Since the accident at Three Mile Island, discussions of nuclear power
plant risks have emphasized the need to differentiate between the risks to
public health and safety and the environment and the financial risks to the
plant owners. Probabilistic risk analyses suggest that on neither count are
nuclear plants on average any worse than other large-scale energy facilities
which appear to be generally accepted.* Thus, is there a rational case for
attempting to reduce the risks from nuclear power plants any further?
For the prospective innovator, the pragmatic answer is that a case
surely can be made if the product would be acceptable where current plants
are not. But this in turn introduces the difficult question of the
relationship between perceived and actual risk. In exploring this issue,
several authors have proposed risk definitions broader than the simple
measure of expected mortality rate (i.e., the product of event probability
and number of fatalities per event) in an attempt to match more closely the
risk perceptions of the lay public.** These studies indicate that public
risk
* The literature on this subject is extensive. For a recent discussion, see
A.M. Weinberg, "A Second Nuclear Era: Prospects and Perspectives,"
presented at the 40th Anniversary Celebration of the First Nuclear Chain
Reaction, University of Chicago, December 1-2, 1982.
*
3ESee, for example, Rowe, W.D., An Anatomy of Risk, (New York, Wiley 1977);
D. Litai, D.D. Lanning and N.C. Rasmussen, "The public perception of risk,"
Proceedings of the Society of Risk Analysts, June 1981 Meeting, Washington,
D.C.; and C. Hohenemser, R.W. Kates and P. Slovic, "The nature of
technological hazard," Science, Vol. 220, 22 April 1983, 378-384.
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perceptions vary non-linearly with the magnitude of the event consequence,
implying that more could be gained in terms of enhancing the acceptability of
nuclear power plants by reducing the publicly perceived probability of
catastrophic events than the traditional, one-dimensional measure of risk
would suggest. Several other factors have also been identified which lead
people to feel differently about hazards for which the products of frequency
and consequence are the same. One goal of current research is to determine
the strength of societal risk aversions to catastrophic events and to other
characteristics of hazards, and to examine the variation in the strength of
these risk aversions among different social groups.* Such information is
important in determining the appropriate targets for engineering responses to
public concern about technological hazards.
A related issue concerns the possibility that different technological
approaches to the same target might elicit different public reactions. For
example, a technical response to the societal risk aversion to catastrophic
events which relied on a collection of engineering modifications to existing
designs whose effectiveness could only be discerned through the application
of probabilistic risk assessment methods might be less convincing, by virtue
of its greater obscurity to a lay audience, than one which was based on more
easily understood or demonstrable physical principles, even if the actual
reduction in the probability of a catastrophic accident was the same in both
cases. (The presumed virtue of 'transparency' in reactor safety philosophy
was an important factor in the development of the PIUS concept (see
* Lital et al, op. cit.
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Section 6.2).) Nevertheless, our ability to gauge accurately the practical
significance of such differences is discouragingly low.
More generally, although the strategy of devising engineering 'fixes' to
shape public perceptions might initially seem attractive, the volatility of
these perceptions, their susceptibility to uncontrollable external
influences, and the generally poor understanding of how they develop and how
they affect public policy may mean that in practice such a strategy is
unworkable.
A less ambitious, but potentially more rewarding approach would be to
concentrate on the risk perceptions of utility managements. As is often
pointed out, they, not the general public, make the decisions to order
nuclear plants. But this approach is also not without difficulty. For
example, the preoccupation of utility owners and managers with the financial
risks of nuclear investments is not really separable from public perceptions
of health risks. The latter bear directly on the former, for example via
political and regulatory actions which may complicate and prolong
construction projects, or which may result in expensive shutdowns even in the
absence of any physical damage to the plant. Moreover, as with public
perceptions of health risks, it seems plausible that plant owners'
perceptions of financial risks are shaped by more than probabilistically
derived expected dollar losses. Once again, our present understanding of
this question is not well enough developed to point reliably to a sensible
design strategy, though the problems of measurement and analysis seem more
tractable in this case, because of the much smaller and less diverse
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population at issue. One feature of utility risk perceptions already seems
clear, however: no risk-reducing design innovation -- whether it involves an
evolutionary change in current LWR designs or a radical departure from them
-- is likely to capture the interest of U.S. utilities unless it is
accompanied by an overall reduction in the expected cost of nuclear
electricity generation.
(v) Optimized unit size
There has been much inconclusive discussion in recent years of whether
the economies of scale putatively realized in large nuclear plants would be
more than offset by the higher reliabilities, inherently lower risks, less
complex designs, and shorter construction times expected of future smaller
units (and actually experienced with smaller units in the past). The
discussion has been handicapped by a lack of practical experience with small
plant design and construction in the present economic and regulatory
environment. The question of appropriate unit size must also be addressed
from the perspective of utility system capacity needs and financial planning,
however, and here the situation is clearer. Given the financial constraints
and lower load growth behavior which seem likely to prevail for the
foreseeable future, we anticipate that most utilities, including some of the
largest, will opt to build new capacity in smaller increments than the
900-1200 MWe range typical of current nuclear plant designs. Moreover, in a
period of increasing marginal capital costs, smaller units can generally be
introduced into a utility's rate base with much less public resistance than
the large plants. We note in passing that the trend of the advanced coal
technologies mentioned previously is also towards smaller unit sizes.
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To investigate the unit size issue further, a simple, highly stylized
model of the U.S. electric utility industry was constructed. The purpose of
the model was to estimate the impact of unit size on the theoretical upper
limit of nuclear penetration into the new baseload plant market during the
period 1990-2010. The model and results are summarized in the Appendix to
this Section. Among the results: the potential expansion of the nuclear
market to include utilities too small to accommodate large nuclear units
which would result from reductions in unit size seems unlikely to be a
decisive factor in determining whether such reductions would be worthwhile.
Rather, the issue would seem to hinge on whether the previously discussed
advantages claimed for the smaller units are in practice sufficient to
attract the interest even of those utilities whose systems are large enough
to accommodate the large plants.
Fuel cycle costs
In table 4.1, the goal of reducing fuel cycle costs was included in the
second rank of innovation targets. This ranking differs from the traditional
view of the role of nuclear power plant innovation. The latter, formulated
during a period of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry, was based on the
expectation that depletion-driven increases in the price of natural uranium
would be the primary threat to the economic competitiveness of the nuclear
option. According to this view, the chief goal of reactor design innovation
was to ensure that nuclear power plant systems with suitably conservative
uranium consumption characteristics would be available commercially on a
schedule dictated by the rate of uranium price escalation The efforts in
the U.S. and overseas to develop the liquid-metal cooled fast breeder reactor
(LMFBR) are, of course, the product of this thinking.
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As detailed above, however, other, more immediate threats to the
competitiveness of the nuclear option have emerged within the last decade
which are at least partly susceptible to mitigation through technological
innovation, but which the breeder was not intended to address. At the same
time, as a result of both sharp reductions in the expected growth rate of
nuclear power and recent additional discoveries of high-grade, low-cost
uranium resources, the projected future rate of increase of uranium prices
has declined, and the need to develop an appropriate technical response has
become correspondingly less urgent.
There may well be a time in the future when high uranium costs will
induce a shift to the LMFBR or to an alternative breeder concept. But those
circumstances now seem very unlikely to arise before the year 2025 in the
U.S., and certainly will not arise at all if the other problems which are
currently inhibiting nuclear power growth are not resolved first.
Conceivably, innovations introduced to resolve these nearer-term
problems could become a victim of their own commercial success; that is, they
could be driven into premature obsolescence by depletion-driven uranium price
increases and resulting competition from the breeder before their development
costs could be fully recovered. We did not attempt a quantitative analysis
of this issue in the present study; the answer obviously would depend on the
magnitude of the initial investment required to commercialize the innovation,
as well as on trends in electricity demand and uranium supply well beyond the
2010 cut-off date used in the analysis in Section 3. The issue certainly
deserves more careful study. However, even without such an assessment it
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seems probable that, in decisions on whether to make major new investments in
nearer-term nuclear power plant design innovations, the financial risk of
premature obsolescence posed by the breeder would be outweighed by the risk
that the product would fail to attract sufficient utility interest in the
first place.
4.A-1
Appendix to Section 4
Impact of nuclear unit size on ordering potential
To investigate the issue of appropriate unit size in more detail, a
simple, highly stylized model of the U.S. electric utility industry was
constructed. The model disaggregates the national utility system into
individual utility service areas. The purpose of the model was to estimate
the impact of unit size on the theoretical upper limit of nuclear penetration
into the new baseload plant market during the period 1990-2010. In other
words, by how much would a given reduction in nuclear plant size potentially
increase the number of nuclear orders placed during this period? The model
was based on the following principal assumptions:
* In 1990, and again in the year 2000, each utility would order one or
more new baseload plants based on its 10-year forecast of demand
growth in its service area and its expected 10-year schedule of plant
retirements.
* Each utility would order the combination of units which would
approach as closely as possible its baseload capacity requirements at
the end of the tenth year without exceeding them. (A further,
implicit assumption is that baseload plant lead-times will not exceed
10 years.)
a There is no joint utility ownership of plants.
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Obviously this last assumption will bias the model in favor of smaller
units. In practice, co-ownership is already quite common in the utility
industry, and is probably increasing in extent.
Three national electricity demand growth scenarios were selected
corresponding to those analyzed in Section 3, as shown below:
Assumed Growth Rate (%/yr)
1990-2000 2000-2010
LOW 1.5 1.0
MID 2.5 2.0
HIGH 3.5 3.0
For each national scenario, average growth rates were obtained for each of
the nine electric reliability regions in the U.S. These derived regional
growth rates reflect the current pattern of interregional differences in
electricity demand. All utilities in each region were assumed to experience
the average regional growth rate. (A fuller description of the assumptions
used in the model is given at the end of this Appendix.)
In order to estimate the theoretical upper limit on nuclear
ordering, it was assumed that 'a nuclear unit would always be preferred
to a coal unit of the same size. Utility ordering behavior was then
simulated for each of the three demand scenarios assuming that the smallest
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nuclear unit available was (1) 1000 MWe; (2) 600 MWe: (3) 300 MWe; or (4) 100
MWe.
Figure 4.A.1 shows, for the 'MID' scenario, the maximum share of
marginal 'baseload' demand between 1990 and 2000 that could be captured by
nuclear for the four unit size cases. Also shown is the maximum nuclear
market share if nuclear ordering were limited to those utilities which
already had nuclear plants in operation prior to 1990. Figure 4.A.2 shows
the results for the decade 2000-2010. Figures 4.A.3 and 4.A.4 show the
number of utilities placing orders in each case.
The main points emerging from this analysis are as follows:
9 The utilities that are individually large enough to introduce at
least one 1000 MWe unit in each of the 10-year planning cycles will
account for almost half of the industry's total projected requirement
for new baseload capacity.
* More than 70% of these large utilities will have had prior nuclear
experience by 1990. On the other hand, less than half of all the
utilities with prior nuclear experience by 1990 will be in a position
to order new 1000 MWe units before 2010.
* The availability of smaller units increases the potential market
penetration of nuclear significantly, though the actual effect would
be smaller than is indicated in the figures because co-ownership
would result in a greater commitment to the large plants. With no
co-ownership, the availability of 300 MWe units would increase the
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maximum nuclear market share by 70% relative to the 1000 MWe case
during the 1990s (equivalent to an increase in the maximum potential
ordering rate of about 3 GWe/yr.)
* If the increase in the potential size of the nuclear market created
by the availability of smaller units were to be exploited fully, a
majority of the utilities ordering the smaller plants would have had
no previous nuclear experience. Ease of construction and operation
would thus be particularly important design goals for small systems.
* Though a more detailed analysis of the issue is certainly necessary,
a plausible interpretation of these preliminary results is that the
expansion of the potential market to include utilities which could
not accommodate large units on their system is unlikely to be a
decisive factor in determining whether significant nuclear unit size
reductions would be worthwhile. Rather, the issue would seem to rest
on whether the other advantages claimed for smaller units --
discussed elsewhere in this report -- are in fact sufficient to
attract the interest of those utilities which could in principle also
accommodate large plants.
Other Major Assumptions
(1) Regional growth rates were formulated so that the assumed national
average growth rate was maintained during each ten-year period,
while the growth rate distribution from region to region reflected
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that predicted by the National Electric Reliab;iity Council for the
period 1980 to 1990.*
(2) Sixty-five percent (65%) of the marginal (i.e., new and
replacement) electricity supply will be generated by units on
baseload duty.
(3) The average capacity factor for each utility's total generating
plant was taken to be 44%, ** and the capacity factor of base-loaded
units was assumed to be 65%.
(4) Coal stations were retired after a 40 year service lifetime. Their
capacity factor at the time of retirement was assumed to be 44%.
(5) Generation data for the approximately 350 individual utilities
treated in this analysis were obtained from "Statistics of Publicly
Owned Electric Utilities.. .1980"*** and "Statistics of Privately
Owned Electric Utilities ... 1980. "****
* National Electric Reliability Council, "Electric Power Supply and
Demand, 1981-1980," July 1981.
** U.S. Department of Energy, July 1981, "1982 Annual Energy Outlook,"
DOE/EIA-0383(82), April 1983.
* U.S. Department of Energy, "Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric
Utilities in the United States -- 1980," DOE/EIA-0172(8).
***AJ.S. Department of Energy, "Statistics of Privately Owned Electric
Utilities in the United States -- 1980 Annual (Classes A & B
Companies)," DOE/EIA-0044(80).
5. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION VERSUS POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Many of the targets for technological innovation discussed in the
preceding paragraphs can in principle also be achieved by institutional
reforms of various kinds, some of which are already underway. For example,
although its prospective contribution is sometimes exaggerated, stabilization
of the nuclear power plant licensing process through administrative and
possibly legislative reform can help to reduce utility concerns over the
financial risks of new nuclear investments. Higher levels of insurance
coverage for property damage and replacement costs incurred during forced
outages can also help in this regard. Standardization of existing plant
designs would facilitate the licensing process and enhance the predictability
of construction costs and leadtimes. Improvements in construction management
practices would alleviate many of the problems now being experienced at
nuclear construction sites around the country. Better training programs for
operating and maintenance personnel would help upgrade plant operating
performance and reduce the risk of accidents initiated or aggravated by human
error. A more sympathetic economic regulatory environment -- in particular,
one in which all utilties were permitted to earn a return on construction
work in progress -- would help to lessen the current utility industry
aversion to long lead-time, capital-intensive nuclear construction projects.
Beyond these measures, other more far-reaching organizational reforms
have also been proposed, though not so far acted on. Such reforms are
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intended to address the generic problems caused both by excessive
fragmentation in the U.S. utility industry and by the often unwieldy
tripartite approach to design and construction management involving
utilities, NSSS vendors, and architect engineers.*
Evidence from abroad that nuclear power programs utilizing essentially
the same technology are manageable when some or all of these conditions are
present is often used in support of the case for such reforms in the United
States.
Some have gone further, arguing that properly conceived and implemented
institutional reforms, coupled with demonstrable progress in nuclear waste
management and disposal, and barring any major mishap involving existing
nuclear plants, will be sufficient to restore the viability of the nuclear
option. This is all the more likely, it is suggested, if concerns about acid
rain and C02 emissions from fossil power plants continue to escalate.
Therefore, it is argued, technological innovations beyond the relatively
modest efforts now underway are unnecessary. This assertion may prove to be
correct. It is, however, impossible to prove in advance. And should it turn
* The proposed reforms include greatly expanded roles for nuclear service
companies, and the creation of government or privately-owned regional
nuclear generating consortia separate from the organizations responsible
for transmission, distribution, and other generating operations. (For a
recent review of such proposals, see 3. Barkenbus, "An assessment of
institutional alternatives for nuclear power generation," (mimeo) Institute
for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, February 1983.)
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out to be wrong, unambiguous evidence to that effect would come too late to
permit a timely technological response, in view of the long development
lead-times involved. Even if it is correct -- in the sense that utilities
will at some future time resume ordering LWRs of conventional design -- that
is not a reason not to proceed with the development of advanced nuclear power
plant systems. In short, irrespective of whether current nuclear plant
designs are in some sense 'adequate,' we see no logical basis for the notion
of institutional reform as a viable alternative to technological innovation,
but rather view them as being properly pursued in parallel.
6. THE TECHNICAL OPTIONS
In this chapter, opportunities for design innovation involving several
nuclear power plant systems are assessed in light of the innovation targets
established previously. Evolutionary improvements in LWR systems are
examined in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 presents a discussion of the PIUS
reactor concept, of Swedish origin. Current and advanced high-temperature
gas reactor systems are assessed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. The latter focuses
in particular on small-scale, modular HTGR systems. Finally, liquid metal
cooled breeders, heavy water moderated reactors, and several other reactor
systems are reviewed in Section 6.5
6.1 Next Generation LWRs
In identifying potentially promising areas of design innovation for the
next generation of LWRs, it is recognized that ultimately the value of a
power station to a utility company is measured by its contribution to the
financial health of the company. The financial health of a regulated utility
and the economic benefits which it makes available to its customers are
closely linked quantities, being roughly coincident (at least in the long
run) in the areas of capital and operating costs, and in the related area of
system availability. The following discussion focuses upon these areas of
economic performance. The other major cost component, the fuel cycle cost,
is largely external to a utility's control and to its benefit stream.
Moreover, largely for historical reasons, the current generation of LWRs has
been designed with greater emphasis on fuel cost minimization than on the
reduction of capital and operating and maintenance costs.
6-2
The capital cost contribution to the total -ost of nuclear electricity
is a function of both the final construction cost of the plant and the plant
capacity factor. Design innovations can affect both of these properties, and
it is useful to distinguish between them in this regard.
Plant construction costs:
The main types of design innovation which influence plant construction
cost are summarized in Table 6.1.1 according to the category in which
benefits may be realized (e.g. carrying charges, material costs). Also shown
are several project management innovations which could bring about
construction cost reductions. Because of the large role played in power
station design by safety requirements the safety-related portion of Table
6.1.1 is elaborated in Table 6.1.2.
Typically there may be several means of achieving the design goals
summarized in these tables. For example, the goal of slowing the transient
response of the PWR nuclear steam supply system could in principle be met
variously by increasing the water inventories of the primary and/or secondary
portions of the steam generator, by increasing the pressurizer volume, and by
optimizing the moderator coefficient of reactivity. Identifying the optimal
design solution in this case wouldrequire, inter alia, a careful
quantitative specification of the design goal, along with a determination of
the feasibility of the possible design options.
Plant capacity factor:
Table 6.1.3 lists the major causes of plant capacity factor reductions, and
Table 6.1.4 summarizes many of the most important design measures for
Table 6.1.1
Major Factors Affecting Plant Construction Costs
Cost Component Carrying Materials Labor Satisfaction Negotiation
charges and of Safety of Licensing
Design or (Construction Components Requirements Maze
Attributes Duration)
Design standardization x x x x x
Use of modular x x x x x
components
System & component x x x x x
simplification
Design for ease in x x
construction access
Use more smaller units x x x x
at a single site
Improvement in Safety x x x x x
(see Table 6.2.1
Project Management
Attributes
Replacement of ? ? ? x ?
Architect/Engineers
by utility staff
Use of small scale x x
design models
Comprehensive project x x x x x
scheduling and
management
Completion of design x x x x x
prior to start of
construct ion
Table 6.1.2
Design Targets for Improving Plant Safety
Accident Prevention
Greater system reliability
Greater system simplification
Greater use of PRA to identify, upgrade and monitor sensitive
components
Rendering system more forgiving of equipment failures and
operator errors
Increasing design margins
Increasing interacting component characteristic time scales
and ensuring that such scales for entire system are mutually
consistent
Increasing standardization and modularization
Improving information system control scope, comprehensiveness,
ability to focus upon high-priority information and reliability
Challenging the justification of systems required to deal with
low risk and unrealistically stylized accidents
Designing control room for easy access and focus upon essential
information
Eliminating opportunities for containment bypass in accidents
Accident Mitigation
Minimizing potential for interactions of subsystems and
components which can function independently
Re-examining seismic analysis assumptions, methods and design
requirements ab initio in light of past earthquake experience
Designing primary and containment systems to maximize fission
product retention in severe damage accidents
Emphasizing use of passive heat sinks and heat removal systems
Table 6.1.3
Sources of Capacity Factor Reductions
Capacity Factor Relative
Loss (%)* Percentage
of Loss
Forced shutdown 18.4 42.1
Accident affecting plant safety
Mechancial
Human
Component failure or malfunction
Human failure or malfunction
Unstable system response to an initiating
event
Mechanical
Human
Major accident <2 <4.8
Mechancial
Human
Shutdown or de-rating mandated by regulatory
authorities 4.7 11.3
Common mode problem
Design error
Reduced or lost design margin
Maintenance shutdowns 13.4 32.1
Component repair
Component replacement
Radiation-limited operation
Refueling
Other (e.g., Training, operation below capacity) 3.2 7.7
*Source: D.C. Bley, 'Light Water Reactor Productivity Improvement," MIT Nuclear
Engineering Department Ph.D. thesis (1979).
Table 6.1.4
Methods for Increasing Plant Capacity Factor
Avoidance of forced shutdowns
Use of historical experience and PRA to identify unreliable components and
systems to be upgraded and/or monitored
Simplification, standardization and modularization of systems
Use of more forgiving systems -- in terms of transient response
time scales and of inherent design margin
Use of more reliable, simpler, more comprehensive and focussed
information processing and control systems
Use of more reliable components and systems
Reduction of maintenance shutdown duration
Design for minimal system radioactive contamination and
corrosion
Design for easy component replacement
Design for robotic maintenance
Design for easier monitoring of component state (e.g.,
brittleness)
Reduction of scheduled shutdown frequency
Increase fuel burnup and refueling interval
Design components for longer useful lives
Increase system design margins to allow more easily for
accommodation to new adverse information
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enhancing plant availability. The latter roughly fall into the categories of
making plants more reliable, more tolerant of failures and of new information
regarding adverse phenomena, and easier to repair and maintain.
Operation and maintenance costs:
Table 6.1.5 summarizes several design measures which would reduce the cost of
maintenance operations or avoid the real need for them altogether. Measures
to reduce occupational doses associated with equipment replacement and other
maintenance operations are of particular importance.
Areas of High Priority Interest
Without a comprehensive survey of utility options, an attempt to specify the
highest priority design goals among those discussed above would be
premature. However, among the most probable candidates are the following:
e reliability improvements;
e simplification;
* refinement of plant safety criteria;
* optimal plant sizing;
* minimization of maintenance and equipment replacement shutdown
durations and costs and of radiation dose burdens.
As these areas are expected to be of special importance in any LWR innovation
effort, they are discussed individually in this section.
Table 6.1.5
Factors Related to the Costs of Maintenance Operations
Maintenance avoidance
Use of low corrosion materials and ultra clean water
Use of simpler, more compact water filtration systems
Better component monitoring to identify maintenance needs
Radiation dose reduction
Use of modular, easily replaced components
Design for remote automated maintenance
Avoidance of use of easily activated, long-lived materials
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Reliability Improvements. Improvements in plant reliability can be achieved
in several ways, including the following:
e Making reduced demands upon control systems (human and
mechanical);
e Improved components;
* Better-trained, more competent operators aided by more helpful
information systems:
e More robust, simpler systems;
e Improved monitoring and maintenance of sensitive components.
The tools necessary to address the various means of reliability range
from Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) and historical records -- for
identifying the most sensitive components for monitoring and attentive
maintenance -- to common sense (which perhaps is not so common) in the case
of more robust, simpler systems. The difficulty in attaining high
reliability in current plants is that it typically does not appear as an
explicitly identified, unambiguously quantified, design goal. Rather it is
approached through setting design, manufacturing, and performance
specifications for the various station components.
Quality Control (Q/C) during construction of the station is intended to
ensure that these requirements are met. Associated with the Q/C program --
especially regarding components of the plant which are safety-related (which
may in itself be a dangerous concept) -- is the Quality Assurance program
(Q/A) which is intended through a combination of inspection and
documentation, to be able to demonstrate upon inquiry that specified
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procedures have been followed. The Q/A system is punitive in that its
immediate goal is to avoid the sanctions attendant upon failure to conform to
the required procedures. It promotes the goals of reliability improvement to
the degree that it aids the Q/C program in assuring that the various
component specifications are met. In return, the Q/C program can promote
high reliability only to the degree that the specifications which it enforces
reflect that goal. Reliability is only one of several design goals which may
be promoted in component requirements specification. Among others are
component capacity maximization and the ability to function in hostile
environments.
What is needed in this area is a far more comprehensive approach to the
achievement and maintenance of a high level of reliability. This goal will
be much easier to meet if it is made a more explicit component of the plant
design and operational requirement than is currently the case. There are
difficulties involved in incorporating such a goal into the set of goals
pursued by the groups who typically design power plants -- the
architect/engineer firms and the utility equipment divisions. These groups
are different from those who usually operate the completed power stations.
While the former may attempt to respect the spirit of a requirement for high
plant reliability, unless this requirement can be stated in an unambiguous
quantitative fashion it will remain difficult to ensure that it is being met
adequately. The formulation of that statement is not obvious but is so
important that it will require considerable care and attention.
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The most important ways in which reliability improvements can be
obtained using existing plants is to examine their operating histories with
the goal of identifying and remedying the leading contributors to
unreliability. (See Table 6.1.3). It is also important to ensure that the
broadest and most current data are employed in comprehensive PRA's oriented
toward identifying the leading sources of unreliability.
Plant Simplification. The idea of plant simplification is attractive
but vague as there are limitless ways in which such a goal may be
approached. There exist no clear criteria or methodologies to guide a
designer to the most effectively simplified plan. The generalprinciples for
plant simplification are the following:
e Re-examining the function of each plant system and component in order
to identify those which are not essential and/or to determine whether
this function could be satisfied adequately by a different, simpler
system. As an example,it has been suggested that the PWR soluble
boron reactivity control system should be eliminated, since this
would significantly reduce the complexity and number of components
in the plant piping system. The price of doing this would be a
possible reduction in the uniformity of the power distribution in the
core (though this could possibly be avoided through core redesign).
Whether this simplification is worthwhile depends upon whether its
net estimated benefits are positive, and, if so, whether they are
greater than those of other simplifications which could be achieved
with the same resources.
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* Identification of unnecessary or avoidable interactions between plant
systems and components. Avoidance of such interaction is essential
for minimizing the potential of common-mode failures and of needless
propagation of the consequences of improper operation of a particular
system.
e Adoption with each system and component of a requirement that it be
demonstrated that the function of that system be necessary or
beneficial. If it is necessary its function should be provided in
the simplest way possible. If its function is unnecessary but
beneficial, then the net evaluated benefits of the function
(includinq allowance for the costs of unreliable operation) should be
substantial. This principle is expected to be especially important
in assessing the best way of meeting plant safety requirements,
since the designs of many current plants reflect a consistent pattern
of using design "add-ons" in order to meet evolving safety criteria
which became imposed after initial planning was completed.
Some examples of possible LWR design simplifications are listed in
Table 6.1.6. The list is not intended to be comprehensive. Indeed, current
designs offer a very large number of possibilities. Identification of the
most important opportunities in this regard must rely substantially on the
judgement and experience of the persons most familiar with the existing
plants.
Table 6.1.6
Examples of Ways in Which Simplication Could be Used to Improve Plant
Design
Design Change Benefit
Elimination of soluble Reduce piping system complexity
control systems in PWRs possible failure modes, costs.
Use of oversized PWR Increase range of secondary
pressurizer. system events which could be
tolerated without use of primary
control system.
Possible elimination of PORVs.
Use of large volume, Elimination of need for hydrogen
inert atmosphere generation mitigation system
containments.
Reduced need for atmospheric
sprays, fan coolers.
Use of signal multiplexing, Reduced use of signal cable,
possibly with fiber-optical simplified signal network,
transmission. qreater network reliability,
smaller number of containment
penetrations.
Elimination of safety system Reduced dependence of safety
bunkering. system upon reliable functioning
of auxiliary cooling system
and service water systems.
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Refinement of Safety Criteria. From the beginning of the nuclear power
era, and especially during the past fifteen years, the safety requirements of
LWRs have increased significantly from one year to the next. As a result, no
plant in existence today reflects an optimized, comprehensive approach to the
satisfaction of current safety requirements.
The typical evolution of a safety concern is from the status of a new
issue, the validity of which is uncertain, through a period of investigation
and of resistance by the nuclear industry to its inclusion in the set of
mandatory safety concerns, to a final definition of the concern and of a set
of allowable design solutions. In principle, a nuclear power plant license
applicant remains free to challenge both the basis of the safety requirement
and the identified solution, but the high costs and low probability of being
successful is enough to deter such challenges in the great majority of
cases. In practice, the identified solutions are incorporated into new plant
designs and as backfits on existing plants as a path of least resistance in
meeting the requirements of the regulatory authorities.* The result of this
process has been the development of an extensive literature of Regulatory
Guides and Regulations codifying the issues of concern and their accepted
solutions. This vector of safety concerns is not formulated so as to reduce
public risk most efficiently using available sources; it is not internally
consistent; and it is not permanent (reflecting, among other factors, the
persistent existence of a list of unresolved safety issues).
* The major notable exception to this rule in recent years is the post-
Three Mile Island "source term" re-examination of the treatment of off-site
radioactive releases in nuclear plant accidents.
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Even for a single hypothetical accident the existing regulations are
inconsistent. As an example, in a specified loss-of-coolant accident the
safety system is required to maintain the fuel (and its contents) in a stable
condition, the containment system is required to perform effectively assuming
that core stability is not maintained, and the off-site emergency response
plan is to be formulated as if the containment failed to function properly.
This cascading of assumed failures in the determination of individual system
design requirements is justified on the basis that it provides a residual
defense against accidents more extreme than those specified as a
deterministic design basis.
The result of this pattern of evolution is, in a given plant, a set of
approximately integrated systems designed to address the set of safety
requirements which had been codified at the time of the plant's initial
design, and a set of systems added later to address newly-evolved safety
criteria. The arbitrariness and incompleteness of the safety criteria and
the high costs of the resulting systems suggest that a rationalization is
desirable which could also provide for increased safety through more
efficient use of available resources.
Important areas in which substantial improvements could be achieved by
refining safety criteria are listed in Table 6.1.7. In all cases the purpose
would be to increase the realism of the criteria and postulated accidents in
order to maximize the degree of safety obtained with a given commitment of
resources. This would involve identifying the greatest contributors to
potential risk, and relying to the fullest justifiable extent on
Table 6.1.7
Possible Opportunities for Rationalizing and Refining Plant Safety
Requirements
Phenomenological modeling
Emphasize the consistent upgrading of the realism and accuracy
of models used for safety analysis in order to reduce needless
and possibly misleading "conservatism."
Maintain long range industry and governmental research programs
to provide the basis for modeling improvements. This would
constitute a departure from the current practice of withdrawing
resources from areas in which regulatory authorities have removed
pressure, but where a substantial refinement of requirements
remains feasible.
Seismic and dynamic loads
Reformulate design basis earthquake to be more realistic.
Design systems conservatively but dynamically and consistently,
not statically.
Permit allowable system response to include tolerable plastic
deformation.
Redefine postulated failure modes so as to be more realistic
(e.g. focus more upon small pipe cracks than upon double-ended
ruptures of major pipes).
Combine temporarily-varying component loads stochastically rather
than statically -- in worst combination.
Risk evaluation
De-emphasize the current set of highly-stylized, deterministi-
cally specified design basis accidents.
Undertake programs to provide much greater data base to improve
PRA accuracy and versatility and use PRA to identify the leading
contributors risks, as a guide to redefine design basis accident
formulation.
Couple PRA to NRC Safety Goal prescription and prescription of
design basis accident set.
/continued
Table 6.1.7 (continued)
Emergency planning
Shift focus to realistic rather than conservative planning basis.
Shift the public response emphasis of such planning from
evacuation to protective actions based upon seeking shelter and
minimizing dose received.
Emphasize formulation of extensive quick-access libraries of
analyses prior to accidents to facilitate rapid accurate
diagnosis of accident conditions.
Safety system design
Shift from need for active quick-acting systems to passive
systems required only to respond slowly.
Emphasize use of natural convection for emergency heat removal.
Introduce passive primary, containment safety heat sinks.
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well-understood physical phenomena in designing systems to provide protection
against those risks.
It is important to recognize that if a revision of plant safety criteria
along the lines suggested is indeed to occur, the electric utilities will
have to take the lead. Although the nuclear plant supply industry (vendors,
architect-engineers, component suppliers, etc.) would presumably benefit from
such an effort in the long run, its incentives to act are weaker.*
Optimal Size of Plant. A factor not tied directly to LWR innovation but
which significantly determines the qualitative design options available to a
plant is that of the plant's generation capacity. The range of sizes (900 to
1250 MWe) of plants currently available from the nuclear vendors is the
result of past attempts to capture economies of scale. Whether such
economies can easily be captured is debatable, with evidence being available
pro and con. However, the reality is that the available size range is rather
narrow, and possibly not well suited to the needs of the utility industry.
In the past large plants could easily be accommodated into the expansion
* This is reflected in the organization of the current IDCOR (Industry
Degraded Core) effort, which is largely utility-financed with only weak
nuclear-vendor architect/engineer leadership. Other evidence consistent
with this view is provided by the deliberate decoupling of advanced LWR
system design efforts currently being pursued in Japan by Westinghouse and
General Electric from the domestic nuclear plant market. A strong
motivation for this is to avoid subjecting the advanced designs to review
by U.S. regulators, both to protect the designs from aspects of American
requirements which are considered to be unjustified, and to avoid
introducing additional safety innovations into the American regulatory
system for fear that their existence will be used as a rationale for
requiring that existing plants incorporate them in their designs. Thus,
even though such innovations could permit a better use of resources in
addressing safety requirements, the vendors do not at present perceive it
to be in their interests to introduce them into the United States.
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plans of the typical rapidly growing utility. However, current conditions of
uncertain demand growth, of difficulties in keeping nuclear construction
projects on schedule, and of high costs of capital increase the financial
risk to a utility embarking upon such a project. These factors of
uncertainty and possibly large cost may argue in favor of use of smaller
plants, for which the attendant risks are smaller.
If this is the case, the range of feasible plant innovations becomes
significantly greater than if another larger LWR is to be built as the next
unit in the system. Among the possible areas of innovation are those of
greater use of modular construction, prefabrication, standardization, and use
of pre-licensed multi-unit sites than is possible with 1000 MWe plants. Such
plants could also presumably be constructed more rapidly, have more complete
initial designs and pose less individual risk (due to lower core fission
product inventories) than larger plants. Whether such plants should be
pursued depends upon the situation of an individual utility and upon the
evaluated net benefits of these factors of small-scale economy. Because it
is at least plausible that optimized smaller plants could be attractive, it
is important that future planning consider LWR use in this mode.
Minimization of Maintenance and Component Replacement Costs and
Associated Radiation Doses. As the current generation of LWRs ages,
utilities are experiencing an increasing burden of maintenance and equipment
replacement costs and attendant radiation doses. The most dramatic instances
have occurred at several plants where unanticipated steam generator repairs
and replacements have been necessary. These and other tasks have been much
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more costly and difficult than they would have been had the need for them
been anticipated at the design stage. Designing for such operational
problems in future plants should thus be an important objective. The keys to
minimizing these problems are the following:
* Designing components as easily exchanged modules.
* Designing for easy component access and transfer out of the
containment building.
e Designing for rapid work by humans and for access and compatibility
with robotic repair devices.
* Use of frequent maintenance and component monitoring to prevent and
detect deterioration prior to failure.
* Use of low activation and low corrosion materials and environments
to minimize production of radioactive contaminants and to prevent
component failures.
The opportunities for improvement in this area seem substantial. That
they have been neglected previously provides a further indication of the need
for greater utility involvement in future LWR design specifications.
Improvements to Existing Plants
An effort to refine the designs of new LWRs would also be expected to
provide benefits to existing plants. The main limitation upon potential
design changes to existing plants is that imposed by the additional costs of
backfitting. In many cases these additional costs can be so large as to
outweigh the potential benefits of the change.
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The main areas where the benefits of new plant changes should also be
easily translated to existing plants include the following:
* Improved reliability through increased component monitoring and use
of more comprehensive and active information systems.
* Operation for reduced corrosion and radiation field buildup.
* Fuel management to increase refueling intervals.
e Rationalization of safety requirements in order to permit relaxation
of current safety system performance requirements.
Thus, an effort to refine the design goals of new LWRs can also be expected
to provide substantial benefits for existing plants, although the scope of
such benefits would be more limited than for the new plants. The corollary
to this is that a plant redesign effort focussed upon improvements to
operating plants would provide only limited benefits for the refinement of
new plant designs.
Proposed LWR research
It is proposed to carry out a research project at M.I.T. in conjunction
with a consortium of leading utilities with the ultimate goal of developing a
design specification for an advanced LWR which would come closer than present
systems to meeting future utility needs. The research group would consist of
several M.I.T. faculty and staff (including the project leaders) and also
several full time technical staff assigned by the participating utilities to
the project. The duration of the project would be approximately 5 years, and
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the M.I.T. reseach effort would be funded at a level between $0.8 and
$1.6 million annually. A fuller description of the goals, organization,
personnel requirements, budget, and schedule of this project is presented in
Section 8.1.1.
The M.I.T. researchers would contribute to the continuing work of the
group in defining the design goals, and would also individually conduct
research - typically working with graduate student research assistants -
needed to advance the understanding of possible LWR design improvements.
This work would build upon the traditional nuclear engineering research
efforts at MIT and upon particularly relevant current research projects such
as those in the following areas:
* Thermal hydraulics for operational and safety analysis
e Nuclear power station operational simulation and advanced
information systems
* Seismic design refinement
e Behavior of crucial component materials
* Robotics
* Design of small, modular LWR and HTGR power stations
e Reliability of key operational and safety systems
* Historical trends in power plant design
More detailed examples of continuing investigations at M.I.T. which would be
relevant to this work are presented in the appendix at the end of this
section, to provide an idea of the scale and diversity of these research
efforts.
6-15
6.2 The PIUS Reactor Concept
The "Process Inherent Ultimate Safety" (PIUS) reactor is a
radically redesigned LWR concept proposed by Kare Hannerz of ASEA-ATOM
in Sweden. * It has been designed from the outset with intrinsic safety
in mind, and has an inherent capability of self-protection against loss
of fuel integrity during severe transient or accident events.
Figure 6.2.1 and Table 6.2.1 illustrate the key features of this
reactor concept, which include:
* enclosure of the entire primary system in a large PCRV filled
with pressurized water; the hot primary system is immersed in a
pool of cold borated water to which it is hydraulically coupled
at two fluid interfaces (6 and 7 in Fig. 6.2.1). The remainder
of the primary system is separated from the cold pool by low
pressure ducting, and special steel gauze insulation.
e use of an immersed main circulating pump to dynamically balance
circuit pressure drops during normal operation such that the
interfaces are stabilized; under upset conditions the cold
borated pool water is drawn into the core, shutting it down.
The large coolant inventory is sufficient to guarantee approxi-
mately one week of "walk-away" safety before external intervention would
be needed to insure the continuation of shutdown cooling.
* K. Hannerz, "Towards Intrinsically Safe Light Water Reactors," ORAU/
IEA-83-2(M), February 1983 (and revision of April 1983).
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Fig. 6.2.1 Schematic of PIUS reactor conceptual
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design
Table 6.2.1
Representative PIUS Design Parameters
Power Rating:
Thermal . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 MW
Electrical . . . . . . . . . . . 500 MW
Thermodynamic Efficiency . . . . . . 31.3%
Size of PCRV . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 ft i.d.
90 ft o.d.
100 ft I.Ht.
200 ft 0.Ht.
Core Power Density . . . . . . . . . . 70.1 Kw/Z
Core Height; Diameter . . . . . . . . . 6.46 ft; 12.60 ft
Operating Pressure (core exit) . ..... 1307 psia
core P ....... 6.44 psi
Core Inventory ......... .. ..... 68.4 MTHM
Design Burnup ..... .. ...... . -. 30,000 MWD/MT
Steam Generators . . . . . . . . . . . once-through
(boiling in tubes)
Fuel Assemblies . . . . . . . . . .. 16 x 16 rod array
0.482 in o.d
0.600 in pitch,
2.82% enrichment,
193 assemblies
Number of:
Steam Generators . . . . . . . . . 4
Main Coolant Pumps . . . . . . . . 2
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Sev<eal man-years of effort have been invested by its proponents in
evaluation of the accident response of the PIUS system, and to date it has
successfully withstood all postulated insults. The full roster of events has
not yet been fully explored in depth, however, and questions still remain
concerning such aspects as susceptibility to thermal shock, and instabilities
during a depressurization transient. In addition to these low probability
scenarios, more evaluation is needed in the area of design and performance of
the once-through steam generator, and with respect to overall system
maintainability. In this latter regard, in particular, it should be noted
that the PIUS design is an evolving concept, and hence should be assessed in
the form of its most recent embodiment.
Overall, the prospects are encouraging that PIUS may fulfill the goals
for which it was designed -- greater assurance against severe core damage,
hence against hazard to the public health and to utility financial
integrity.
Nevertheless, there are some major uncertainties which caution against
an unqualified endorsement of the PIUS concept at this state of its
development.
(a) If a containment building is required (as we speculate would be the
case in the U.S.), then a PIUS unit would be slightly more
expensive than a conventional LWR. Indeed, the potential impact of
the licensing process on all aspects of system design is a major
concern: the reintroduction of complexity could further compromise
economic prospects.
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(b) Hydraulic stability is not yet fully proven -- the reactor may shut
itself down too frequently without just cause; the time to recover
from these scrams, particularly those involving rod drop, appears
to be sufficiently long to raise concern over maintenance of a high
capacity factor. Computer simulation studies and experimental work
in the area of hydraulic response are currently in progress.
(c) Apart from its greater simplicity, PIUS does not appear to be
significantly better suited to other innovations which may be
necessary to promote a renewed interest in nuclear systems by
either U.S. utilities (downsizing, modularity, accelerated
construction) or long-range strategic planners (uranium utilization
and low fuel cycle cost). However, 30 years' worth of in-vessel
storage is available for spent fuel -- a safeguards advantage, and
overall the reactor is less vulnerable to sabotage and earthquake
damage.
The investment in time and money required to prove out this concept is
not insubstantial, despite the fact that maximum use is made of available
PWR/BWR technology. PIUS is sufficiently different that construction and
operation of a prototype unit (which might be as small as 20-50 MWe) is
called for, preceded by 3-5 years of preliminary engineering analysis and
experimentation. Commercial plants could therefore not be committed to for a
decade or more. R & D costs, including the prototype unit, over this time
period would probably total on the order of one billion dollars. In addition
to arranging for a commitment of funds at this level, it will probably be
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necessary to find a U.S. industrial sponsor/licensee willing to act as vendor
for this system. Recent indications in the trade press are that at least one
major utility (TVA) and an architect-engineering firm (Burns and Roe) have
more than a passing interest in the PIUS concept.
Finally, PIUS may be viewed as one end of a spectrum of redesigned
LWRs. For example, more forgiving versions of the BWR can also be devised.
Some compromise design hybrid between PIUS and more conventional reactors may
turn out to best satisfy the (as yet unquantified) consensus goals for
next-generation units.
The recommended strategy for the MIT effort is to start from current LWR
design configurations and progress,. through an evolutionary process, toward a
concept or concepts best suited to next-order units for the U.S. utility
market. Although individual faculty members at MIT may contribute to the
PIUS (and other) programs, it would appear that the PIUS evaluation process
is both well founded and well underway, and hence that, even apart from
philosophical differences, a concerted effort in this area under the aegis of
the MIT Reactor Innovation Project would be redundant.
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6.3 High Temp(erature Gas-Cooled Reactors
The properties of the high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) follow
in a particularly direct way from the microscopic properties of its fuel and
coolant. HTGRs utilize small uranium oxide or carbide fuel kernels coated
with pyrolitic carbon and/or silicon carbide dispersed in a graphite
moderator cooled by helium. The use of a refractory moderator and helium
coolant allows operation at high outlet temperatures: most designs eliminate
metallic structures entirely to facilitate such operation. The large thermal
capacity of the graphite core and the large negative temperature coefficient
of reactivity make HTGRs relatively insensitive to reactivity insertion and
to loss of coolant accidents. Low fuel concentration and direct embedding of
the fuel particles in the high conductivity graphite matrix yields low peak
fuel temperature and small thermal gradients. These generic properties plus
others to be discussed later have sustained interest in HTGRs even though
they employ a fuel cycle that was once considered to put them at a severe
commercial disadvantage.
There are two major subspecies of HTGR depending on whether the reactor
core is composed of randomly packed fuel/moderator spheres ("pebbles" of
approximately 6 cm diameter) or of monolithic graphite (typically 80 cm high,
36 cm hexagonal "prismatic" blocks) with included fuel and coolant zones. In
either case, the bulk graphite making up most of the core is mixed with
resins and then molded at high temperatures and pressure to form extremely
robust fuel elements. The U.S. program has, for the most part, considered
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reactors with monolithic cores. The German program pioneered and continues
to exploit the pebble-bed concept.
There is a large body of experience with these reactors. HTGRs have
been operated for over 15 years in the United States, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the U.K. 1 The Japanese are currently building a small (50 MWth)
experimental unit. At the moment, the German program is the most active.
In the U.S., experience with HTGRs has been based on operation of the 40
MWe Peach Bottom 1 plant from 1967 to 1974 and on the 330 MWe Fort St. Vrain
plant that has been in commercial operation since 1976.2 Although limited at
first by many difficulties, the Fort St. Vrain plant is now demonstrating the
high fuel integrity, low radiation exposure to plant personnel, and ease of
reactor control that is typical of the HTGR design. The Fort St. Vrain
operation has achieved 771 0C primary loop temperatures and 538*C steam
temperatures. A flow diagram on a plant schematic for Fort St. Vrain is
shown in Fig. 6.3.1. Extensions of the Fort St. Vrain technology, including
the use of prestressed concrete reactor vessels (PCRVs) has been the subject
of designs for both large electricity-producing HTGR plants and for
cogeneration of steam and electricity for process applications. Figure 6.3.2
shows a typical large (1000 MWe) design utilizing a prismatic element
monolithic core in a multicavity PCRV. This particular design would produce
steam of 1000*F and 2415 psi, suitable either for process heat or for
cogeneration.
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The German HTGR experience is based primarily on the AVR; a 50 MWth
research reactor that has been in nearly continuous operation since 1968.3
AVR, designed to produce very high temperatures, operates at a coolant outlet
temperature of 950*C. A much larger (300 MWe) pebble-bed demonstration
reactor (THTR) is effectively completed and is scheduled for initial
criticality in October 1983. THTR is designed for 750*C outlet helium
temperature. There is also a continuing series of studies of 350-500 MWe
units supported by a consortium of German utilities because units of this
size are particularly well suited to the German power grid. It is possible
to design small HTGRs for negligible fission product release (i.e., peak core
temperature below 1600*0C) even in the event of a depressurized loss-of-
coolant flow accident. Recent work at KFA and KWU has concentrated on
designing units of largest possible size that still retain the negligible
fission product release attribute of smaller units. Figure 6.3.3 is a
cross-section of a 350 MWe annular pebble-bed core design under study at KFA.
The Germans consider pebble-bed fuel technology to be essentially fully
developed -- over two million pebbles have been utilized to date -- and are
concentrating on various reactor implementations of the technology. Of
course, HTGRs promise high efficiency electrical generation but the high
temperature capability is also of particular interest for gasification of
Germany's large supply of hard coal and lignite.
The fuel cycle for the HTGR was initially conceived with the idea of
using highly enriched uranium fuel combined with thorium. This cycle offers
a high conversion to U-233 and a beneficial reactivity lifetime. However,
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recent emphasis has centered on a low enriched uranium once-through cycle
similar to that employed in present day LWRs. The use of low enrichment fuel
has been thoroughly demonstrated in the Dragon5 reactor in England as well as
in the AVR.
Thus, commercial HTGRs exist and advanced designs have been developed
that have the potential for producing process heat as well as high efficiency
(40%) electricity production. From a technical point of view, in comparison
with present day LWRs, the large HTGR has advantages in increased safety
margins, lower radiation exposures to operating personnel and higher thermal
efficiency. However, these advantages have not been strong enough to
overcome the initial increased financial costs and uncertainties that arise
in making the first large commercial HTGR.
As a general conclusion, one can observe that although on paper the HTGR
looks very acceptable, it has not been possible to prove that large HTGR
plants have fewer financial uncertainties than present-day LWRs and this,
combined with the uncertainties in such areas as U.S. licensing, has delayed
any commercial use of the HTGR for electricity or process heat.
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6.4 Advanced High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors
The large thermal capacity and high limiting temperatures of the HTGR
core offers the possibility of significant, qualitative advantages with
respect to the LWR. Because these advantages are most evident in smaller
units, there is considerable interest in modular systems of 250-300 MWth size
and a substantial body of literature is available. Although very small
special purpose (i.e., military) reactors have been studied for some time,
the commercial potential of reactors of less than 100 MWth has not been
adequately explored. This end of the size spectrum has, in principle, unique
and possibly very valuable attributes. We will consider below the categories
of "small" and "very small" HTGRs.
Recent HTGR studies in the U.S. and the FRG envisage a small number
(4-8) of identical modules as moderately redundant power plant heat sources,
or highly redundant (i.e., with capacity substantially greater than nominal
output requirement) process heat sources. In these studies, individual
reactor modules are designed to be as large as possible consistent with the
constraint that none of the fission products be released in a depressurized
loss of coolant flow accident. This design choice is made in order to take
advantage of certain economies of scale and to reduce the complexity
associated with the connection and simultaneous operation of individual
reactors. The typical unit size consistent with this design approach is of
the order of 250-350 MWth, although modular systems have been designed with
600 MWth units.
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There is also another regime of operation for which the HTGR may be
uniquely suited. In this regime of "very small" reactors the economy of
scale of large individual units is replaced with the economies of serial
production, shop fabrication, and standardization of very much smaller
units. These units might be typically 50-100 MWth. In Section 6.4.1, we
discuss the first class, called here small modular HTGRs. In Section 6.4.2
we consider the somewhat more speculative very small HTGR. In these sections
we emphasize the potential benefits that we believe exist and point out
several of the unresolved problem areas. In Section 6.4.3 we present a list
of research topics which concentrate on one or another of the problem areas
or which quantify the potential benefits. We note that each of the
individual topics appears capable of resolution within a five year time
frame. We believe that pebble bed HTGRs are a particularly fertile area for
intensive study. Such systems have certain unique properties and share in
others not available in combination elsewhere: high inherent safety, high
efficiency, extensive data base, flexible fuel cycle, promise of high
reliability plants, etc. The reduced financial risk of small modules will be
obvious to the utilities but perhaps equally important, the publicly
perceived risk might be substantially smaller because the relatively low cost
of a single modular unit will facilitate proof testing in a variety of
circumstances of units identical to those intended for commercial operation.
Experimental verification is inherently more convincing, and certainly more
accurate, than mathematical simulation of complex systems. This fact will
not be lost on either the public or the utilities.
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Other institutional barriers are similarly avoided. For example, the
relatively low cost and existing technology base might allow new vendors to
enter the arena. The combination of small size and simplicity would allow
small utilities to contemplate nuclear systems, facilitate load growth
matching and greatly simplify the problem of financing nuclear systems.
6.4.1 Small Modular HTGR Systems
Introduction
The concept of a nuclear power plant composed of several small modular
walk-away-safe units is becoming increasingly attractive. During this time
of slow growth in the demand for electricity and difficult new plant
financing due to escalated costs of large plants, it is reasonable to
consider smaller incremental investments in modularized components. Thus, a
plant might be initially small but designed for expansion in steps
commensurate with availability of financing and increases in electric
demand. It should be noted that each individual module represents smaller
financial risk from unforeseen difficulties or accidents and that redundant
modular systems can be designed for unit maintenance or replacement without
loss of plant availability.
In particular, it appears valuable to consider the pebble-bed high
temperature gas-cooled reactor (PB-HTGR) as the nuclear reactor module. In
Europe, this type of reactor is called simply the high-temperature reactor
(HTR) but for consistency in this report will also be referred to as the
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HTGR. This reactor type utilizes a well-developed fuel, pyrolytically coated
fuel particles inside small (approximately 6 cm O.D.) graphite balls, cooled
by helium gas. These fuel "pebbles" can be circulated or reshuffled through
the core, thus providing on-line refueling capability. The combination of
high temperature and on-line refueling results in a high efficiency system
with potential for high plant availability. These characteristics, together
with certain inherent safety capabilities, have been demonstrated by 15 years
of operation of the AVR plant in Germany.
Description of a Small HTGR (approximately 200 MWth)
The principle characteristics of small HTGRs include the integrated
arrangement of all primary loop components in a steel reactor pressure
vessel. The modular HTGR described by Lohnert and Reutler is a good example
of the class (see Fig. 6.4.1a). As shown, the flow of coolant gas goes
through the core to the steam generators located to the sides of the core at
an elevated level, with the control rods and back-up shutdown mechanisms
located only in the graphite reflector. The back-up shutdown system is
composed of smaller absorber spheres which can fall into the channels in the
reflector if needed to assure shutdown. The fuel elements have shown good
performance up to peak operating temperature of 1250*C and maximum burn-up of
160,000 MWD/t.6 At present, a "once-through cycle" is contemplated where the
spent fuel is loaded into cast-iron vessels (50,000 pebbles in each) for
storage and disposal cycles. The core is designed so that temperatures do
not rise above about 16000C even in a hypothetical accident such as loss of
all active coolant systems. As long as the fuel temperature remains below
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1600'C, there is no appreciable release of fission products from the
pyrolytically coated fuel particles.
For after-heat removal following a reactor shutdown, three possibilities
are provided:
(1) Normally, after-heat removal is performed through the operating
water-steam cooling loops, by natural convection of the He-coolant;
(2) In case the water-steam system is not available, the after-heat can
be removed on the secondary side through a 4-loop auxiliary cooling
system.
(3) If all systems fail the after-heat can be removed primarily by
radiation and conduction from the pressure vessel to a 2-loop
concrete cooling system which is located in the inner concrete
layer of the surrounding containment structure. In case of loss of
concrete cooling, the reactor will still be safe (although the
concrete might be damaged). Also, if the control rods do not shut
the reactor down, the low excess reactivity with on-line refueling
and the high negative temperature coefficient can cause the reactor
to be safely shut down during the heat-up. The fuel temperature
limit of 16000C will not be exceeded (see Fig. 6.4.1b).
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Some Additional Features of Small HTGRs
The following features of small HTGRs should also be noted:
e Emphasis can be made on simplicity for high degree of reliability and
ease of operability to minimize support staff requirements. In
addition, the reactor can be more easily automated than other
concepts because of the single phase coolant, large core heat
capacity and simple fuel form.
* The dose level to operating and maintenance personnel is very small
compared to other nuclear reactor systems (low coolant and component
activity).
e The reactor offers operational flexibility, fast high-power ramping
and rapid start-up from part load conditions.
* High efficiency of the HTGR minimizes thermal heat rejection.
Finally, although the primary objective in this project is to study
systems for electric generation, it should also be noted that small HTGRs
represent an excellent alternative to big plants in the heat market.
Modular Utilization of Small HTGRs
In the case of reactor components like steam generators, circulators,
etc., it is usual to connect several smaller units rather than one large unit
to obtain a required large power. But the possibility of increasing the
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power output by connecting several "reactor cores" has not often been
seriously considered, i.e., a power source was never thought of being
generated by several individual "cores." It is now being proposed that a
plant with high total energy capacity could beneficially be composed of more
than one reactor in the same containment building, a so-called "modular
system."
In big nuclear power plants, the cost of engineered safeguards is
becoming higher and higher. To avoid this complication, simplification of
the safety design has been pursued for small HTGRs. Moreover, it may also be
possible to reduce the specific cost of the modular concept by increasing the
number of small reactors to be built in the same reactor containment
building. Increases of fuel-cycle and capital costs would contribute only
moderately to the overall plant costs. Even for the medium-sized
power-plants the fuel-cycle costs and capital costs for the reactor-core
contribute only approximately 1/7th to the overall costs for electricity
production.7 Hence, it seems possible to separate, or modularize, the heat
source in analogy to the common practice of separating the heat sink without
too-heavy acost penalty and to design a fully modularized HTGR system. This
process leads to a reduction of the financial risk of introducing
high-temperature reactors into the market since plants of various sizes and
applications can be derived from one common basic concept.
Some Features of Modular HTGRs
* The specific plant costs of a modular HTGR could possibly be lower
than the specific plant costs of a large prismatic HTGR of
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conventional design at least up to the medium power range. Major
reasons are:
(1) Use of standardized, prefabricated steel-pressure vessels.
(2) Simplifications in the core design due to the limited core diameter
(e.g., reflector control rods only).
(3) Reduced or no need of redundant decay heat removal systems or of
emergency power supplies inside the primary system.
(4) Elimination of need for gas-tight containment building (this
possibility is still debatable).
(5) Standardization and serial (possibly shop) production of all
essential components. A further cost reduction would be attributed
to a reduction in plant construction time.
(6) Shutdown systems can be designed on simple principles since the
requirements are determined by requirements for cold shutdown only.
(7) No active auxiliary cooling systems are necessary inside the
primary system.
(8) Licensing procedure once established should be accelerated over the
LWR since the safety-related analyses are easy to verify and
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because many of the design basis accidents can be demonstrated
experimentally (e.g., the AVR supercritical loss of coolant flow
tests). 8
6.4.2 Very Small Modular HTGRs (50-100 MWth)
At the smallest end of the modular reactor size spectrum, it is possible
to conceive of standardized reactors that are built in serial production by
centralized shops, and shipped over the road to serve as interchangeable
thermal modules for electrical and process heat applications. Such a
scenario, so much at variance with the existing one, is attractive only if
the economy of serial production is comparable to economy of scale in large
units and if the individual units are, and are perceived to be, incapable of
releasing radioactive fission products.
Reactors designed for this regime of operation must have certain
mechanical and operational features. The major mechanical constraint is
obviously size, with maximum core diameter limited to 4-5 meters to allow
shipment of complete units. Other desirable mechanical features include the
use of a steel containment vessel, simplified internal structure, and the use
of external (reflector) control systems. The minimal operational
requirements are simplicity of control, stability of operation, and most
importantly demonstrable safety under all postulated accident conditions,
i.e., an individual module must remain undamaged in the event of a fully
depressurized accident with full reactivity insertion. Because there will be
many modules in a single system, simple fuel handling techniques are highly
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desirable, although on-line refueling will be unnecessary (single units can
be taken off line with only a small impact on availability). It is this
combination of features that would allow the simultaneous operation of many
identical units without the rapidly mounting costs associated with
intereacting control circuits and multiply-redundant safety systems.
The plant concept suggested above essentially describes the parallel
operation of a large number of highly simplified "user-friendly" reactors.
The technology is not new; in fact, there is a substantial data base.
Prototypes of such reactors exist in the form of TRIGA (exploiting the
properties of Uranium-Zirconium Hydride fuel) and AVR. Of the two, AVR
appears to have substantially more commercial potential. The required fuel
fabrication technology is available both in this country and abroad, and, of
course, the operating temperature is substantially higher.
With only modest redesign and extrapolation of demonstrated AVR
technology, it appears possible to build a very small gas cooled reactor
(VSGCR) that has the attributes of:
e demonstrable safety
* stable operating point
* simple fuel handling
* shop fabricability
e external (i.e., reflector) control
e low operating expense
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VSGCRs designed for this mode of operation would have several
disadvantages with respect to large HTGRs and even with respect to existing
LWRs. First, the neutron economy is relatively poor in small systems because
of neutron leakage. Second, coated particle fuel designs do not have a
demonstrated reprocessing system. The first problem appears sensitive to
design mitigation and should be a major focus of research in this area. The
second disadvantage is probably inconsequential in view of the general trend
to once-through fuel cycles and the time frame of this study.
The postulated multiple VSGCR plant design is not technology driven but
is specifically designed to meet the minimum requirements for utilities
considering purchase of a nuclear power plant: predictable cost and reliable
operation. These attributes follow directly from the large scale shop
fabrication of identical units and from the high order redundancy of a single
power plant.
6.4.3 Suggestions for Future Study
The following topics address the major unresolved issues:
(1) The interconnection of several individual plants must be studied to
develop optimum control strategies for smooth operation under
expected normal conditions and anticipated modular system
transients.
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(2) The core physics of very small reactors must be studied with the
goal of understanding and optimizing fuel utilization,
controllability, and transient behavior.
(3) Further safety analysis studies should be made concerning water or
air ingress, and work on impurity limits in the helium coolant as
well as long-term effects of impurities needs to be continued. The
development of combustion-resistant fuel pellets is of particular
interest.
(4) Further research must be done on designs that can allow safe
installation of a new module while other modules are running. This
might include the use of robotics for installation, removal and
remote maintenance.
(5) Further study must be done on designs to minimize component
radioactivity and make well-spaced component installations for
safety and ease of expected maintenance and eventual
decommissioning.
(6) The auxiliary systems, such as cooling water loops, fuel loading
systems, and gas purification systems, must be laid out largely
independently for each individual plant in order to achieve an
adequate reliability of operation and also to avoid larger
consequences due to interactions in the case of accidents in an
individual unit.
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(7) The often-discussed question of movements within the pebble-bed
core under vibrational excitation should also be studied. Major
HTGR components should be investigated with respect to operation
under seismic conditions.
(8) The containment system requirements must be studied and
established.
(9) Work should be continued that is in progress in the U.S. (at GE and
GCRA) and Germany on design and cost estimates of small modular
HTGR systems.
The following are a selected group of topics proposed for a program at
MIT.
* Comparison studies of prismatic versus pebble-bed modular HTGR
designs including both safety and economic considerations.
* Core physics in very small reactors.
* Study of modular size optimization over the range of possible modular
sizes.
* Study of computer control of the modular system including possible
applications of robotics to maintenance.
* Study of the containment system requirements and designs for the
modular arrangement.
* Assessment and study of improved modular steam generator designs.
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The thrust of these proposed MIT projects is in the area of modular
reactor systems studies. Although the potential benefits in this area seem
substantial, the research to date on modular systems has been limited. Much
work must be done in conjunction with groups such as the Gas Cooled Reactor
Associates (GCRA) if utility interest is to strengthen. Implementation of
the proposed work is discussed further in Chapter 8.
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6.5 OTHER CONCEPTS
During the early days of the nuclear power era, scores of reactor
concepts were examined at the paper study level, and more than a dozen were
pursued as far as the operating prototype stage. While this winnowing-out
process may not always have been carried out on the basis of strict
technical/economic merit -- particularly as we now view matters, having the
benefit of several decades of experience -- this is largely a moot issue,
since present realities require that near to intermediate term innovations be
supported by a substantial framework of both base technology and plant
operating experience. Thus, beyond the concepts already explored elsewhere
in this report, only heavy water reactors and sodium cooled fast breeder
reactors can muster the requisite credentials for serious consideration.
This is born out by the roster of power plants, arranged by nuclear genotype,
presented in Table 6.5.1.
6.5.1 Heavy Water Reactors
While a number of reactor concepts have been devised which employ heavy
water as a moderator, the CANDU type reactor is by far the most highly
developed system for central station power generation. Moreover, the
impressive operating record of more than ten large units in Canada argues
strongly for their consideration in any review of future nuclear options. In
assessing their potential for the U.S. market we are also the fortunate
Table 6.5.1
Nuclear Power Plants (Operable, Under
(> 30 MWe), as of 6/30/80
Construction, or on Order
KEY: PWR
BWR
PHWR
LWBR
LWCHWR
HWBLWR
GCHWR
GCR
AGR
LGR
HTGR
THTR
LMFBR
Pressurized Water Reactors
Boiling Water Reactor
Pressurized Heavy Water Moderated and Cooled Reactor
Light Water Breeder Reactor
Light Water Cooled, Heavy Water Moderated Reactor
Heavy Water Moderated Boiling Light Water Cooled Reactor
Gas Cooled Heavy Water Moderated Reactor
Gas Cooled Reactor
Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor
Light Water Cooled, Graphite Moderated Reactor
High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor
Thorium High Temperature Reactor
Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor
Source: Nuclear News, Vol, 23, No. 10, August 1980.
TYPE (COOL/MOD.) U.S. WORLD
PWR 113 (63.5%) 280 (53.2%)
BWR } LWR(H20) 61 (34.3%) 119 (22.6%)
LWBR
PHWR (CANDU) 36
LWCHWR } (D 20) 2 (8.0)
HWBLWR 2
GCHWR 2
GCR 36
AGR 15
LGR } Graphite 1 23 (14.4)
HTGR 1 1
THTR 1
LMFBR (Na) 1 8
TOTAL UNITS 178 526
TOTAL GWE 171 400
TOTAL OPERABLE 74 229
GWE OPERABLE 54 125
6-38
beneficiaries of an in-depth study carried out for the DOE by Combustion
Engineering Inc. as part of the NASAP effort.*
Table 6.5.2 summarizes some of the key features of the CE version of a
pressure tube reactor and Fig. 6.5.1 shows a typical core layout for one of
these units. Based on the results of their study and our own review, the
following points appear particularly germane to present concerns:
(1) The CANDU is more capital intensive than the LWR, but capable of
greater long term fuel economy; its higher inherent (and actual)
capacity factor offsets part of the capital penalty.
(2) This concept appears to be less susceptible to whole-core
involvement in hypothetical severe accident scenarios, but
potentially more vulnerable to small LOCA events associated with
features provided for, or the conduct of, on-line refueling.
(3) The CANDU appears to be no better suited than the LWR to
implementation of the innovations under consideration in many
quarters for revitalization of the nuclear option -- e.g.,
modularization, downsizing, simplification, augmentation of
inherent safety features, and the like.
* N.L. Shapiro and J.F. Jesick, "Conceptual Design of a Large Heavy Water
Reactor for U.S. Siting," CEND-379, Vols. I-IV, Sept. 1979.
Table 6.5.2
Proposed Features of U.S. PHWR (CEND-379)
Thermal Power Rating
Electrical Power Rating
Number of Primary Loops/Steam Generators
Number of Pressure Tubes
Moderator Inventory
Fuel Inventory
Fuel Enrichment
414 Metric Tons D20
166 MT
1.2 w/o U-235
Lifetime (30 yr) U30 8 Requirement
Lifetime SWU Requirement
Discharge Burnup
Capital Cost Relative to LWR
Excluding D20
Including D20
3545 tons
927 MT
19,750 MWD/MT
1.08
1.34
Busbar Power Cost Relative to LWR
Near Term (40$/lb U30 8)
Long Term (100$/lb U308)
1.02
0.94
RD&D Costs:
Generic Technology
Demo/Lead Plant/Commercial Plant
Safety & Licensing plus first of a
kind engineering costs
$14 x 106
$100 x 106
4029 MW
1260 MW
2/4
740
ISOMETRIC VIEW REACTOR PICKERING
Fig. 6.5.1 Section through a representative CANDU reactor core
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(4) Some consider that this type of reactor can offer more of a
safeguards risk than the LWR, but this aspect is unlikely to be of
much significance in the present context.
(5) Importation of this technology would involve complications which
are greater than involved with those other systems for which a base
of U.S. vendor/AE/utility (EPRI) support and experience already
exists.
(6) As indicated in Table 6.5.1, several variations on the PHWR theme
have also received some attention, differing from the main line
effort chiefly in the choice of coolant (light water, boiling light
water, and gas-C0 2); in addition, a small organic cooled prototype
has been operated quite successfully in Canada. None, however,
appear to be enough of an improvement to dislodge the basic CANDU
concept from its preferred status among this class of reactors.
All-in-all, it is our conclusion that the CANDU system does not appear
to be "sufficiently different" to justify serious hopes that it, or any
evolutionary extension of its essential features, could radically alter the
prospects of nuclear power in the U.S.
Many of the same caveats which have been cited with regard to the CANDU
system can be applied to other D20 moderated systems -- in particular, the
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pressure-vessel type HWR (e.g., ATUCHA*), and the spectral-shift PWR.**
Again, they are not a sufficient departure from current technology to merit
their substitution for the LWR -- it is preferable to pursue evolutionary
improvements in the latter.
6.5.2 Fast Reactors
With the notable exception of Canada, all countries which have embarked
on substantial nuclear power programs have targeted breeder reactor
development as the focus of their long-range planning. In the U.S., the
breeder program in general, and CRBR in particular, have born the brunt of
much of the protracted debate over the role of nuclear power -- so much so
that a detailed review of either breeder policy or technology would be
superfluous here. However, approached with a fresh perspective, the LMFBR
has much in its favor as an inherently preferable concept: low pressure
operation and a superbly effective coolant being the most obvious.
Nevertheless, apart from all the sound and fury of partisan debate, it is
clear that the high capital cost of present designs and reliance on fuel
reprocessing will considerably delay deployment of the breeder reactor in the
present economic environment. Thus, one Is led to inquire whether a version
* ATUCHA II, Nuclear Engineering International, Vol. 27, No. 332, Sept.
1982.
*jR.A. Matzie and G.P. Menzdl, "Conceptual Design of a Large Spectral Shift
Controlled Reactor," Vols. I & II, CEND-377, Aug. 1979.
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of the breeder reactor more in tune with present needs can be defised; as the
following comments suggest, some rather radical possibilities exist.
One obvious (albeit ambitious) target for plant simplification and cost
reduction in the LMFBR is the elimination of the intermediate sodium loop.
It is conceivable that this goal could be accomplished by re-introduction of
the concept of the duplex-tube steam generator. While EBR-II employed
duplex-tube units, this approach has not been followed in subsequent breeder
designs. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that EBR-II has not had a
steam generator leak in over 17 years while leaks have been a common problem
in LMFBRs built since. Indeed, some contend that the steam generator is the
"achilles heel" of the LMFBR, and recent PWR experience does not strengthen
the case for leak-free technology. It is encouraging to note that EPRI has
recently supported a re-assessment of the duplex-tube concept,* (although
still for use with an intermediate sodium loop).
The U.S. is in a particularly good position to move in this direction
because its design emphasis of late has been on the "pipe" rather than the
"pool" concept. Hence it should be easier to "replace" the intermediate heat
exchanger by a steam generator; whereas it would not be safe practice to
immerse a steam generator in the pool of primary sodium, as would be the case
if the IFK of a pool concept design were substituted for.
A second major change in philosophy which could be considered is the
option of starting up the first generation of breeder reactors using enriched
* EPRI NP-2316, "Component Development for Duplex Tube Steam Generator forLarge LMFBR Plant," April 1982.
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uranium instead of plutonium fueling.* (This in fact has been the practice
in the majority of fast reactors operated to date, but while it is proven
practice, it has always been regarded as an unwelcome compromise.) This
would free the breeder from reliance on the concurrent development of a
reprocessing capability and make good use of the near term surplus in
separative work capacity and the cheap ore now available on the spot market.
Although fast spectrum cores in the breeding mode deserve primary
attention, it is well to recall that sodium-cooled thermal reactors, using
graphite** or zirconium hydride*** as the moderator, have been constructed
(sodium has a microscopic thermal absorption cross section 40% smaller than
that of water). Hence this basic reactor type is an extremely adaptable
concept. Even if attention is restricted to fast systems, a varied menu of
options is available; for example, one can design cores which do not require
refueling for the life of the plant (e.g., 30 years).**** Thus we are led to
* C. Braun and S. Golan, "A Strategy for Fueling Early Large Proptotype
Fast Reactors," Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc., Vol. 44, June 1983.
** C. Starr and R.W. Dickinson, "Sodium Graphite Reactors," Addison-Wesley,
Reading, MA, 1958.
* R. Harde and K.W. Stohr, "A Sodium Cooled Power Reactor Experiment
Employing Zirconium Hydride Moderator," 3rd I.C.P.U.A.E., Vol. 6, Geneva,
1965.
***11.A. Doncals, G.J. Calamal, J.A. Lake, "Additional Considerations in
LMFBR Core Design Philosophy," Trans Am. Nucl. Soc., Vol. 38, June 1981.
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stress the need for a clear definition of design objectives; it is all too
easy to compile specifications having a given generic reactor type in mind,
but most difficult to decide what will sell -- both to utility executives and
the concerned public.
Given the above considerations, it would be beneficial if sodium cooled
plant designs were prepared emphasizing features (down-sizing, inherent
safety, rapid constructability, lower cost) currently being touted for other
reactor concepts, so that a directly comparable assessment can be made of the
ability of the LMFBR to fulfill the same role proposed for other "advanced"
or "inherently safe" systems. This exercise would also have the salutory
effect of forcing the design community to fully come to grips with the
problem of defining precisely what technical specifications must be met by
these next-generation systems. Some of this re-thinking is already in
progress; the initial focus has been, for the most part, on cost reduction.*
The major deterrent to re-programming the LMFBR is the overall cost and
uncertain schedule. Certainly another zig-zag in the already tortuous path
of U.S. breeder development will only lead to an increase in R & D costs and
a further slippage in schedule. On the other hand, given present
*AW.H. Arnold, et al., "Design Approaches to Achieve Competitive LMFBR
Capital Costs," Power Eng., Sept. 1982.
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circumstances, earlier deployment of a significant number of sodium cooled
systems could be expected, since they would now be decoupled from a purely
resource-driven scenario. Thus a re-targeted sodium system might be judged
eligible for consideration within the time frame of current interest -- one
to two decades. It is admittedly not as imminent as some of the other
options we have considered, such as the HTGR, but still worthy of
consideration, because it can naturally evolve into the breeding version for
which it was originally conceived. If the breeder continues to be funded as
a long-term option, the marginal cost of developing a near-term version may
be rather small.
6.5.3 Other Reactor Types
Many additional reactor design concepts have been given serious
consideration as recently as the late 1970s, during the NASAP and INFCE
studies.* While the focus of these efforts was somewhat different than in
the current MIT review, the extensive documentation developed in these
programs provides a useful data base from which to launch our effort.
A critical re-reading of the NASAP and INFCE final reports has failed to
identify other concepts (beyond those already discussed earlier in this and
* (1) INFCE, Report of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, IAEA,
Vienna (1980).
(2) "Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power," Report of the
Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program
(NASAP), DOE/NE-0001, Vols. 1-9, June 1980.
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preceding chapters) worthy of consideration, with the possible exception of
the molten salt homogeneous reactor -- because of its low pressure operation
and low in-core fission product inventory. However, the practical aspects of
reviving this reactor concept suggest that it not be given co-equal status
with the other initiatives identified in this report. A major factor which
could alter the status of the MSR in the long term (beyond that of primary
emphasis here) would be the finding that molten salt systems are preferred
technology for fusion reactor blankets, as some now contend.
In any event, the following observations are germane:
e Although the U.S. program to develop molten salt based systems has
lapsed, there is a continuing (albeit modest) effort in Japan.*
Hence, it might be possible to pursue this line of research on the
basis of an international cooperative program.
* Although large (e.g., 1000 MWe) units are feasible, the MSR should be
one of the more compatible concepts as regards the use of small
modular units.
* Anticipated RD&D plus commercialization costs of the MSR, over a
projected period spanning four decades, total between 6 to 9.5
* (1) R. Ishiguro, K. Suglyama and H. Sakashita, "Basic Studies for Molten-
Salt Reactor Engineering in Japan," Proceedings of the Japan-U.S.
Seminar on Thorium Fueled Reactors, Nara, Japan, Oct. 1982.
(2) K. Furukawa, "The Combined System of Accelerator Molten-Salt Breeder
and Molten-Salt Converter Reactors," (ibid).
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billion dollars (1979$).** Hence, this concept is probably beyond
the time frame and funding horizon of our current interest.
6.5.4 MIT's Role
The MIT Nuclear Engineering Department has a long history of
participation in the development and analysis of advanced technologies, and
it is anticipated that individual faculty members or teams of researchers
will continue to fulfill this role. It is clear, however, that most of this
activity should take place outside the project scope defined in this report
because of the constraints imposed by the time frame of interest and
limitations on the totality of available department resources. An effort
should be made, however, to establish a more than casual level of liaison
with both other major ongoing programs (CANDU, LMFBR) and important new
initiatives (PIUS) to insure that different perspectives are fully
appreciated and accounted for in developing a balanced evaluation of those
alternatives which will constitute the primary foci of the MIT innovation
initiatives. In turn, we may be able to encourage like-minded workers in
these organizations to develop a parallel set of responses to the concerns
motivating the MIT efforts.
* ORNL/TM-7194, "An Assessment of Advanced Technology Options for NASAP,"
Sept. 1980.
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Appendix to Section 6
1. Primary System Dynamic Response Modification
It has been suggested that PWR's could be made more tolerant of
component and operational faults through increasing the characteristic time
scale of system transient response to various initiating events. This would
have the effect of allowing more time for the control system (both human and
automatic) to respond correctly to unexpected events, and of increasing the
envelope of events for which no control system action (e.g. activation of PWR
pressurizer sprays to compensate for coolant expansion due to a temperature
increase) would be required.
Among other options this could be accomplished through increasing the
primary water inventory in the steam generators and/or increasing the
pressurizer 'volume.
The implications of both of these design variations have been examined
in order to quantify the time scales of variation of different primary system
parameters of interest. This has been done by comparing similar primary
system transients analyzed by the different PWR vendors in attempt to infer
relevant design variation sensitivities. This has also been done by using a
simplified PWR system model to analyze both the loss-of-feedwater-flow
accident and the loss of load accident with scram.
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Comparison of Design of Different PWR Vendors for the Steam Line Break
Accident:
The designs of the Sequoyah plant by Westinghouse and the San Onofre
plant by Combustion Engineering are summarized in Table 6.A.1. It is seen
that the two plants are very similar in terms of electrical capacity but
quite different in their designs. We have compared the primary system design
differences in an attempt to determine whether reasons for the differences in
the system responses to the steam line break accident (in which a steam
generator outlet pipe breaks suddenly) can be inferred from the design
differences. We have concluded that they can, and that the system could be
made more tolerant of these accident by changing its design.
It is seen in comparing the Westinghouse (W) to the Combustion
Engineering (CE) designs that the ratios of the times required for primary
system depressurization to 1000 psia and for emptying of the pressurizer are
all roughly equal to 2.6. These quantities are all governed by the rate at
which the primary system liquid volume decreases due to cooling of the water
in the damaged steam generator. The rate of liquid volume decrease is given
by:
3V L S UA AT _ A
at PC pV SC C pat p SG
where
V L = primary system liquid volume,
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Table 6.A.1
Comparison of Westinghouse* and Combustion Engineering ** PWR System
Designs and Steam Line Break Accident Responses
Item Westinghouse Combustion Ratio: W/CE
Engineering
Design Parameters
Number of Steam 4 2 2.0
Generators
Primary Liquid Volume 1077 1880 0.57
per Steam Generator (ft 3)
Primary Coolant Mass (lbm) 12,200 12,200 1.0
Heat Transfer Surface 51,500 90,200 0.57
per Steam generator (ft 2)
Primary mass flowrate 33.5 74.0 0.45
Steam Generator (106 lbmls)
Pressurizer Volume (ft 3) 1800 1500 1.20
Accident Response Times (s)
Primary coolant pressure 28 10 2.8
1000 psia
Pressurizer empties 21 8 2.6
Reactor recriticality 25 20 1.25
* Abstracted from San Onofre FSAR
**Abstracted from Sequoyah FSAR
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The
indicated
the ratio
emptying,
VSG = primary system steam generator liquid volume,
S = water volumetric coefficient of thermal expansion,
UA = steam generator overall heat transfer coefficient,
p = water density,
C = water specific heat,
AT = temperature change from primary to secondary side of
steam generator, and
t = time.
primary liquid volume change needed to affect any of the quantities
is approximately proportional to that of the pressurizer. Thus,
of the time scales for depressurization, or for pressurizer
T, is expected to be aproximately
W Press-W UACE)
CE Press-CE UAW
TW
- = (1.2)(2.06*) = 2.47.
CE
The value for this ratio obtained from the respective plant FSAR's is 2.6,
which is in reasonably good agreement with our crude estimate.
Similarly, the rate of insertion of reactivity into the reactor via flow
of cold water from the damaged steam generator to the shut-down core will
occur on a characteristic time scale, T, given as
* Inferred from FSAR results.
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VSGP
mSG
where mSG is the primary coolant mass flowrate through the steam
generator.
The ratio of time scales for the two systems for bringing the shutdown
reactor back to critical could then be expected to vary approximately as
W SG-W (SG-CEJ
CE SG-CE mSG-W
(.57)(2.2) = 1.26
The value obtained from the FSAR's for this ratio is 1.25.
From the foregoing we may conclude that the dependence of the system
response to component design variations may be assessed by relatively crude
analytical methods - for the steam line break accidents - and that the system
response times can be increased substantially by increasing the volumes of
the steam generator and/or pressurizer.
Analysis of the Loss of Feedwater Flow Anticipated Transient Without Scram
(ATWS):
A computational model has been constructed at M.I.T. by Nuclear
Engineering Department faculty and graduate students for simulation of
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a set of PWR system transients. The model and its use in an analysis of the
Loss-of-Feedwater-Flow ATWS is summarized in a recent paper, enclosed in
Annex A. This model has been used to examine the sensitivity of the system
response to this accident to pressurizer and steam generator design volume
changes of the system response to this accident.
The base case used in these analyses is that described in Annex A.
Separate simulations were performed in which the volumes of the steam
generator and of the pressurizer were varied. For most system dependent
variables the sensitivity to these design changes is found to be effectively
nil. The greatest sensitivity observed is that of the coolant pressure, for
which the results are shown in Figs. 6.A.1 and 6.A.2. Even for this
parameter the transient response sensitivity is weak.
These results can be explained by examining the progress of the
accident. In this accident secondary coolant flow (feedwater) ceases and the
reactor fails to scram but rather continues to generate power. As a
consequence the primary coolant ceases to be cooled in the steam generator
and continues to be heated when it flows through the core. As the coolant
temperature in the core increases the correspondingly impaired neutron
moderation results in a reduction of the core reactivity, and consequently of
the core power.
The effect of increasing the primary side volume of the steam generators
is to decrease the rate of temperature increase of the primary coolant and
correspondingly to decrease the magnitude of the subsequent coolant
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Fig. 6.A.1 Sensitivity of Primary System Pressure to a Change in the Pressurizer
Volume for a Loss of Feedwater ATWS
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Fig. 6.A.2 Sensitivity of Primary System Pressure to a Change in the Steam Generator
Volume for a Loss of Feedwater ATWS
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temperature-related reactivity decrease in the core and of the subsequent
power reduction. The net result of these coupled interactions is one of
counterbalancing effects so that the primary coolant temperature, fuel
temperature and core power histories are approximately the same for steam
generators of various sizes.
The effects of pressurizer size variations are similarly small. During
this accident, the pressurizer control system functions too slowly to have a
conspicuous effect. The existence of the pressurizer becomes manifest mainly
when the pressurizer becomes filled with liquid (due to coolant thermal
expansion), resulting in a rapid subsequent coolant pressure increase. This
behavior is seen in Fig. 6.A.1, however its pressurizer size sensitivity is
small.
In this case the major design innovation which can provide a significant
change in the system response is a change in the core moderator coefficient
of reactivity. It can be seen from Annex A that the peak coolant pressure
increases rapidly as the moderator coefficient decreases. Thus, this
accident is different from the steam line break accident in that the system
response is relatively insensitive to the component volumes. However, the
responses to both accidents are sensitive to the core moderator coefficient
values.
Loss of Load With Reactor Scram Transient:
The loss-of-load transient has also been analyzed using the model
described previously. In this accident the turbine load is lost, secondary
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steam is directed instead to an atmospheric steam dump uponactuation of a
relief valve and the reactor' is scrammed. The secondary system is unable to
act as an adequate heat sink for the primary coolant, resulting in primary
coolant heating and expansion. In this process the pressurizer pilot
operated relief valves (PORV) open at a pressure of 2400 psia, and the
pressurizer sprays are activated at a slightly lower pressure.
The sensitivity of the system pressure response to pressurizer size
variation is summarized in Fig. 6.A.3. It is seen for this case that the
rates of both pressurization and subsequent depressurization can be decreased
by increasing the pressurizer volume. By increasing the pressurizer volume
from 750 ft3 to 3000 ft3 the rate of depressurization can be decreased from
0.13 psi/s to 0.06 psi/s.
In this instance as in the steam line break accident the primary system
response time can be significantly increased by increasing the system thermal
inertia.
Summary
The important lessons from this work are that it is feasible to perform
university-scale research which can provide insight into the value of
available reactor design innovations, and that it is necessary to investigate
the full implications of a possible innovation (i.e. in different cases) in
order to assess its value correctly. As is seen with the options of changing
the steam generator and/or pressurizer volume significant increases in the
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system response times may be obtained for the steam line break and loss of
load accidents, but the same design variations will provide benefits which
are negligible (at best) for the Loss-of-Feedwater-Flow ATWS.
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2. Investigation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Nuclear Steam Supply
System Materials
The behavior of nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) materials in
corrosive stressful environments has belatedly become recognized as being of
primary importance in meeting goals of component longevity and power plant
relability. Past failures of steam generators, core structural components
and fears of future failures of reactor coolant piping have all involved
stress corrosion cracking as the primary failure mechanism.
A research program at M.I.T. investigating the causes and cures of
materials susceptibility to cracking in such environments is described in a
recent paper appended as Annex B.
In this work the effects upon selected NSSS nickel-based alloys of hot
working and annealing in permitting them to survive long-duration fatigue
loads in various test environments are being investigated experimentally.
Work to date has indicated that beginning-of-life heat treatment is
important in extending the fatigue resistance of the materials tested.
A significant dependence upon both the amplitude and frequency of the fatigue
loadings has also been observed.
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3. Advanced Instrumentation and Control
Among the possible LWR improvements which could be pursued in the
proposed project are those involving development and implementation of
advanced instrumentation and control systems (see Table 6.1.7). Work
currently underway at M.I.T. is directed toward this goal, and has included a
demonstration of the feasibility of limited automatic reactor control. This
is an initial step in the development of a set of "real time" subsystem
models which may be used for analytic verification of reactor signals, for
system state analyses and ultimately for reactor control. It is also an
example of the class of university research which could provide substantial
benefits in thisarea of LWR innovation. This work illustrates development of
an innovation which can be initiated via technology-oriented research at a
university prior to commercialization. Improvements in instrumentation and
control have potential cost benefits in terms of reducing operator errors,
increasing plant availability through early detection of pending problems and
prevention of transients which could challenge the reactor safety system and
which could cause thermal cycling of plant components.
An internally funded project concerned with Advanced Control has been in
progress in the Nuclear Engineering Department for some time. This joint
project between M.I.T. and CSDL (Charles Stark Draper Laboratory) is based on
the following goals and concepts:
o Technology now exists, based on aerospace developments and
applications, that can greatly enhance the instrumentation and control
systems for nuclear piants (and also fossil plants).
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* The technology involves utilization of digital computer systems;
specifically, the use of distributed mini- or micro-processors with
fault-tolerant central processors connected through multiplexing
systems for distribution and collection of information. The output
includes validated control signals and CRT display systems.
* The first stage of the program is the development of validated data
and the display of that data in a useful summary to the operator.
Validated data are based on the computed (statistical) analysis of
redundant sensors combined with analytic process calculations
giving so-called "analytic redundancy". Display of the validated
data from a highly reliable system will relieve the operator of the
need to rapidly decide which redundant instrument is reading
correctly.
* With valid data and a system of analytic models tracking the
process, the next stage is to diagnose faults. At the lowest
level, the sensor failures are a natural output of the data
validation. At a higher level, the equipment status and system
integrity (e.g. pump failure or pipe breaks) can be monitored and
rapidly brought to the attention of the operator.
e As confidence develops from the demonstrated performance and
reliability of the data validation and diagnostic instrumentation,
basic research is also in progress on the possible future
strategies for future digital control systems. This control may
initially be on a subsystem only and finally a complete closed loop
control will be considered.
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The first application of this conceptual design is expected to be in the
area of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS, as described in NUREG-0696).
The methodology, with validated signals utilizing analytic redundance, is
capable of meeting the accuracy and high reliability required for the SPDS
integrated safety function information and display.
Another area of research appropriate for a university is a basic study
of unified systematic approaches to the use of distributed digital
processors, in a fault-tolerant array, for complete closed loop control of
nuclear power reactors.
An example of part of this program is the active research study and
demonstration of advanced reactor control which has been in progress at
M.I.T., using the M.I.T. reactor. Figure 6.A.4 shows the basic configuration
of the digital control system being demonstrated. A recent report describing
this work is also enclosed in Annex C. In this work the power regulation of
the M.I.T. reactor is controlled by the motion of a control rod by utilizing
the validated signal from a set of redundant sensors. The control methods
tested are analog and digital. The non-human control methods have been
utilized in different feedback constraint modes. The results are summarized
in the attached paper. It has been seen, for the application being tested,
that digital control permits the most successful (and most flexible)
attainment of operational goals.
Work is continuing on improved closed loop control techniques and
development of the distributed processing system for use in power reactor.
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Fig. 6.A.4 Digital Control Scheme for MITR-II
7. GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE
In the preceding section, several promising lines of engineering
development were identified which in principle could significantly enhance
the competitiveness of the nuclear option in the 1990s and thereafter. Given
the present state of the industry, however, few of these ideas will be
readily implemented. As noted in the introduction, the electric utilities
are primarily preoccupied with their operating nuclear plants and with those
that are still under construction. For most utilities, the response to the
problems experienced with many of these plants has been to draw back from the
nuclear option rather than to encourage a search for ways to make it more
attractive in the longer run. The present generating capacity surplus has
influenced this attitude, as has the general erosion of political support for
nuclear power. There is also concern that a significant departure from
conventional light water reactor designs, if it appears to be motivated by an
effort to reduce risks, would heighten public suspicions about the safety of
existing plants, and could trigger another costly round of regulatory
ratchetting.
The vendors have different but at least as compelling reasons not to
invest heavily in the development of advanced nuclear power plant systems.
The potential market is too many years into the future, and its magnitude is
uncertain. Nuclear power plant manufacturing has never been profitable in
any case. And the successful commercialization of advanced nuclear plants
would of course take place at the expense of existing designs, in which,
moreover, the vendors continue to- claim confidence. A modest-sized design
7-2
improvement program is acceptable to the vendors and even desirable, if only
to preserve a residual system design capability for a possible nuclear
recovery; but, at least for Westinghouse and General Electric, this is being
achieved through the collaborations with their Japanese licensees and
partners. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. vendors will continue to
concentrate on the more profitable nuclear services sector.
Finally, against a political background of rapidly growing federal
budget deficits, a vocal and active political opposition to nuclear power,
and sharp cutbacks elsewhere in the federal energy research and development
budget, the prospects for a major government-funded nuclear power plant
innovation program are also poor. The political situation is further
complicated by the breeder controversy. An influential element of the
natural constituency for a government-backed program of design innovations
targeted for commercialization in the mid-1990s would withhold its support if
the program was perceived as a threat to the breeder, and to the Clinch River
Breeder Reactor in particular. Among this group, the recognition that a
successful intermediate-term innovation program would ultimately enhance the
prospects for breeder commercialization is apparently overshadowed by the
fear that breeder opponents would characterize such a program as a viable
alternative to the breeder, and that it would allow wavering supporters of
the Clinch River reactor to dissociate themselves from that project without
seeming to embrace an antinuclear position.
Table 7.1, which compares the current political and economic climate for
technological innovation with the conditions under which the light water
Table 7.1
Comparison of
early 1980s*
the incentives for nuclear power plant innovation in the late 1950s/early 1960s and the
Late 1950s/Early 1960s Early 1980s
Utilities: A place in the vanguard of an emerging in- Prestige attached to nuclear industry
dustry important to some utilities. leadership eroded. Public relations
Public relations value high. value low or negative.
Utilities generally in sound financial Utility financial position much weaker.
postion. Declining marginal costs. Low
interest rates.
Fear of government ownership of electric Less fear of government ownership.
power generation provided incentive for
utility participation in reactor
commercialization.
Public utility commissions generally fa- PUCs less sympathetic to utilities.
vorable towards utilities and towards Electricity rates increasing. Nuclear
nuclear. less popular. PUCs under political pres-
sure to oppose new nuclear projects.
Hospitable climate for safety and environ- Historical record of difficulties with LWR
mental regulation of new plant designs. licensing a deterrent. Also possibility
of adversely affecting existing plants.
Demand growth much slower. Large
Period of steady, rapid growth in uncertainties over future demand
electric power demand. behaviour.
Optimism over nuclear economics. Expecta- Historical record of unanticipated major
tion of long-run decline in costs. cost escalations with LWR plants a strong
deterrent.
Attractive loss-leader turnkey plant Vendors unwilling to bear financial
offers by vendors. risks.
Vendors: Expectation of major long-term profit op- Future market for nuclear plants uncer-
portunities. Early market penetration im- tain. Vendors sustained heavy financial
portant. Rapid market growth seen. losses with LWR commercilization. Risks
perceived to be much greater. Services
market more profitable.
Major export prospects. Opportunity for International market in recession. Home
world leadership. Nuclear the next tech- markets of foreign competitors protected.
nological frontier. Proliferation problems complicate inter-
national connerce.
Government willing to share financial Government support less certain.
risks.
Government: Public support for nucledr 0ower hian. Puuli; unentnusiabtic dbuut iiuclear puwer,
Atoms-for Peace program. Opportunity New innovation program politically as well
for world leadership. as financially costly. Competinq
priorities for government energy r.&d.
support. Concern over impact on breeder
program.
* Adapted from Johnson, Merrow, Baer, and Alexander (1976), p. cit.
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reactor emerged as a commercial option two decades ago, underlines the
difficulties facing a major initiative of any kind at this stage.
How might the present situation be changed? What would be needed to
stimulate more vigorous efforts to develop innovative nuclear power plant
system designs for the 1990s? There are no easy institutional solutions.
The obstacles are deep-rooted, and without a basic change in assumptions and
policies no amount of creativity in organizational restructuring will
suffice. In particular, two fundamental changes in strategy would seem to be
necessary:
(i) Notwithstanding its highly fragmented structure, the electric
utility industry must recognize its own pre-eminent role in ensuring the
timely availability of the technology which will enable it to sustain and
improve the quality of its service. Specifically, the electric utilities
must focus now on the question of whether nuclear power might have an
important role to play in meeting the nation's demand for new and replacement
sources of electricity a decade or more in the future. If this seems likely
-- and we expect this to be the case -- a group of utilities should take the
lead in establishing a set of general technical specifications to be met by
nuclear power plants at that time. In the longer run, the utility industry
(and, ultimately, the ratepayers) must bear a substantial portion of the
costs and the financial risks involved in developing the technology to meet
these requirements.
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(ii) Provided the private sector is demonstrably prepared to take the
lead, the Federal government should strengthen the medium term component of
its own portfolio of nuclear power plant research and development. At
present, Federal nuclear r.&d. is primarily oriented towards the short term
(in support of LWR plants in operation or under construction) and the much
longer term (in support of the breeder). Federal participation along the
suggested new lines should be in close support of clearly-defined electric
utility objectives.*
We note that these requirements differ from the arrangements in effect
during the period of LWR commercialization, and also from those pertaining
today to the breeder program. In particular, they imply a significant shift
in both the burden of developmental financial risk and the focus of
technological decision-making towards the utilities. These shifts reflect
current political and economic realities: it is evident that neither the
traditional suppliers of nuclear plants nor the federal government will act
in the absence of a clear commitment by the electric utilities. But they
also incorporate at least two important lessons learned from previous efforts
to develop and commercialize large-scale new technologies. First, greater
risk and cost sharing by the utilities relative to the government is likely
to enhance the quality of the information generated by the innovation
* We do not attempt to prescribe an 'optimal' allocation of risks and costs
between ratepayers, utility investors, taxpayers, and plant suppliers. The
issues are complex, and the political and regulatory processes for
resolving them untidy. The point remains, however, that unless the
electric utility industry is prepared to take the initiative no significant
advance is likely.
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program. Private companies are generally better judges of commercial
prospects than is the Federal government, and their participation as
risk-bearers is an effective filtering device to identify technologies with
the greatest near-term commercial potential. Private cost and risk-sharing
also means that more realistic program goals are likely to be set and that
the incentives of the private participants to meet these goals will be
greater.*
Second, where the success of an innovation depends upon the
technological capabilities of the user as well as the supplier, as is
obviously the case with nuclear power plants, the importance of a
well-informed user and of good technical communication between user and
supplier is self-evident. In retrospect, the lack of experience and
sophistication of the electric utilities in the field of LWR technology (with
* L.L. Johnson, E.W. Merrow, W.S. Baer, and A.J. Alexander, Alternative
Institutional Arrangements for Developing and Commercializing Breeder
Reactor Technology, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California,
R-2069-NSF, November 1976. For a more recent affirmation of these
arguments, see R.R. Nelson and R.N. Langlois, "Industrial innovation
policy: Lessons from American history," Science, Vol. 219, 18 February
1983, 814-818. According to this historical study, of the various types of
government support for civilian research and development which have been
tried in the past, programs in which federal agencies have "attempted to
insert themselves directly into the business of developing particular
technologies for a commercial market in which they had little or no
procurement interest" have enjoyed least success. The authors contrast the
'unequivocally negative' results of such programs with other types of
government support in which the experience has been at least partly
positive, including: programs in industries in which the government was
heavily involved as a user of the technology; programs to support 'generic'
technologies in the area between basic research and applied r.&d.; and
programs to support applied r.&d. pursuant to well-defined client demands.
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some notable exceptions) has been a major cauLse of the difficulties
encountered in nuclear power plant construction and operation. There is also
reason to believe that the utilities' limited ability to define their
requirements and to articulate them to the plant designers may also have
contributed to subsequent problems (although this point is inherently more
difficult to substantiate). For all of these reasons, without the active
technical participation of the utilities in the formulation of design
specifications and, where applicable, in the construction and operation of
prototypes, future nuclear power plant innovation efforts appear much less
likely to succeed.
We do not attempt to prescribe fully the organizational structures
needed to bring the innovations in Section 6 to commercial fruition. (How
many utilities would be involved? How much would each participant contribute
to the expected cost of the program? How would the financial risks of cost
overruns, delays, and other unanticipated developments be distributed among
the individual participants? Who would be responsible for the various
technical functions of the program, including, where appropriate,
development, design, construction and operation? Who would have overall
management responsibility?) Such structures tend to emerge in an ad hoc
manner, the product of the possible rather than the result of a systematic
analysis of alternatives. In any case, a full discussion of these
programmatic issues would not be particularly meaningful until committed
'champions' of specific innovation concepts could be identified.
Nevertheless, in the following section we propose some organizational
arrangements which would permit at least the next step to be taken in the
exploration of some of the most promising of these innovations.
8. IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF M.I.T.
Thus far we have developed a general argument for pursuing power plant
design innovations as part of a larger effort to restore the competitiveness
of the nuclear option. Several promising design concepts or lines of
development have been described. We now propose, in outline form, a program
of research in this area to be undertaken at MIT. The program is put forward
as a response to the needs and opportunities for technological innovation
already identified. At the same time it reflects the capabilities,
objectives and constraints of a university research effort. The program
would be centered in the Nuclear Engineering Department, where many of the
relevant research capabilities are located; however, it has been conceived
from the beginning as a multidisciplinary effort, and would draw on the full
range of faculty research interests and experience at the Institute.
We stress at the outset that the proposed program would be conducted in
parallel with substantial and continuing departmental research efforts
focused on longer-term options, i.e. the breeder and fusion, and on improving
various aspects of the performance of the 120 or so LWRs currently in
operation or under construction. These latter plants will continue to demand
most of the attention of the nuclear utilities and their suppliers, and our
own research profile will reflect this emphasis.
A very large commitment of technical, financial, and probably also
political resources will be required to bring about major innovations in
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nuclear power plant technology. No university research effort can make more
than a minor contribution on this scale. In the shorter run, however, the
role of an independent research group such as exists at M.I.T. may be more
important. As the previous discussion has implied, in the present difficult
climate for nuclear power the major industrial participants can point to many
good reasons not to take initiatives in this area, even while acknowledging
that more attention to it could yield generally beneficial results. To this
extent, a small, independent research group which is prepared to address
constructively some of the more difficult, speculative or sensitive
design-related issues may have an important role in catalyzing the much
larger-scale effort that would be required for full commercial
implementation.
The proposed research program will center on two large-scale engineering
development projects. It will also include supporting engineering and social
science research projects and policy studies, as appropriate.
8.1 Development of specific plant design innovations
We have selected two general areas of emphasis for engineering
development: evolutionary innovations in LWR designs; and small,
modular high temperature gas reactor systems. Expanding the list any further
would lead to an unacceptable dilution of faculty effort. The two areas
chosen reflect current faculty research interests as well as a general
assessment of relevance to the national need.
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8.1.1 LWR Innovation
It is proposed to carry out a research project in association with a
consortium of leading electric utilities with the objective of developing a
design specification for an advanced LWR responsive to the projected needs of
utilities in the 1990s. Specifically, the project is intended to achieve the
following:
* The definition of a comprehensive set of design goals for an
optimized LWR;
* Investigation of the technical requirements implied by these goals at
least to the extent of demonstrating that a feasible design solution
exists; and
a Use of these goals as the basis of a specification for subsequent LWR
plant construction projects to be undertaken by participating
utilities. The actual design specification of a new plant would not
be formulated in this project. Rather, this step would be undertaken
by a participating utility, possibly with the participation of the
project staff. However, the basis of that specification would be
established in this project.
The consortium assembled for this project would ideally consist of
between four and eight large technically-advanced utility companies and a
team to be assembled from MIT faculty and staff. Each utility would assign
two staff members to work on the project full-time, either at the utility
site or at MIT, depending upon the nature of the work to be performed.
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Overall responsbilities for the project would rest with the leader of the MIT
team. The immediate task of the group would be to formulate a comprehensive
inventory of the design goals (and their justifications) which should be
incorporated in the companies' next LWR project, and to rank them in
importance. It is expected that these lists of design goals would vary from
one utility to another but that they would have a sufficient amount in common
to permit the development of a consensus regarding the highest priority areas
of design specification. These in turn would probably form the central focus
of the project. As discussed in Section 6, some probable examples of these
areas of focus include the following:
e Reliability improvements.
* Simplification.
* Refinement of plant safety criteria.
* Unit size optimization.
* Minimization of maintenance and equipment
replacement costs and radiation dose burdens.
Many of these areas of potential design change are expected to require
significant refinement before a practical, unambiguous and optimal design
specification can be expressed, and with each such specification it will be
essential to demonstrate that at least one practical design approach exists
by which it can be met. These tasks of refinement and demonstration of
practicality are expected to consume most of the resources of the project.
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The intended project duration is five years. With a project of this
sort there is no natural duration, in that as higher priority design issues
are resolved attention would shift to other outstanding topics. The current
list of such issues is long enough that this effort could occupy several tens
of man-years. The five year project duration is selected because this is a
period sufficient to make substantial progress on a large number of the
highest priority topics, and also because it is compatible with the planning
window of many utilities with regard to new baseload capacity additions.
PWR vs BWR: Because of the many significant differences between PWR and
BWR technologies and because of the preponderance of PWRs in United States
and world nuclear power programs, it is intended that the initial and primary
focus of the project would be upon the PWR type. In such a project it would
remain possible to address a limited, but important, set of BWR innovations
in areas where the technology is similar (eg. materials corrosion and water
chemistry, pressure vessel neutron embrittlement, information system and
robotic design). Further, it would be possible to undertake a separate BWR
effort if sufficient interest were to exist among project participants, or
once the project were fully underway on the PWR phase.
It is anticipated that the supporting investigations will be performed
equally by the utility and MIT project participants. This structure is
needed to ensure the continued dynamic involvement of the utilities and the
MIT participants in the development of the design goals and to avoid
segregation of the consortium into a group of analysts and a group of their
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sponsors. The participation of experienced and knowledgeable utility
personnel is essential to the success of this project.
The work of the consortium is thus envisioned to consist of a group of
continuing projects which would contribute to the resolution of questions
arising in the iterative refinement of the design goals, with periodic
meetings, workshops and other communications for review of findings, project
redirection and design goal clarification. It is expected that the MIT
researchers involved in this work would function in a fashion similar to that
of the utility participants, contributing as a group to the continuing work
of design goal definition, and individually conducting research -- typically
working with graduate student research assistants -- needed to advance the
understanding of the various possible LWR design improvements. Examples of
current investigations at MIT which would be relevant to the project are
presented in Section 6.
Budget and Timescale
The proposed project would be completed in approximately five years. A
consortium membership of between four and eight utilities would be most
desirable in order for the proposed work to make a substantial contribution.
Each utility would be asked to contribute approximately $200,000 per year to
support the work of two MIT researchers and two graduate research assistants
and the necessary administrative functions (with adjustments for inflation).
The anticipated MIT project budget would thus be approximately
$0.8-1.6million/yr. In addition, each utility would be asked to assign two
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staff members to work full time on design goal definition ani refinement,
and to arrange for a Vice President to manage the utility's interactions with
the project. A total of 24-48 technical staff (including 8-16 graduate
students) would thus be involved.
8.1.2 Small modular HTGR systems studies
In Section 6 several research projects were suggested in connection with
a proposed new MIT initiative in the area of small, modular HTGR systems.
Our ultimate goal is to determine whether small, modular HTGRs should be
promoted as next generation power systems, and, if so, how the development
program should be structured. The initial stages of the program are aimed at
defining more fully the properties of this class of systems. They will
include:
e Comparison studies of prismatic versus pebble-bed modular HTGR
designs including both safety and economic considerations.
* Core physics and neutron economy in very small reactors.
* Studies of computer control of the modular system including possible
applications of robotics to maintenance.
* Studies of the containment system requirements and designs for the
modular arrangement.
* Assessment and study of improved modular steam generator designs.
Although we believe that this technology offers considerable promise
over the time frame of interest, developing the commitment necessary to move
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it towards commercial demonstration in an industry which historically has not
shown much enthusiasm for gas reactor systems will obviously be a formidable
task. Evidently the approach here will be much different from that proposed
in the LWR case. We envisage an incremental process, with attempts made at
each stage to increase the level and scope of participation. In view of the
narrow base of support for gas reactor systems in the U.S., we would seek to
build international links from the outset. In the United States, Gas Cooled
Reactor Associates (GCRA) is probably the key organization. GCRA is a
utility financed group established some years ago to evaluate and plan the
commercial deployment of gas cooled reactors. At present, some 29 utilities
contribute approximately $2 million annually to GCRA. Most support for gas
reactor research and development has been provided until now by the
Department of Energy, but only a small fraction of this has been assigned to
small modular reactor studies. This small funding is supporting work in
progress at General Atomic, General Electric and Bechtel. The studies
involve both prismatic and pebble bed modular systems. (GE is not supporting
this effort with any internal funds.) Overseas, KFA Juelich in West Germany
is pursuing small modular systems most actively, as discussed in Section 6.
Contacts with members of all of these organizations have been established.
The next step towards obtaining funding for the proposed studies at MIT
will be to review the program with the GCRA management. Early contacts
indicate that they will be willing to encourage funding of our work. We
anticipate next approaching interested GCRA sponsors for research support.
If some funding is forthcoming, the fact of utility interest could be used in
support of a subsequent request for government funding. Support from the
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Department of Energy will depend on Congressional actions with regard to the
DOE HTGR budget. Our potential for funding may thus be enhanced if the
interested utilities are willing to provide additional signals to Congress.
Budget and Timescale
The program at MIT is envisaged to start with at least two interested
professors and build up to 4 or 5 supported students per professor. The
target funding level for the project is $0.5 - lmillion/yr. The first phase
of the project will consist of a comprehensive assessment of the
acceptability of the small, modular HTGR concept. It will be completed in
3-5 years, depending on the rate at which the target funding level is
approached.
8.2 Supporting engineering and social science research and policy
studies
8.2.1 Supporting Research.
During the course of this study, several research topics have been
identified which, while not specific to one design concept or another, would
nevertheless strengthen a general program of research on nuclear power plant
innovations, while at the same time providing excellent opportunities for
student thesis research projects. Some of these topics conceivably could be
supported under the technical projects described previously, but in other
cases separate funding will be necessary. Examples include:
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a Further research on the relationship between technological hazard
characteristics and the risk perceptions of the general public, and
the implications of this relationship for power plant design goals;
e Research on the risk perceptions of utility investors and managers,
and the implications for future innovation efforts;
* A comparative study of power plant construction experience across a
sample of U.S. utilities in order to identify and quantify the
primary contributors to the variance in construction lead-time and
plant capital cost;
* A comparative analysis of specific industrial innovation decisions
and programs in the nuclear power plant and civilian aircraft
industries in order to investigate the impacts of industry structure
and organization on the process of large-scale technological
innovation:
e An economic analysis of the optimum baseload unit size as a function
of demand growth, cost of capital, supply system size, generating
mix, utility power pooling, construction lead times, and scale
economies.
8.2.2 Policy Studies.
It is also proposed to carry out policy-related studies which would
contribute to the development of a framework for evaluating alternative
advanced nuclear power plant options and innovation strategies at the
national level. Such studies would include the technical review of a range
of potentially promising design innovations (including but obviously not
limited to those under active investigation at MIT): the identification of
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the key engineering steps required to bring each to the point of trial use;
and the assessment of the organizational, financial and regulatory demands
associated with these innovations.
8.2.3 Funding.
Possible sources of funding for the research proposed in this category
include the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation and several
private foundations.
A research grant of $176,000 has been received from the National Science
Foundation to undertake a preliminary assessment of alternative national
nuclear power plant innovation strategies during an 18-month period beginning
in September 1983. The NSF-sponsored project will involve four faculty
members and three graduate students. The faculty members will also be
participating in other areas of the overall innovation program.
ANNEX A
ANALYSIS OF LOSS OF FEED WATER ATWS TRANSIENTS
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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Anticipated Transients without Scram
(ATWS) forms an important part of the assessment of the
safety of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). The loss
of feed water anticipated transient, in which the sec-
ondary side of the steam generators suffers a boil-off,
leads to high temperatures and high pressures in the
primary system. The prediction of the course of this
ATWS transient is the subject of this paper. A simple
computer code based on lumped parameter modeling has
been developed to predict the transient pressures and
temperatures. The results compare very well with those
obtained from the RETRAN code. The computer run time
is approximately 1/15th of the transient real time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The loss of feedwater (LOFW) transient in a PWR
degrades the heat removal from the primary water due to
the boil-off of the water on the secondary side of the
steam generators. This condition, if not accompanied
by a scram of the reactor power (ATWS) will lead to
temperature increase and pressurization of the primary
side. The opening of safety valves discharges flow and
energy from the reactor system and the reactor power
decreases due to the negative reactivity feedback from
the increase in the moderator temperature. The reactor
Pressure eventually decreases due to the coolant loss
and the power decrease. High values of pressure,
(above critical pressure), however, may be reached
during this transient for a typical PWR.
Analysis of loss of feedwater anticipated tran-
Sients without scram (LOFW ATWS) are usually performed
with the thermal hydraulic systems codes such as
RETRAN (1). RETRAN has the capability of modeling a
Vide variety of transients in both pressurized and
boiling water reactors, but suffers from long running
Present Address: Electric Power Research Institute,
3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, Ca. 94303. Work per-
formed while serving as a Visiting Professor in the
Oepartment of Nuclear Engineering at MIT (1980-81).
times. This paper describes a simpler fast-running
computer code for modeling this transient. Typical
running times octained have'been approximately 1/15th
the transient real time.
The code is presently restricted to the LOFW ATWS
in PWRs with U-tube steam generators, but can be
extended to a wider class of PWR transients. For
instance, the LOFW transient with reactor scram can be
treated easily with the addition of a scram reactivity
curve and a decay heat curve. The addition of a momen-
tum equation for the primary loop would allow modeling
of a pump coastdown. The code should be able to model
the loss of load, overcooling, and steam line break
transients with minor modifications of the steam gen-
erator model.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CODE
The system model includes representations of the
core, primary coolant loop, pressurizer, and the secon-
dary system. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate major aspects
of the plant representation. The core is represented
by an average coolant channel coupled to a fuel pin
model. Changes in reactor power due to fuel and moder-
ator temperature feedbacks are simulated using the
neutron point kinetics equations. The primary coolant
loop is represented by several volumes or nodes, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The major assumptions con-
cerning the primary system are: (1) pressure drops
between components are negligible in comparison to the
system pressure; (2) the coolant loops operate symmet-
rically, thus allowing their represenation by a single
lumped loop; and (3) the volumetric flow rate of the
primary coolant is constant in time, i.e, the pumps
remain in operation. The pressurizer is modeled as a
two region nonequilibrium volume with sprays and relief
valves. The secondary system model (Figure 2) consists
of a steam generator, main steam and bypass lines,
valves, and a constant pressure volume representing the
condenser. A detailed description of these models is
given in the next section.
Figure 3 is a flow chart illustrating the major
subroutine calls of the main pcogram. Subroutine
READIN reads input data and p'rforms a steady-state
initialization. The steady-state initialization
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minimizes the amount of input required and insures a
consistent set of initial conditions. After .nitial-
ization, a loop througn time is begun. Subroutine
PKNTCS is called first each time step. Input to this
subroutine includes the average temperatures of the
fuel and coolant and output is core power. Subroutine
TEMP solves the energy conservation equations for the
fuel pin and primary coolant nodes. The output of this
subroutine are fuel and coolant temperatures. Subrou-
tine PZR determines the primary system pressure by
solving the conservation of mass and energy equations
for the primary system and pressurizer simultaneously.
Input to this subroutine is the net heat input to the
primary coolant, which is computed in subroutine TEMP.
Subroutine STMGEN computes steam generator secondary
side temperature and mixture level. These parameters
are used by subroutine TEMP to determine the heat
transfer rate from primary to secondary coolant during
the next time interval.
III. PRIMARY SYSTEM ENERGY EQUATIONS
This section describes the formulation and solu-
tion technique of the primary system energy equations.
The primary system as referred to here includes the
fuel pin and primary coolant loop, excluding the pres-
surizer. These equations are used to compute average
temperatures in the fuel and coolant.
A. Fuel Pin Heat Conduction
The fuel pin heat conduction equation is solved by
dividing the fuel pin into several radial nodes and
using a lumped parameter equation to simulate each
node. Up to ten radial nodes may be used to simulate
the fuel pin. The following lumped parameter equation
is used to represent each node:
dT. T. - T. T. - T.dT T -1 i Ti -Ti+1
m.c. - q'''V - .i i t i i R R.i-1 i
m
h 
-
h.Jo
y. ninj
ou j
m
outj
mast I.,w rate of primary coolant
enthalpy of liquid entering noae -
enthalpy of liquid exiting node ,
total heat input to node j,
total heat extracted from node j,
volume of node j,
conversion factor
mass flow out of node j due to volume
expansion of the primary coolant
Note that it was implicity assumed that the mass
rate of the primary coolant is uniform througnout
system. The term mo represents the mass decreasp
due to the expansion o the primary coolant. It ,
included only for completeness and is eliminatea e
The mass conservation equation for node j is simpty:
din.
dt outl
Assuming there is no phase change in the primar.
coolant, temperature may be related to enthalpy t.rc -
the state equation by:
dT. dh + - dP
; Th ) P 3 aP h
Defining the specific heat as Cp = (3h/ZT)p and comin--
ing equations (1), (2) and (3) yields the following
equation for temperature:
dT. m C (T -T. )+Q -Q
- P li ,o inj out,
dt m.
(1)
where:
m mass of node i,
c specific heat of node i,
T = average temperature of node i,
.' = volumetric heat generation rate in node i,
V. = volume of node i, and
R - thermal resistance between node i and node i+1
B. Primary System Temperature
Figure 1 illustrates the nodalization of the pri-
mary coolant loop. The core is represented by a single
average coolant channel. The steam generator U-tube
region is represented by two coolant nodes and two wall
nodes. Nodes are also provided for a lumped lower
plenum and cold leg and a lumped upper plenum and hot
leg.
An energy balance on any coolant node j, neglect-
ing changes in potential and kinetic energies, yields:
d .d (m.h.) = m (h - h ) + Q. - Qutjdt 3 ji jo inj ot
dP -
+ CV -- in h (2)j dt outj j
where
m coolant mass in node j,
h = average enthalpy,
JPj
+ +3T dP
mjC P dt
(41
Equation (4) is invalid if there is a phase chanze
(boiling) in the node. If the temperature of any node
reaches the saturation temperature, execution is haltea
and a message printed.
Equation (4) is simplified for various nodes as
follows. For the upper and lower plena, perfect mixi-
is assumed. That is, the temperatures of the coolant
exiting the plena equals the average coolant tempera-
tures of the plena (Tj = T ). The average temperature
of all other nodes is relatid to the inlet and outlet
temperatures by:
(5)T - (T.. + T.j 2 ji jo
For the core node (j - 1), Q = 0 and
out
T - T
c 1
in R
c
(6)
where Tc is the average clad temperature and Rc is the
thermal resistance through the clad plus the surface
resistance. Equation (6) couples the fuel pin equa-
tions to the coolant energy equations.
e
For the steam generator nodes, Q inj = 0 and
T. -nT
T. - T
outj R_
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where T .al is the U-tube wall temperaturc and R is
a thermai resistance. The steam generator UJ-.ubes are
represented by two nodes, one eacn for the hot and cold
sides.
C. Core Power
Core power will chance in time due to the tempera-
ture feedback effects from the moderator and fuel. To
model this effect, the point kinetics equations with a
prompt-jump approximation are used. The delayed neu-
tron precursors are represented by two effective
groups. Reactivity is calculated by:
FB = a(T - T ) + a(T -T )
FB F F Fo m m -mo
where
(8)
OFB(t) = reactivity due to temperature feedbacks
aF = fuel temperature coefficient of
reactivity
T F(t) = average fuel temperature
- TT-0 = reference fuel temperature
T ('t) = average moderator temperature,
T = reference moderator temperature.
To permit an analytical solution of the kinetics equa-
tions, the reactivity is considered constant over each
time step.
D. Solution Technique
The fuel pin heat conduction equations (1) and
primary coolant energy equations (4) form a coupled set
of first order differential equations. The equation
set may be represented by:
dt
The vector T contains the temperatures of fuel, clad,
primary coolant and steam generator U-tubes. The coef-
ficient matrix A contains thermal inertia and resis-
tance terms. The vector q contains heat sources terms
(from fission), heat sink terms (steam generator), and
a term to account for changes in temperature due to
pressure change (see Equation 4). The equation system
is linearized by assuming the coefficients of A and q
are constant over each time step. The system is inte-
grated over each time step by the trapezoidal rule, a
second order method which is stable for any time step
size.
IV. PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE
The primary system pressure is calculated by com-
bining mass and energy balances for the primary coolant
loop with mass and energy balances for the pressurizer
and the equation of state. The pressurizer is modeled
as a two region volume, one region being liquid and the
other predominantly vapor. The two regions are assumed
to be at the same pressure but not necessarily the same
temperature. The rest of the primary system is modeled
as a single lumped volume.
A. Pressurizer
The conservation of mass and energy equations for
the liquid region may be written concisely as:
dM L
= W.
and
d dP
- (M h ) = W h + CV -
dt L LJ L I L dt
where
ML
w=
W3L
h =
V L
C=
P =
(10)
mass of liquid region
enthalpy of liquid region,
mass flow rate into or out or liquid region,
enthalpy of mass entering or leaving liquid
region,
volume of liquid region,
conversion factor
pressure
denotes the summation over all flow paths j
into or out of tne region.
Equations (9) and (10) can be combined to give:
dh L L L )L jL -+ Cv dP
dt ML L de
(11 )
where v, is the specific volume of the liquid region.
For the vapor region, there are no heat sources
and equation (11 ) takes the form:
W (h -h)
dhv jv jv v
--- v - + Cv dP
dt M v dtv
where
Mv = mass of vapor region
hv enthalpy of vapor region
Wjv= mass flow rate into or out of vapor region
hjv enthalpy of mass entering or leaving vapor
region,
v = specific volume of vapor region,
2 denotes the summation over all flow paths
into or out of the vapor region.
The change in volume for each
terms of changes in enthalpy,
the liquid region,
2)
region may be written in
pressure and mass. For
dVL dL dv L
- v + ML 
-dt Ldt d
Introducing equation (9) into (13) yields
dVL 
_vL
dt v L + ML at
JL -
From the equation of state we may write:
dvL 3v
P L
L 3L L)
- + P/
hL
(13)
(14)
(15)dP
dt
Introducing this into equation (14) we obtain:
dV L [ v dh L avLh dP
-- =v WL + M - dh + - (16)
dt L ) L L ah d P djL Lh
L
'' (9)
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Similarly, for the vapor region:
dv .LV v. dhv v dP
v P h
(17)
The total volume of the pressurizer is constant. This
implies that:
dV, dV
-- + - 0
de- ait
Condensation
The condensation rate on spray droplets is calcu-
lated by assuming the condensate comes into equilibrium
with the spray. Witn this assumption, an energy
balance yields
W = f sp sP
cd h - h f sp (20)
(18) Rainout
Equation (16) and (17) can now be combined and Equa-
tions (11) and (12) can be used to eliminate the
unknown enthalpies. The result is a single equation
for pressure:
The code does not allow subcooled vapor states,
and any liquid condensing in the vapor region is
assumed to deposit instantly on the liquid surface. In
order to implement this assumptions, the rainout flow
rate is calculated from:
+v
P
v~~ a L) W - W(h h)
L . jL + )ah jL L L
LP jL
av
+ W + -- W.(h.-h) (19)
v jv 7 vjjV v P jV
The terms W, , W , etc., are expanded below:
jL jV
J-v
W W +W + W - W
jL cd rain flashjL
W jL(hj-h L)= W srg (hsrg -h L) + (W sp+Wcd +W rain)
jL
(h -h ) - W (h -h ),f L flash g L
W =W -W -W -W -W
v jv boil cd rain Rv sv
SW. (h. -h )=W (h -h )-W (h h
iv jv 3v v boil g v rain f v
where
Wsrg
Wsp
Wcd
Wrain
Wflash
WRv
W
sv
hsrg
hf
- inlet surge flow rate
- flow rate of spray,
- condensation rate of vapor on spray,
- rainout of liquid droplets from vapor
region,
= vapor generation rate in liquid region,
= mass flow rate through the relief
valve(s),
- mass flow rate through the safety
valve(s),
- enthalpy of surge flow,
- saturation enthalpy of liquid phase
= saturation enthalpy of vapor phase.
The spray flow rate is computed from a user
defined linear function of pressure. Auxiliary models
are employed to compute the vapor condensation rate,
rainout and flashing flow rates, and the mass flow
rates through relief and safety valves. These models
are described below.
x M
W i v v
rain at
where
h -h
X Wv 9x =
v h - h
where At is the time step size.
(21)
(22)
Flashing
The flashing term is the liquid region equivalent
of the rainout term. Superheated liquid states are not
allowed, and any vapor formed in the liquid region is
assumed to instantly appear in the vapor region.
Hence, the flashing flow rate is calculated from:
xLML
w = - (23)flash At
where
h - hL f
xL*h - h
Choked Flow
The homogeneous equilibrium model is used to com-
pute the critical mass flux through the relief and
safety valves. The critical mass flux is then multi-
plied by user supplied valve flow areas and conserva-
tism factors to obtain the mass flow rate.
The unknowns in equation (19) which are not sup-
plied as input or computed from auxiliary models are P
and the surge line flow rate W g. Hence another equa-
tion is needed to close the set
B. Surce Line Flow Rate
The surge line connects the pressurizer with the
hot leg of the primary coolant loop. The surge line
flow rate is computed by assuming that pressure changes
in the coolant loop and pressurizer are equal. Combin-
ing mass and energy balances on the coolant loop with
the equation of state results in the following equation
for pressure:
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The collapsed l.quid level is calculated from a mass
balance on Lhe steam generator. It is assumed that the
collapsed liquid levels (static head) in the downcomer
and U-tube region are equal. The collapsed liquid
level may then be computed from:
(25)
net heat input rate to primary system,
specific volume of primary coolant,
average enthalpy of primary coolant,
mass of primary coolant.
An expression for the surge line flow rate may now be
found by equating the right hand sides of equations
(19) and (25) and solving for Wsurg
V. SECONDARY SYSTEM
The secondary system model is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. The model consists of a three region steam gen-
erator, steam lines, valves, and a condenser volume.
The purpose of the model is to calculate heat transfer
conditions, i.e., temperature and heat transfer coef-
ficients, on the secondary side. Therefore, some
phenomenon (such as recirculation flow) which do not
strongly affect these parameters are not modeled.
A. Pressure
The steam generator pressure is calculated by
assuming the secondary fluid is an equilibrium mixture.
The conservation of mass and energy equations for the
entire steam generator, neglecting potential and
kinetic energy terms, are:
z g-
bc g (Ab 
- Ad )f
where
g= conversion factor
g = gravitational constant,
I = total liquid inventory
Ab = flow area of bundle region,
Ad - flow area of downcomer, and
Pf - density of liquid.
The average void fraction is defined by;
z
a =mix m(z) dz
mix 0
(29)
(30)
The average void fraction is computed numerically
by dividing the boiling region into axial steps. In
this calculation, the mixture level at the previous
time step is used.
The void fraction at each axial step is computed
from either the drift flux equations (2) or the empiri-
cal Yeh (3) correlation.
The drift flux model expresses the local void
fraction as:
dU
so(W h. W h
dt sg in in s g
dM
sg
dt
where
M
Usg
.sg
W i
h n
Os
hg
= (W. - W ) dtin s
= total water mass in steam generator,
= total internal energy,
= heat transfered to steam generator
= inlet flow rate to steam generator
= enthalpy of inlet flow,
= flow rate of steam exiting steam generator,
and
= enthalpy of steam.
Once internal energy and steam generator water mass are
known, pressure may be calculated from the equation of
State.
B. Mixture Level
The two phase mixture level in the U-tube bundle
region is computed from:
Zbe
z. z
mix (-
where
2 .
mix
z
-bc
(28)
- two phase ixture level,
B collapsed liquid level, and
B average void fraction in the bundle region.
(31)C (j
o g f V
(26) - -
The parameter C. is a distribution parameter which
arises from radially averaging the void fraction and
(27) fluid velocities. It typically ranges from 1.0 for
bubbly flow to around 1.2 for fully developed slug
flow. The quantity vgj is the vapor drift velocity.
It is computed from:
1/4
V = 4 gc f 
gh I.'- 2 j (32)
P f
where a is the surface tension and g and jf the super-
ficial velocities are computed from:
Q -W~A
j (z) so bi f
g p A L hg bb -fg
w. p
jf(Z) = b - p j (z)f A b f
z (33)
(34)
where
-bi w flow rate from the downcomer to the bundle,
Ahf = subcooling of liquid in downcomer,
Lb = height of U-tube bundle, and
hfg = latent heat of vaporization.
An equation for the flow rate Wi may be derived by
writing mass balance equations tor the bundle region
and downcomer and equating the collapsed levels. The
result is
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o in A so fg
o= A~ +Ad ( hf/hg) (35)
where Win is the feedwater (or auxiliary feedwater)
f low rate.'
The feh correlation expresses the local void frac-
tion as:
0.239
0. 925 
-Op )Ef
b 0.6
bcr g f
where the critical superficial steam velocity Vbrc is
given by:
V 2 (1.53) 2 1/2 1/2
bcr 3 L 2/3 gPf
and the power coefficent in Eq. (36),
b = o.67 if ig/Vbrc < 1
b = 0.47 if j /Vbr > 1
Both.the Yeh correlation and the drift flux model were
employed in determining the two phase mixture level as
a function of time in the FLECHT-SEASET (4) and the
Westinghouse 336 rod bundle (5) boil-off experiments.
Examples of the comparisons with data are shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5, respectively, for the 336 rod bundles run
numbers 718 and 722. The run No. 718 had a power level
of 1.258 MW and pressure of 5.5 MPa (799 psia). The
run No. 722 nad a power level of 1.264 MW and a pres-
sure of 2.7 MPa (395 psia).
C. Heat Transfer Coefficient
The primary reason for tracking the mixture level
is to determine heat transfer coefficients on the sec-
ondary side. The heat transfer coefficient for a
U-tube node j is computed from:
(z - z. ) h - (z .- z )h
h. = too mix nb mix bottom dry(z -z
top bottom
if z bottom < Zmix < z top
= hbhnb
h dry
where
z too
zbottom
zmix
h ab
hnb =hdry =
if z .>zmix top
if z . < z
mix bottom (38)
elevation of the top of node j ,
elevation of the bottom of node j
mixture elevation ,
two phase boiling heat transfer
coefficient,
heat transfer cofficient after dryout.
3 3 -1
1L
6 a -
2 1=4 1
The two phase heat transfer coefficent (h nb) is com-
puted from the Thom (6) correlation. The post-dryout
heat transfer coefficient (h dry) is input by the user.
VI. ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL LOFW ATWS TRANSIENT
The LOW ATWS transient analyzed was for a two
loop PWR operating at 2610 MW (thermal). Pettinent
plant parameters are summarized in Table I. The 2
group decay constants were obtained from the standard
group constants as follows:
Table II indicates that the peak primary pressure
is sensitive to the fuel-clad gap conductance. Halvin1
9
the conductance increased the peak pressure by 7 MPa
(1000 psia). This is due to the relationship between
core power and fuel temperature. The lower gap conduc-
tance results in higher initial fuel temperature. AS
the core power drops, the decrease in fuel temperature
is greater than that for the base case. This results
in a greater positive reactivity addition through the
6 Doppler feedback, hence a slower rate of power decrease
and greater peak pressure.
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Results of the base case calculation are presentep
in Figure 6. All feedwater is shut off at 0.0 seconds.
The secondary system liquid inventory then begins to
boil-off. At around 80 seconds the steam generator is
completely dry ana the primary system pressure and tem-
perature begin rising sharply. The pressurizer relief
valve opens at 75 seconds and the safety valve at 80
seconds. The pressurizer fills at 90 seconds and
reaches a peak pressure of 33.7 Mpa (4896 psia) at 115
seconds.
Results of the base case analysis are compared
with a RETRAN calculation (7), employing the same input
parameters as in Table I, in Figures 7 through 9. The
two sets of results agree fairly well, the major dif-
ference being a somewhat higher predicted peak pressure
by the code developed here.
A number of cases were run to determine the sensi-
tivity of the peak primary system pressure to various
parameters. The results are summarized in Table II.
The largest changes in peak pressure occurred due to
variations in the moderator temperature coefficient,
the Doppler coefficient, the fuel-clad gap conductiv-
ity, and the pressurizer relief and safety valve flows.
A. Moderator Temperature and Doppler Coefficents
Figure 10 illustrates variations in core power and
primary system pressure due to changes in the moderator
temperature coefficient (MTC). These plots illustrate
the sensitivity of the peak pressure to the rate at
which core power is reduced. Halving the MTC resulted
in a peak pressure of 42.8 MPa (6220 psia) at 122 sec-
onds. Doubling the MTC reduced the peak pressure to
27.9 MPa (4050 psia).
Figure 11 illustrates the sensitivity of core
power and primary system pressure to the Dopper coeffi-
cient. Note that doubling the coefficient slowed the
rate of power decrease and hence resulted in a higher
peak pressure. This is because the fuel temperature
was dropping, thus adding positive reactivity.
B. Valve Flow Area
The effect of varying the valve flow areas on sys-
tem pressure is illustrated in Figure 12. Assuming one
of the two pressurizer relief valves fails to open
increased the peak pressure to 41.3 MPa (6000 psia).
Increasing the.relief valve flow area by 50% (i.e. add-
ing another relief valve) reduced the peak pressure to
29.2 MPa (4250 psia).
C. Gap Conductance
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have developed a relatively simple code for the
analysis of anticipated transients without scram (ATWS)
in a PWR. In particular, the loss of feedwater (LOFW)
transient in which the secondary side of the steam gen-
erators boils dry in a short time has been treated.
This has required tracking of the two phase mixture
level in thle secondary side and the attendant variation
of the heat transfer rate from the primary to the sec-
ondary side. The modeling for the two phase mixture
level is based on the drift flux model and was verified
by comparing to the measured data in the separate
effects boil-off experiments performed in the FLECHT
SEASET and tne 336 rod bundle facilities.
The basic approacn employed in developing the code
is lumped parameter modeling of the system components
based on mass and energy conservation equations. The
primary system during the LOFW ATWS transient remains
full and does not experience phase separation and sin-
gle phase description is adequate. The pressurizer is
treated with two (liquid and vapor) non equilibrium
regions with provisions for flow out of the relief and
safety valves and the spray and heating for pressure
control. The steam and subcooled water properties
employed were polynomial fits shown in the RETRAN-2
manual. (1)
The code developed was employed in analyzing the
LOFW ATWS transient for a typical PWR and the results
obtained were compared with those obtained with the
RETRAN-2 code employing the same input parameters.
Good comparisons were obtained, thereby lending con-
fidence to the basic soundness of the developed code.
The main attractive feature,- of course, is that the
computer run time for the code developed here is about
1/15th of the transient real time. Thus, this code can
be employed for extensive parametric analyses with lit-
tle cost.
It is possible to extend the range of applications
of the code developed here with selective improvements
in modeling. For example, overcooling transients could
be treated with mu.nor modifications of the steam gener-
ator model. Similarly, it is possible to extend the
primary system mocel to include tracKing of a two phase
mixture level in the core and thereby treat core under-
cooling transients. The main empnasis should be to
employ as sopnisticated (and complex) modeling as
necessary to describe the transients adequately, witn
as little computational cost as Possible, thereby pro-
viding a tool for rapid parametric analyses.
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Table 1
Input Parameters
Thermal Power
Moderator temperature coefficient
Dopper coefficient
Primary system volume
Pressurizer volume
Relief valve flow area
Flow area multiplier
Safety valve flow area
Flow area multiplier
Initial secondary liquid inventory
Void correlation
Kinetics parameters
Prompt neutron lifetime (A)
Group 1 delayed neutron fraction
Group 2 delayed neutron fraction
Group 1 decay constant (<I> 1 )
Group 2 decay constant (<1> 2)
2610 MW
-9.9 x 10-5 AK/K/-C
-1.9 x 10-5 AK/K/eC
267 m 3  (9440 ft3 )
42 m3  (1500 ft3)
0.0020 m2 (.022 ft 2
0.74
0.0036 m2 (0.039 ft 2
0.78
119,000 Kg (262,000 lbm)
Drift flux
0.00006 sec~
0.003647
0.002854
0.339 sec"
0.043 sec'
(8 )
(82)
Table II
Sensitivity Study Summary
Parameter Varied
Base Case
Moderator Temp. Coeff. Halved
Moderator Temp. Coeff. Doubled
Doppler Coeff. Halved
Doppler Coeff. Doubled
Gap Conductivity Halved
Gap Conductivity Doubled
Relief Valve Flow Areas Reduced by 50%
Relief Valve Flow Areas Increased by 50%
No Spray Flow
No Aux Feed
Turbine Trip at 10 sec
Peak Pressure
33.7 MPa (4896 psia)
42.8 MPa (6220 psia)
27.9 MPa (4053 psia)
30.2 MPa (4382 psia)
40.8 MPa (5923 psia)
38.5 MPa (5582 psia)
30.9 MPa (4488 psia)
41.4 MPa (4488 psia)
2'9.3 MPa (4256 psia)
33.8 MPa (4901 psia)
36.5 MPA (5293 psia)
330. MPa (4793 psia)
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4
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6
7
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2 nodes
Figure 1. Primary system model.
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Figure 2. Secondary system model.
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Figure 3. Flow chart of main program.
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Nickel-base alloys are used extensively in Light Water Reactor (LWR)
nuclear power systems due to their excellent corrosion resistance and strength
in high temperature aqueous environments. Alloy 600, a solid solution
strengthened nickel-base alloy, is used for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)
steam generator tubing for almost all U.S. PWR power stations. Alloy 600 is
also used in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) systems for safe ends and other
components. For applications requiring very high strength and superior
corrosion resistance, age hardenable nickel-base alloys such as Alloy X-750
and Alloy 718 are often used. Specific applications include fuel assembly
hold down springs, BWR Jet Pump components and high strength bolts for core
and other structural components. In spite of their generally excellent
general corrosion resistance the above mentioned alloys have been found to
be susceptible to localized forms of corrosion attack such as stress corrosion
cracking, corrosion fatigue, and intergranular attack. Susceptibility to
these forms of damage is a function of prior thermomechanical treatment and
service environment. For Alloy 600, from an economic standpoint, the most
severe impact has resulted from instances of intergranular attack (IGA) and
denting related cracking initiated from the secondary side of PWR steam
generators; there have been instances where cracking from the primary side
environment has occured. In some of these cases, fatigue could not be ruled
out as a contributing factor. For certain environments and heat treatments
Alloy X-750 is susceptible to environmentally assisted fatigue and stress
corrosion cracking. Failures of components in service, while few in number,
have resulted in significant economic impact. These failures have provided
impetus for the development of materials with improved resistance to these
environmental effects but the available data is limited. For this reason
a research program, under the sponsorship of the Electric Power Research
-l -
Institute, has been initiated with the goal of achieving a mechanistic under-
standing of the fatigue and stress corrosion cracking behavior of Ni-Cr-Fe
alloys used in nuclear power systems. This paper presents results of a
program to evaluate the effect of thermomechanical processing, environmental
and mechanical variables on the corrosion fatigue behavior of Alloys X-750
and 600.
Alloy X-750
The Alloy X-750 used in the program was tested in three metallurgical
conditions. These conditions were selected based on a desire to evaluate
material conditions prototypic of that used for components of past, present
and future vintage. Material heat treatments were as follows:
* Equalized and Aged (AH)
Hot Worked + 24 Hr @ 8850C/AC + 20 Hr @ 7040C/AC
* Low Temperature Anneal (BH)
Hot Worked + 1 Hr @ 982 0C/AC + 20 Hr @ 704 0C/AC
* High Temperature Anneal (HTH)
Hot Worked + 1 Hr @ 10930C/AC + 20 Hr @ 704 0C/AC
The above heat treatments result in significant microstructural differ-
ences. The microstructure of the AH material is characterized by a bi-modal
y' size distribution with a grain size of approximately 15 ym. The grain
boundaries are decorated with carbides as well as containing y' of the larger
size fraction in the bi-modal distribution. The intragranular region is
characterized by both a large and small y' size fraction. Regions adjacent
to the grain boundaries are free of the large y' size fraction. The BH
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material is characterized by Z si-modal grain size distribution and a single
size fraction of y'. The grain size for the larger size fraction is approxi-
mately 150 ym, while that for the smaller size fraction is approximately
150 um, while that for the smaller size fraction is approximately 15 Um,
similar to that for the AH material. The HTH material is characterized by a
large grain size, 150 um, and a single line y' size fraction.
Fatigue tests were conducted at frequencies of 0.1 and 10 Hz using
a sine wave loading history with a stress rate, Pmin/P max, of 0.1 in the
following environments: (1) Air @ 250C, (2) High Purity Oxygenated Water
(8 ppm) @ 93,288,3160 C, (3) High Purity Deoxygenated Water (<5 ppb), (4)
Simulated BWR water chemistry with hydrogen additions, and (5) Simulated
PWR primary water chemistry. Testing was conducted using CT specimens with
1T dimensions except for specimen thickness, which was 12.7 mm. Tests were
performed in a titanium autoclave system integrated with a fully automated
servohydraulic fatigue machine. Specimens were electrically isolated from
the load train grips and autoclave. Electrochemical potential was monitored
during testing using an external Silver/Silver Chloride reference electrode.
Crack length was evaluated using compliance measured using an in-situ LVDT.
Crack growth rate data was collected using crack length increments at
constant AK.
Figures 1-3 present some of the experimental results. Crack growth
rates are a function of AK, frequency, heat treatment, and environment. In
addition, crack morphology is also a function of the above variables.
Frequency effects are the most significant for the AH heat treatment and
decrease in significance for the BH treatment and still further for the HTH
heat treatment. With minor exceptions, crack growth rates decrease, for a
given AK, from AH to BH to HTH.
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Figure 1 shows some c::primental results for the AH material. Several
points should be noted: (1) the crack growth rate is a strong function of
temperature and frequency, (2) the crack path is a function of AK, temperature
and frequency. At 930C the crack path parallels the grain boundaries at
10 Hz but switches to a more transgranular mode at 0.1 Hz. At 288 and 316 0C
the crack path is mostly transgranular at both frequencies. For values of AK
greater than 25 MPavE the crack path becomes more transgranular and striated.
The effect of frequency reverses itself between 93 and 288/316 0C.
Figure 2 shows data obtained to date for the BH heat treatment. Crack
growth rates are lower than those for the AH treatment. At low values of AK
the crack path is intergranular within the small grain size fraction and
transgranular but strongly crystallographic within the large grain size
fraction at all temperatures. At higher AK's the fracture path becomes more
transgranular and striated for both size fractions. The frequency effects,
observed in the AH treatment are still present but to a lesser extent.
Figure 3 shows data obtained to date for the HTH treatment. Crack
growth rates are generally lower than the other heat treatments and, while
the frequency effects are still present, they are minimal. Crack paths are
strongly crystallographic and transgranular at lower AKs but more striated
and less crystallographic at high AKs.
Alloy 600
Material for the Alloy 600 test program consisted of plate material
with a thickness of 12.7 mm. The processing schedule for the plate was
designed, in consort with the vendor, to produce a microstructure similar,
both in terms of mechanical and corrosion behavior, to that for product
line mill-annealed steam generator tubing of the type used in older
-4-
Westirm,,house NSS systems. -A'jilysis indicated that this goal was achieved.
Grain size, carbide morphology and corrosion behavior are consistent with
tubing. Tests were conducted at room temperature and 288 0C at frequencies
of from 0.1-10 Hz. Two basic heat treatments were employed in the program:
(1) mill annealed plus a 2 hour age @ 7000C and (2) mill annealed plus a
120 hour age @ 7000C. The two hour age produced a highly "sensitized"
condition as evidenced by severe chromium depletion at the grain boundaries.
Material thermally treated for 120 hours @ 700 0C exhibited no chromium
depletion at grain boundaries. Sensitization behavior of the Alloy 600
material was examined and quantified using conventional corrosion testing
and high resolution scanning transmission electron microscopy (STEM) using
a Vacuum Generators, Inc., HB-5 STEM. Detailed analysis of grain boundary
and near grain boundary analysis were performed.
Test environments used in the test program included the following:
(1) room temperature air @ 250C, (2) 288 0C, high purity water, 8 ppm oxygen,
(3) 2880C simulated secondary AVT chemistry and (4) 2880C high purity low
oxygen water.
Figures 1 and 2 present the data generated in the program thus far.
The overall test matrix is incomplete at this time; but, so far, the data
indicates that there is little, if any, effect of thermal treatment on the
crack growth rate. There is, however, a significant frequency effect as well
as a stress ratio, (Pmin/P max), effect. The crack path, in both cases, is
transgranular except at low (<10 mPzvi) AKs. At low AKs the crack path
becomes increasingly intergranular.
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Abstract
This paper presents the development and implemen-
tation of a digital control system in an. operating
nuclear reactor. The control system incorporates on-
line detection and isolation of faulty equipment, sen-
sor calibration, measurement esti=ation, and informa-
tion display in a given controller structure. It is
tolerant of process disturbances, certain equipment
failures, and sensor degradation and noise.
Rather than relying on signals from single sen-
sors, each feedback/feedforward signal that is sent to
the controller under this approach is a digitally pro-
cessed, weighted average of several valid measurements
of the appropriate process variable. The weights are
not i priori fixed but depend on the A posteriori pro-
babilities of failure of individual sensors and are
computed on the basis of past and current observations.
Thus, for a gradually degrading measurement, its
weight is smoothly reduced and eventual isolation of
the fault does not cause an abrupt change in the esti-
rate, i.e. the controller action remains bumpless.
Introduction
In contrast to avionic and industrial processes,
the role of computers in the instrinentation and con-
trol of nuclear power plants, excepting the Canadian
EER units, has been quite limited [1). Recently, com-
puter-aided fault diagnosis and infermation display
techniques have been developed to enhance the safety
of nuclear power plants [2-6). It is possible to
achieve safety, reliability, operatioral fle-xibility,
and superior performance by simultaneously applying
on-l.ne fault detection and isolation (TDI), sensor
ca.libration, and information display techniques to a
feedback/feedforvard control sys:em. An integrated
co-ntrol system that has inherent capabilities to per-
form the afore-mentioned tasks has been developed and
designed to be executable by cc=ercially available
microcomputers. This contrnl system has been imple-
mented in an on-going series of experiments on the 5
'.t nuclear research reactor, CTR-II,.which is
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Co==-ission (NRC)
and is operated by Massachusetts Institute of Techno-
logy. Presently, the power of the IR-II is being
digitally controlled, under both steady-state and tran-
sient operations, via feedback of an on-line estimate
from a set of power sensors. A real-time CRT display
presents the validated data and diagnostics of the
power-related istrumentation such as neutron flux de-
tectors, pri.ary coolant flow, and temperature sensors.
The major functions of this on-line control sys-
ten relative to the YIT nuclear research reactor are:
(1) The regulation of reactor power under both
steady-state and transient conditions. The
latter include xenon oscillations, coolant
temperature variations, and operator-induced
load changes.
(2) The on-line detection, isolation, and recon-
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figuration of faulty sensors without inter-
ruption of plant operation.
(3) The on-line estimation of both measurable
and non-measurable plant variables such as
power, coolant flow, temperature, and reacti-
vity using the available sensors and/or ana-
lyric redundancies [7) that rely on the phy-
sical relationships amongst the plant vari-
ables.-
(4) The on-line calibration of power sensors to
compensate for process disturbances such as
changes in the spatial distribution of the
neutron flux due to xenon transients and the
resulting shim blade motion.
(5) The on-line information display of both the
critical plant variables and the diagnostics
of any faulty sensors and equipment, thereby
assisting the operators to make timely and
appropriate decisions.
This paper is organized in several sections that
describe the design concepts, the experimental facili-
ty, the pertinent results, and the experimentally-
deduced conclusions. While the digital control system
has been demonstrated on an operational nuclear
reactor, it is adaptable to large and complex contin-
uous processes such as cherical and power plants.
Backeround of the Sir:al Validation Methodolorv
The signal validation methodology uses redundant
measurements that may be obtained either directly, as
sensor outputs, or indirectly as analytic calculations
from a mathematical model formulated on the basis of
physical relationships among other process variables
(e.g. mass and energy balances in thermo-fluid pro-
cesses). The methodology provides a un-ified, svstema-
tic procedure for (1) fault detection and isolation
(DI), and (2) sensor calibration and measurement
estimation.
The FDI technique, used in the control system, is
a sequential decision-maikrLg procedure that systemati-
cally seeks out the largest consistent subset from a
set of redundant measurements where the consistencies
among individual measurements of a given process vari-
able are determined on the basis of allowable errors
[2,3). Allowable errors or error bounds, specific to
individual measurements, can be obtained from either
experimental data or the information on instrument
tolerances. As the number of redundant measurements
increases, the checking of consistency in all possible
combinations and the attendant task of bookkeeping for
all information at the current and past sampling in-
strants becomes very complex. A systematic procedure,
appropriate for a digital processor, that relies on
recursive relations, based on the consistencies of
each measurement relative to the remaining ones, has
been developed for diagnosing sensor and plant equip-
rent failures. The matheratical background and other
details of the FI technique are given in the previous
-A
publications [2,3).
The sensor calibration and measurement estimation
technique is also a sequend..al procedure that is per-
formed on-line in the framework of the aforesaid FDI
technique. If the process variables being measured
are tine-dependent and if the redundant sensors are in-
stalled in different spatial locations (e.g., neutron
flux detectors) or if analytic measurements [7) are
used to supplement the sensor redundancy (e.g., fluid
te=perature obtained from thermal power balances), the
individual measurements of the given process variable
may e*.ibit deviations from each other after a length
of time even though the sensors are functioning nor-
mally. These differences could be caused by time-vary-
ing plant parameters, reaction kinetics, transport de-
lays, etc. Consequently, some of the 'ensors may be
erroneously deleted unless they are periodically re-
calibrated. On the other hand, failure to isolate a
degraded sensor could cause an inaccurate estimate of
the measured variable. More importantly, the plant's
perforr.ance igbt be adversely affected if that in-
accurate estimate were used as an input to the con-
troller. These difficulties can be circumvented if
(1) o=ly the consistent measurements are calibrated
such that their residuals are mini'ized, and (2) the
veights of the calibrated measurements (for computing
the estimate) are updated on the basis of their re-
spective a posteriori probabilities of failure instead
of being a priori fixed. The technique is therefore
capable of detecting both abrupt and slow failures.
Specifically, in the event of abrupt disruptions in
some sensor(s) in excess of the specified error
.boud(s), the respective sensor(s) are isolated by the
DI algorithm, and only the remaining, sensors are cali-
brated and used to provide an estimate. If a gradual
sensor degradation occurs, the faulty sensor may not
be i e.iately isolated but its influence on the esti-
mate and the calibration of the remaining sensors is
dininished as a function of its degradation because its
weight decreases with an increase in the i posteriori -
-probability of failure. Thus, if the error bounds of
the masurements are appropriately increased to reduce
the probability of false alarms, the resulting delay
in detectihg a gradually degrading sensor could be
tolerated because an undetected fault, as a result of
its reduced weight, does not sigrificantly affect the
accuracy of calibration and estimation. Moreover,
since the weight of a gradually degrading zeasurement
for computing the estimate is smoothly reduced, the
eventual isolation of the fault does not cause any
abrupt change in the estimate, thereby assuring a bump-
less controller action. Details of the calibration and
estimation technique, and relevant experimental results
are presented in another paper [8) at this conference.
Descrintion of the Reactor and the Instruentation
A description of the system configuration and in-
strumentation of the 5 XWt fission reactor is given in
the ITR-II Reactor Systems Manual [9). The reacter
is heavy-water reflected, light-water moderated and
cooled, and functions as a research and educational
facility. A simplified diagram of the process and in-
strumentation is given in Figure 1. The nuclear in-
strumentatien used for the research reported in this
paper consists of three neutron flux sensors and a
gama-ray sensor that correlates neutron power with the
radioactivity (N-16) of the primary coolant. Four in-
dependent measurements of primary coolant flow are ob-
tained from the pressure differences across crifices.
Primary coolant temperatures are measured as follows:
two sensors for the hot leg, two sensors for the cold
leg, and one sensor for temperature difference between
the legs. In effect, three measurements are available
for the tempevrature difference. The noise and statis-
tical characteristics of the ITR-II's flow, tempera-
ture, and neutron flux instrumentation are similar to
those in cc:ercial reactors. These sensors are hard-
wired to a portable LS1-11/23 microcomputer through
appropriate isolators, signal conditioners, and A/D
converters. None of the sensors that form the lTR-I's
safety system were used for this research.
' At present, neither the
quisitien and reconstruction
tolerant. *Tney consist of a
memory, real-time clock, and
computer nor the data ae-
rystem hardware is fault-
single string processor,
both A/D and D/A convert-
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Figure 1. Simplified Process and Instrumentation Diagram for )ITR-I1
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ers. The software is designed to be fault-free with a
very high probability. It is structured as a main pro-
gram with several modular subprograms following a top-
do-n hierarchy such 'that an appropriate software test
procedure can systematcally identify the faulty mod-
ules. The software is also capable of detecting the
zajority of the hardware failures that are likely to
occur in the course of operations. Details of the
sofrware architecture are not presented here due to
space lir-itations.
Descrintion of the Control Scheme
Coarse control of the power in the 1ITR-II is
achieved by manually positioning a bank of six shim
blades. Once critical, the neutron flux is normally
saI.ntained constant by an automatic analog controller
that is monitored by the reactor operator. The con-
troller adjusts a fine-control regulating rod according
to the feedback signal of a single power sensor, as
sbovn in Figure 2. If the error signal, i.e. the dif-
.erence between the reference and the sensor signal
exceeds a specified bound (typically around 2% of the
ratad reactor power of 5 Wt), "auto=atic" control is
tripped to the "manual" mode in which control is main-
tained directly by the reactor operator. The analog
controller in Figure 2 is a standard proportional-in-
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tegral-derivative (P-I-D) type. The controller output
energizes-a 3-position relay to drive a constant speed
motor that moves the regulating rod up or down at 108
mn/minute, which corresponds to an average of reacti-
vity change of about 1.1 x 10-SLK/K per second.
The digital control system shown in Fig-.re 3, re-
places the single power sensor in Figure 2 by the four
available sensors, supplies the analog controller and
its relay logic by a digital algorithm, and incorpor-
ates on-line FDI, sensor calibration, and information
display. The constant-speed motor has also been re-
placed by a variable-speed stepping motor in order to
implement continuous-action control laws. (Note: The
maximum speed of the motor is limited to reduce the
consequences of any unforeseen malfunction. Also, the
relay logic of the analog controller can be replicated.)
The structure of this digital control system is shown
in Figure 4.
The multiply redundant sensors for power, flow,
and temperature difference measurements are first vali-
dated on-line with the aid of the FDI methodology [2,
3]. The YITR-II's flow and temperature sensors are
stable and do not require on-line calibrations. Bow-
ever, certain of the ?IITR-II's neutron power sensors
ray be affected by process disturbances. This occurs
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Figure 4. Signal Validation and Control System
because these sensors, which measure the leakage flux
from the core, are spatially fixed. Any process that
perturbs the leakage flux will cause the output of the
neutron sensors to vary even though there may have been
no net change in the overall reactor power. For
example, as short-lived fission product poisons build
into the core, the shim bank must be withdrawn to pro-
vide copensating reactivity. This sequence entails
no change in reactor power but, as the shim bank is
withdrawn, the magnitude of the peak in the axial
neutren flux profIle decreases and its position rela-
tive to the bottom of the core rises. Bence, the out-
puts of the neutron power sensors may change even
though reactor power, as indicated by heat balances,
is constant.
. Civen that process disturbances, such as xenon
transients, coolant te=perature variations, and move-
mzet of individual shim blades, can affect the neutron
power sensors and since the reactor control system
feeds back the validated power estimate at each sampling
interval, the neutron power sensors are calibrated on-
line and the estimate is obtained as a weighted aver-
age of all valid, calibrated power measurements.
The output of the calibration filter is protected
,against possible drifting by testing it against an vna-
lyric redundancy that is valid for both.stea4y-state
a.d transient operations. A real-time thermal-hydrau-
lic model of the primary coolant system that accepts
the validated measurements of power and coolant flow
estimates as inputs is used to generate a nalytically
redundant value, ATa, for the hot leg to cold leg tem-
perature difference [7]. The value of ATa is compared
with an estimated value of the te=perature difference,
&Te, obtained from the sensor outputs at every sample.
An inconsistency of Ala and LTe impliespossible errors
in the power estimate since it is one of the inputs to
the analytical relationship for computing ta. If this
occurs, an alarm message is generated to notify the
reactor operator. This procedure also guards against
comon-mode failures that can not usually be detected
from either power or AT sensors alone.
The process and measurement noise in the power
estimate is filtered digitally before that estimate is
used as a feedback signal to the controller. (Refer
to Figure 4). The filter reduces the random movements
of the regulating rod drive motor around an ecuit±brium
position. The digital filter, in its present form, is
a 2-pole Butterworth. Its cut-off frequency is a
selectable parameter having typical values in the
range of 2r to 5r radians/sec.
In addition to feeding back the power estimate,
the controller -is routinely calculating and feeding
back the reactivity deviations as shown in Figure 4.
An inverse kinetics algorithm is used for on-line eval-
uation of the reactivity from the reactor's power
level and history [10]. The advantage of reactivity
feedback is that whenever the equilibrium criticalcon-
dition is disturbed, the reactivity promptly changes
thereby creating an appropriate control signal that
will adjust the regulating rod's position to restore
the original condition. Reactivity feedback provides
a fast, anticipatory control action that is indepen-
dent of the steady-state value of the reactor power.
The regulating rod's associated reactivity, c, is
a nonlinear function of the rod position, x. Given
that the reactor power is regulated by controlling the
reactivity which, in turn, is influenced by the regu-
- lating rod's position, the overall plant gain is
directly related to do/dx. Bence, the plant gain
- varies nonlinearly with changes in the regulating rod's
position. In order to compensate for these variations
in gain that accrue from the nonlinear relationship
between rod position and reactivity, the controller
gain is constrained to be proportional to dx/do. This
is accomplished by approximating the regulating rod's
differential reactivity work curve as a piecevise
linear function and by measuring the rod's height at
each sampling interval.
Saferv Features
The digital control scheme of Figures 3 and 4 can
be activated by one or more power sensors. It is not
restricted to specific control structures such as
P-I-D in the ;nalog controller. Functionally, this
control scheme is more flexible and, from the point of
view of sensor degradation and failures, and the possi-
ble malfunctioning of other pertinent plant components
(such as primary coolant pu=ps), more reliable than
the original analog control scheme. Bowever, since
the computer system hardware, in its present form, con-
sists of single-string components which are therefore
not fault-tolerant, the experiments have been designed
so that any possible hardware failures in the coputer
system will trip the controller to the manual mode as
required by the MIT Reactor Safeguards Committee.
A transfer from "automatic" to "manual" control
is initiated if any of the following events occur:
(1) The co=puter changes its state from "run" to
"halt". This action provides protection
against catastrophic hardware failures such
as failure of the CPU and/or memory.
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(2) The computer does not function in a cyclic
fashion, i.e., the A/D, clock, and D/A sub-
programs are not periodically called. This
action primarLy guards against major mal-
functions of A/D and clock modules, and any
sof.ware failures that may lead to either
termination or delayed execution of the pro-
gram.
(3) The output of a particular power sensor ex-
ceeds the reference signal by a preset bound,
typically 2: of full power. This action pre-
tec:s not only against hardware failures but
also software failures and malfunctioning of
the control law.
(4) Simultaneous multiple sensor failures, pos-
sibly due to a comon cause. This means that
a valid estimate of reactor power could not
be generated using all available redundant
information. This feature guards against an
indecision.
(5) The reactor period is shorter than a conser-
vatively set value. This action is a pro-
tecticn against an unforeseen situation that
might drive the regulating rod out conti.n-
uously.
Systematic procedures have been formulated for
off-line and on-line testing of the system software.
Therefore, protection features noted in items (1) and
(2) might be waived if the single-string hardware of
the computer system were replaced by redundant fault-
tolerant hardware. The protection fertures noted in
±:ems (3) and (4) may not be necessary for less criti-
cal and more slowly varying processes such as chemical
and fossil power plants *where an alarm could be initi-
ated instead of a trip, and the past value of the es-
timated variable be taken as a control signal. The
protection feature noted in item (5) is specific to the
particular application.
Results of the Exoerinent
The digital control system has been tested under
both steady-state conditions and operational reactor
transients and that are induced by both natural pheno-
mena, such as xenon effects, and operator actions. A
sampling interval ranging from 0.2 to 0.5 seconds was
used for most of the tests. The observations from the
experiments are as follows:
(1) The digital control scheme is tolerant of one
or two failures in the power, flow and tem-
perature sensors. This fact has been veri-
fied by both natural and induced sensor fail-
ures that have occurred during the test runs.
(21 The digital control scheme is capable of
calibrating the power sensors on-line during
transients involving xenon variations, fuel
depletion, temperature fluctuations, and
operator-induced power-demand changes.
(3) The digital controller maintains the reactor
power at the desired level during both steady-
state and transient conditions. It does this
even though the neutron sensors themselves
may be affected by process disturbances.
(4) The digital controller successfully main-
tains the reactor power at the desired value
and is less sensitive to sensor degradation
and noise than the original system.
(5) Controllers that feed back both the reacti-
vity and the reactor power deviations are
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superior to those that only feed back reactor
power deviations.
(6) The system reliably displays the on-line in-
fe-ation on sensor failures and estimates
of measured variables, thereby assisting the
operator in making timely and appropriate
decisions.
Data taken during normal steady-state operation
from one cf the neutron flux detectors are shown in
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) to illustrate the relative per-
fer.ances of the analog and digital control systems.
The digital controller maintains the reactor power
steady within a much narrower band than does the ana-
log one. It appears fro= Figure 5(a) that the analog
controller causes the reactor power to oscillate at a
frequency lower than that of the reactor noise. These
oscillations can be attributed to the relay logic in
the analog control law which specifies both a dead band
and hysterisis as shwn in Figure 2. The tiny ripples
observed in the power profile under digital control in
Figure 5(b) are generated by inherent process distur-
bances. The continuous-action digital controller is
capable of eving the regulating rod at a variable
speed to compensate for part of the process noise with-
in the pass band of the controller filter. In contrast
to the fixed gain, reset rate, and the derivative time
in the anaLcg (?-I-D) controller, the digital con-
troller has a variable gain which is automatically ad-
jus:ed fer the nonlinearities of the process gain.
Also, power un'oalances (due to process disturbances)
are d--a=ically co=pensated by the feedback of reacti-
vi:y which is calculated on-line via a nonlinear dy-
nic model of the physical process. Thus, reactivity
functions as a nonlinear ce=ensator in the digital
syste='s ccon:rol law. The najor reasons for the in-
provements under digital control can be attributed to
the following:
(1) The continuous-action control law replacing
the relay logic.
(2) A nonlinear compensator (involving gain ad-
justment and reac:ivity) instead of the
fixed parameter linear (P-I-D) controller.
(3) Sensor noise reduction in the computation of
es:imated power.
The single-input single-output controller, de-
scribed above, is scheduled to be extended to a multi-
variable digital controller which, in addition to the
reactor pcw-er, will regulate the average primary cool-
an: temperature by autoratic .ipulation of the
secondary coolant flow. Research efforts are directed
towards the development of fault-tolerant control sys-
tes for power reactors using advanced' analytical
techniques [11,12].
Conclusions
A digital control system has been developed and
demonstrated for on-line operations involving the
closed loop control of power, fault diagnosis, sensor
calibration, and information display on an NRC-licensed
nuclear reactor. The control system software is
structured for both systematic testing and implementa-
tion on comercially available microcomputers. Replace-
ment of the existing single-string hardware by a fault-
tolerant co=puter system such as FT7T [13] vill lead
to the evolution of an integrated control system that
is completely tolerant of failures of the codiuter,
sensors, and other plant equipment.
This technique may be reliably applied to large
and coeplex industrial processes such as chenical and
power plants for on-line fault diagnostics, sensor
calibration, bupless process control, and infor-.atiorn
display and nonitoring.
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